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7ABSTRACT
Costa Rica has become a new centre of international competitiveness in Latin America and the
Caribbean. Its share in the imports of the member countries of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) has gone up from 0.07% to 0.09% (0.15% to 0.23% of the North
American market) and in the market for manufactures from 0.01% to 0.04% (0.03% to 0.16% in North
America). Costa Rica's pattern of exports to those markets has varied, with the slow-growing natural
resource sector, which accounted for 91.2% of total exports in 1980 (85.2%), losing ground to fast-
growing manufacturing sectors, which made up 38.5% of the total in 1995 (56.6%). The share of the 10
main export products (at three digits of the Standard International Trade Classification) in total exports
came to over 78% (72%), while clothing become the most important category of the new line of exports,
with a 24.5% (37.7%) share of the total.
The striking success of the garment industry, however, is threatened by two factors. First,
clothing manufacturers in the Caribbean Basin cannot hope to match the advantages Mexico enjoys as a
signatory of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). With regard to tariffs, Mexico has a
six-point advantage in the United States; many garments it produce are no longer subject to import
quotas; and, even more importantly, in order to fulfil minimum content requirements, inputs of Mexican
origin are considered as produced within NAFTA. Second, other countries in the Caribbean Basin -such
as El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras- have begun to compete with Costa Rica, on the strength of
their lower wages. Together, these two factors have precipitated a drop in garment exports and a decline
in the share of some articles in United States imports.
In order to study the experiences and competitive situation of garment assemblers in Costa Rica,
a total of 16 such firms (12 foreign and 4 local) were surveyed. Particularly revealing and significant were
the findings with respect to the interrelationship between the three groups of factors associated with
international competitiveness: the global market, corporate strategies and national policy. It has possible
to identify the main features of three distinct groups in the sample. As becomes clear, each competitive
situation has a certain logic.
Group I, consisting of large United States underwear manufacturers, operates in a well-defined
competitive situation. In terms of the global market, over a decade ago the parent companies faced a
strong challenge from Asian competitors in their domestic market. They responded by setting up
manufacturing operations in Latin American countries, which offered them cheap labour and specific
incentives (chiefly duty-free import facilities and tax breaks) and preferential access to the United States
market (through the HTS 9802 mechanism). This enabled them to face down the Asian challenge.
Underwear exports from the Caribbean Basin, especially Mexico, the Dominican Republic and Costa
Rica, increased exponentially, and as a result United States producers were better able to defend their
shares in their own market.
It is interesting to note that these companies have tended to create more extensive networks by
establishing assembly plants in several Caribbean Basin countries, a strategy that gives them the ability to
respond to changes in the competitive situation of each cost centre. Each assembly plant is a small part of
the overall organization, and with similar operations in various countries the companies can add
production lines depending on the efficiency of each individual plant, without having to abandon any
particular site, except in extreme circumstances. For these firms, international competitiveness becomes
to a large extent an internal matter at the corporate level, and most consider that their main competitors
are other United States companies rather than Asian firms. These strategic factors confer security on the
integrated production systems of parent firms. They have, in fact, managed to deal successfully with the
Asian challenge.
This situation is generating significant results in Costa Rica. The underwear industry has become
8the leading source of garment exports from Costa Rica to the United States. This industry is comprised of
three firms established before 1982, along with two others set up in the late 1980s; together, they make up
Group I. This group of firms accounts for close to 60% of exports and total employment in the sample. In
terms of the number of employees, their operations doubled from 1985 to 1989, and again from 1990 to
1995. Their expansionary corporate strategies were extremely successful.
The competitive situation of the four local firms that make up Group III represents the other
extreme of the sample. This is a homogeneous group of small and long-established producers of men's
and boys' outer garments (SITC 842) and other garments; they operate primarily via export contracts to
the United States market, with several categories subject to quotas. These firms were set up as part of the
import-substitution industrialization strategy, and, with the policy shift of the 1980s, they lost local
market share as a result of import penetration. This forced them to adapt to obtain contracts from foreign
buyers, chiefly large department stores or manufacturers of name-brand clothing. They compete with the
rest of the world for relatively short contracts, the main determinant of which is price. This group of
companies does not enjoy the advantages of the transnational garments firms that assemble in Costa Rica.
Unlike foreign companies, the corporate strategies of these firms are based on their competitiveness,
rather than global market factors. They tend to adopt defensive positions and have shown mixed results.
One of the local firms went bankrupt in 1996.
The third competitive situation typifies the remaining foreign firms in the sample. They make up
Group II, which is less homogeneous, as it includes new small foreign firms (five from the United States
and two from Asia) that produce men's and boys' outer garments (SITC 842) as well as other garments for
export to the United States under EPZ or temporary admission arrangements or the Harmonized Tariff
Schedule (HTS) 9802 mechanism. Many of the products they export are subject to quotas. Firms in this
group are in an intermediate situation that includes elements of both Group I and Group III.
As with Group I, firms in this group have a corporate network with many advantages; generally
speaking, however, their networks are thinner and more widely extended, and feature larger but less
specialized components. They identify their competitors and their competitive situation as the local firms
do, i.e., their competitors are other assemblers located in the Caribbean Basin and competition is based
either on competitive pricing or defence of their parent companies market share. Their strategies are more
focused on cost centres. Five of the seven firms surveyed stressed that the main motive that would induce
them to leave Costa Rica would be to reduce labour costs. In addition, an Asian firm that started out by
supplying its corporate network in the United States has begun to compete for contracts with large buyers
not related to its parent company.
Firms in this group are important and account for about 30% of exports and employment in the
sample. They did not show the same sort of job growth as firms in Group I; they increased employment
by only 50% in the period 1990-1995; however, this was considerably better than in the case of the Group
III firms. Three of the seven firms increased their share of the global market in 1990-1995. The export
categories that lost the most momentum in 1995 were suits, men's and boys' pants and women's pants.
In conclusion, analysis of the successes and challenges of Costa Rica's garment industry was
facilitated by the study of the three competitive situations of the different groups of firms operating in that
country.
9RESUMEN
Costa Rica se ha convertido en un nuevo foco de la competitividad internacional de América Latina y
el Caribe.  Su participación en las importaciones de los países de la Organización de Cooperación y
Desarrollo Económicos (OCDE), ha aumentado de 0.07% a 0.09% (de 0.15% a 0.23% en el mercado
de América del Norte), y en el mercado de las manufacturas de 0.01% a 0.04% (de 0.03% a 0.16% en
América del Norte).  La estructura de las exportaciones de  Costa Rica a esos mercados ha variado, ya
que los recursos naturales no dinámicos, que representaban 91.2% del total exportado en 1980
(85.2%) fueron reemplazadas por rubros dinámicos del sector manufacturero, que aportaron 38.5% de
ese total en 1995 (56.6%).  La participación de los 10 principales productos de exportación
(clasificados con tres dígitos en el sistema de la CUCI), en las ventas externas totales fue de más de
78% (72%), en tanto que el vestuario se convirtió en el rubro más importante de la nueva gama de
exportaciones, con una contribución de 24.5% (37.7%) al total.
El notable éxito de la industria del vestuario se ve amenazado, en particular, por dos factores.
En primer lugar, las empresas de armado de prendas de vestir de la Cuenca del Caribe no pueden
equiparar las ventajas que ofrece México como signatario del Tratado de Libre Comercio de América
del Norte (TLC). En materia de aranceles, México tiene una ventaja de seis puntos en los Estados
Unidos, muchos artículos de vestuario producidos en el país ya no están sujetos a cuotas de
importación y, más importante aún, para el cumplimiento de los requisitos mínimos de contenido los
insumos de origen mexicano se consideran generados en el ámbito del TLC. En segundo lugar, otros
países de la Cuenca del Caribe -como El Salvador, Guatemala y Honduras- se han convertido en
competidores de Costa Rica, porque su nivel de salarios es más bajo. Los dos factores mencionados
han provocado una disminución de las exportaciones de prendas de vestir y cierta pérdida de
participación en las importaciones estadounidenses de algunos artículos.
Con el fin de conocer las experiencias y situación competitiva de las empresas ensambladoras
de prendas de vestir de Costa Rica, se encuestó a 16 de ellas, 12 extranjeras y 4 nacionales.
Especialmente importantes, reveladores y significativos fueron los resultados del análisis respecto de
la interrelación entre los tres grupos de factores que se asocian a la competitividad internacional: el
mercado internacional, las estrategias corporativas y la política nacional- y que permitieron definir los
elementos principales de las tres situaciones distintivas de la muestra, esto es, del grupo homogéneo de
grandes ensambladores estadounidenses de ropa interior. Como puede apreciarse, cada situación
competitiva tiene una cierta lógica.
El Grupo I, integrado por grandes ensambladores estadounidenses de ropa interior, opera en
una situación competitiva definida. En términos del mercado internacional, hace más de una década
que sus casa matrices debieron enfrentar el severo reto de los competidores asiáticos en su mercado
internos. Su respuesta fue establecer operaciones de ensamble en países de América Latina, que les
ofrecían mano de obra barata e incentivos específicos (principalmente facilidades de importación libre
de derechos y exenciones tributarias), y acceso preferencial al mercado estadounidense  (a través del
mecanismo HTS 9802). Como resultado, fueron capaces de enfrentar el desafío asiático.  Las
exportaciones de ropa interior desde la Cuenca del Caribe, especialmente desde México, República
Dominicana y Costa Rica, crecieron exponencialmente y así estos productores estadounidenses
defendieron mejor su participación en su propio mercado.
Es interesante señalar que estas compañías tendieron a establecer redes más amplias mediante
la instalación de plantas de ensamble en varios países de la Cuenca del Caribe,  lo que les dio una gran
capacidad para responder a los cambios en la situación competitiva de cada centro de costos. Cada
planta ensambladora es una pequeña parte de la gran organización y, con operaciones similares en
diversos países, pueden agregar líneas de producción de acuerdo con la eficiencia de cada una de
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ellas, sin necesidad de abandonar ningún emplazamiento específico, excepto en condiciones extremas.
Para estas empresas, la  competitividad internacional se vuelve en gran medida un asunto interno a
nivel corporativo y en la mayoría de ellas se considera que sus principales competidores son las otras
compañías estadounidenses y no las asiáticas. Estos elementos estratégicos dan seguridad a los
sistemas integrados de producción de las casas matrices. De hecho, han logrado responder con éxito al
desafío asiático.
 Esta situación genera resultados significativos en Costa Rica. La industria de ropa interior se
ha convertido en la fuente principal de exportación de prendas de vestir desde ese país hacia Estados
Unidos. Esta industria incluye tres empresas establecidas antes 1982, que se complementaron con
otras dos que se instalaron a fines de la década de 1980; todas ellas forman parte del Grupo I.
Corresponde a estas empresas cerca de 60% de las exportaciones y del empleo total de la muestra. En
términos de número de empleados, sus operaciones se duplicaron durante el período 1985-1989 y
volvieron a hacerlo entre 1990 y 1995. Sus estrategias corporativas expansivas fueron
extremadamente exitosas.
Al otro extremo de la muestra se encuentra la situación competitiva de cuatro empresas
nacionales que integran el Grupo III. Este es un grupo homogéneo de pequeños y antiguos productores
de ropa exterior para hombres y niños (CUCI 842) y otras prendas de vestir; operan principalmente
mediante contratos de exportación al mercado estadounidense, en el que algunos rubros están sujetos a
cuotas. Estas empresas fueron creadas en el proceso de industrialización por sustitución de
importaciones y a partir de la reorientación de la política de los años ochenta han perdido
participación en el mercado nacional a raíz de la penetración de importaciones. Esto los ha obligado a
adaptarse para conseguir contratos con compradores externos, principalmente grandes tiendas de
departamentos o productores de prendas de vestir de marcas registradas. Compiten con el resto del
mundo por contratos relativamente cortos, cuyo principal determinante es el precio. No tienen las
ventajas de las corporaciones transnacionales que ensamblan en Costa Rica. A diferencia de las
empresas extranjeras, sus estrategias corporativas se centran más en su competitividad que en los
factores del mercado internacional. Tienden a adoptar posiciones defensivas y sus resultados han sido
variados. Una de las firmas nacionales fue a la bancarrota en 1996.
La tercera situación competitiva es la que se da en las restantes compañías extranjeras de la
muestra. Integran el Grupo II, que es menos homogéneo, ya que está compuesto de empresas nuevas,
pequeñas y extranjeras (cinco de Estados Unidos  y dos de Asia) que ensamblan ropa exterior para
hombres y niños (CUCI 842) y otras prendas de vestir, para su exportación a Estados Unidos bajo el
régimen de zonas de procesamiento de exportación o de admisión temporal, así como mediante el
mecanismo HTS 9802. Muchos de los productos que exportan están sometidos a cuotas. Las empresas
se encuentran en una situación competitiva intermedia que muestra elementos identificados tanto en la
del Grupo I como del Grupo III.
Al igual que el Grupo I, poseen una red corporativa con muchas ventajas; sin embargo,
generalmente sus redes son más pequeñas y extendidas, con componentes mayores, pero menos
especializados. Por otra parte, identifican a sus competidores y su situación competitiva en la misma
forma que las empresas nacionales, es decir, sus competidores son otros ensambladores localizados en
la Cuenca del Caribe y la naturaleza de su competencia  se basa en lograr precios competitivos o bien
en defender la participación de mercado de sus casas matrices. Tienen una mentalidad más enfocada
en centros de costos. Cinco de las siete empresas encuestadas subrayaron que el principal motivo por
el cual dejarían Costa Rica sería la reducción de costos laborales.  Además, una compañía asiática que
era proveedora de su red corporativa en Estados Unidos entró a competir por contratos con
compradores mayores no relacionados con su casa matriz.
Las empresas de este grupo son importantes y representan cerca de 30% de las exportaciones
y el empleo de la muestra. No se expandieron, como las del Grupo I, en términos de empleo, ya que
durante el período 1990-1995 éste apenas se incrementó en la mitad; sin embargo, comparadas con las
firmas del Grupo III, se aprecia una considerable mejoría. En términos de su participación en el
mercado internacional, tres de las siete empresas lograron avances durante 1990-1995. Además, los
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principales rubros de exportación que perdieron dinamismo en 1995 fueron los trajes enteros y
pantalones de hombre y niño, y pantalones de mujer.
En conclusión, el análisis de los éxitos y retos de la industria del vestuario en Costa Rica fue
facilitado por el examen de las tres situaciones competitivas de los diferentes grupos de empresas que




        THE INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS OF COSTA RICA: A CANALYSIS 1
There is little doubt that the international economy is undergoing a transformation in
which international competitiveness is intensifying and playing an increasingly central
role in the definition of benefits and their distribution among countries. International
competitiveness can be analysed from various angles and measured in different ways.2
The framework of this study is based on the  Competitive Analysis of Nations (CAN)
computer software, version CANPLUS,3 which was created by the United Nations
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). According to this
software, international competitiveness is measured exclusively by the import market
shares of the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD).
1.  International competitiveness: A CANalysis
The CAN software indicates that between 1980 and 1994 the weight of manufactures
in the total imports of the OECD countries grew dramatically from 54% to 74% of the
total. The market share of developing countries grew from 11.2% to 19.9% of total
OECD imports of manufactures. Within the category of manufactures, those not based
on natural resources4 were most dynamic, rocketing from 49% to 70% of total OECD
imports. As with total manufactures the market share of developing countries (Africa,
Asia-excluding the Middle East- and Latin America) in OECD imports of dynamic
manufactures shot from 11.2% to 19.9%. In other words, the structural transformation
of international trade opened up a dynamic opportunity for developing countries to
improve their integration into the international economy by gaining market share in the
most dynamic sectors, that is, manufactures.
                                                           
1 A preliminary version of this chapter was presented at the seminar “Costa Rican




example, at one extreme is The Economist, which measures international
competitiveness solely in terms of an index for real effective exchange rates and at the other the
IMD/World Economic Forum, whose World Competitiveness Report 1994 incorporates over 380
separate indicators.
3 The CAN computer programme is an instrument for measuring the international
competitiveness of countries. For further details, consult the article by its inventor, Ousmene
Mandeng, "International Competitiveness and Specialization", CEPAL Review, 45, December,
1991. ECLAC distributes the software through training workshops in the countries that request
them. For example, three such events were organized in Costa Rica during 1995-1996:  The first
was held in February 1995 at the Center for the Training of Trainers and Technical Personnel
(CEFOF), with the support of the Costa Rican Chamber of Industries, and the following two were
held in October 1995 and November 1996 at the Costa Rican Technological Foundation
(FUNDATEC).
4 Manufactures not based on natural resources are those defined in Sections 5 through 8
less divisions 61, 63 and 68, and less groups 661, 662, 663, 667 and 671 of the SITC-Rev.2.
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Table 1 in the Statistical Appendix lists the fifty most dynamic sectors (at three
digits of the SITC-Rev.2) in terms of OECD imports during 1980-1995. These fifty
groups (of a total of more than 230) accounted for almost 51% of total OECD imports
in 1995, up from less than 30% in 1980. These fifty groups grew on average by 81%
over the 1980-1995 interim. As can be appreciated in the table, six major industries
(i.e.,computers, other electrical machinery and electronic equipment, clothing, chemicals
and pharmaceuticals, non-electrical machinery and equipment and automobiles) alone
accounted for almost 39% of total OECD imports in 1995, up from 21% in 1980.
Without doubt, the countries that are capable of participating in this explosion of
international trade in these industries will bring this dynamism to their economic growth
and development trajectory. During 1980-1995, ten "winner" countries proved capable
of increasing, by 0.5% or more, their share of OECD imports of manufactures. They are
China (3.8%), Mexico (1.4%), Singapore (1.0%), Malaysia (0.9%), Spain (0.7%), South
Korea (0.7%), Thailand (0.7%), Taiwan (0.6%), Indonesia (0.5%) and Japan (0.5%).
As is evident, the winners are almost exclusively Asian countries.
This Introduction examines the nature of the participation in this international
market of the following groups of countries: (1) OECD5, particularly the example of
Japan; (2) the developing Asian economies, distinguishing the Asian tigers from the
Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the particular case of China; (3)
Latin America, both the larger countries of the Latin American Integration Association
(LAIA) and the smaller ones of Central America and the Caribbean; and (4) the specific
new focal points of international competitiveness in Latin America, that is, Mexico, the
Dominican Republic and Costa Rica.
In this manner, it is possible to identify the principal tendencies in the
international market and the distinct paths by which some developing countries are
being integrated into that market. This analysis will serve to locate Costa Rica in the
context of this transformation of the global economy.6
Table 2 in the Statistical Appendix deals specifically with OECD. Its total
imports effectively define the international market, both because it accounts for about
70% of world imports and because it is a very demanding market. There exists a
pronounced tendency in favour of manufactures and away from natural resources.
The same OECD members dominate the most dynamic elements of international
trade, that is, total manufactures (85.38% in 1980 and 75.39% in 1995) and
manufactures not based on natural resources (87.24% in 1980 and 76.43% in 1995);
however, they are losing market share in those areas. That transformation produced a
great opportunity for non-OECD countries to increase their share of international trade
by exporting manufactures to OECD.
Eight of the ten principal exports (at three digits of the SITC-Rev.2) of OECD
countries to other OECD countries, which represented more than a quarter of their total
exports in 1995 are found among the fifty most dynamic sectors in international trade.
The automobile, computer and chemical-pharmaceutical industries are prominent.
Nonetheless, in eight of these ten groups, OECD countries are losing market share,
while other, more competitive countries are winning market shares in these sectors.
                                                           
    5 Each table on the “Aspects of the International Competitiveness” of a group of
countries identifies the constituents of the group in the notes.
    6 See M. Mortimore, "Paths Toward International Competitiveness: A CANalysis",
Desarrollo Productivo, No. 25, ECLAC/UNCTAD Joint Unit, Santiago, Chile, June 1995.
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Although the European Union (from 56.02% in 1980 to 47.09% in 1995) and
North America (from 17.88% to 16.25%) lost international market shares in non-natural
resource-based manufactures a few OECD members such as Japan and, to a lesser
extent, Spain, did demonstrate considerable dynamism during this period. The
competitive situation of Japan is found in table 3 in the Statistical Appendix. Japan’s
exports to OECD are almost exclusively manufactures, virtually all of which are
manufactures not based on natural resources. Japan can be considered the inventor of
this particularly successful path towards international competitiveness, increasing its
market share from 9.54% in 1980 to 13.37% in 1985. Nine of Japan’s ten principal
exports corresponded to the fifty most dynamic groups during 1980-1995 (especially
the automobile, computer and electronic industries), and Japan won market share in
seven of the ten. Nevertheless, even the powerful Japanese export machine lost relative
market share in non-natural resource-based manufactures during 1985-1995 (falling
from 13.37% to 9.75%).
In general, the developing Asian economies best took advantage of the
mentioned opportunity in international trade. This group saw a strong transformation of
the structure of their exports to OECD member countries, in favour of manufactures. As
table 4 in the Statistical Appendix indicates, they gained market shares mostly in
manufactures (from 7.43% in 1980 to 15.54 % in 1995) but also in natural resources
(from 7.71% to 9.08%). In developing Asia, the ten principal exports to OECD
accounted for over 40% of total exports in 1995. Modern industries, such as computers
and their parts and other electronic equipment, are prominent, along with more
traditional ones, such as clothing; nevertheless, eight of the ten principal exports are
found among the fifty  most dynamic sectors defined earlier. In all ten of these exports,
the market share of developing Asia increased during 1980-1995. This suggests that
these economies are further back on a path similar to Japan's, adapting extremely well
to the changes in international trade over this period. The "flying wild geese" concept
would seem to apply here.7
If one desegregates the group of countries called developing Asia into its more
dynamic elements, namely the four Asian tigers, the members of ASEAN integration
scheme and China, it is possible to better appreciate the nature of Asian’s success in
taking advantage of the international trade opportunity of 1980-1995 and the relevance
of the flying wild geese concept. Each of these elements experienced huge
improvements in their international competitiveness but in somewhat different ways.
The Asian tigers, namely Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and
Taiwan (Province of China), made themselves famous by their ability to conquer foreign
markets with their manufactures. Like Japan before them, however, their success was
concentrated in the 1980-1985 interim, when they increased their market share for non-
natural resource-based manufactures from 5.73% to 7.77%. Table 5 in the Statistical
Appendix points out that as in the case of Japan, their ten principal exports were also
dynamic, but they were losing market shares in three of them, especially apparel and
toys. Other Asian competitors were advancing faster in these areas.
Within the category of developing Asian economies, the ASEAN countries and
China had the most success during 1980-1995, following the example of Japan and the
                                                           
    7 Akamatsu Kaname made this concept famous in the 1930s. Later, Kojima Kiyoshi and
Terumoto Ozawa brought it up to date. See Pekka Korhonen, "The theory of the flying geese
pattern of development and its interpretations", Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 312, No.1,
1994.
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Asian tigers before them. As table 6 in the Statistical Appendix indicates, the ASEAN
countries increased their market shares for non-natural resource-based manufactures
from 0.68% to 3.19% over the 1980-1995 period. They began to displace the Asian
tigers with regard to certain dynamic exports, such as telecommunication equipment,
other electronic equipment and apparel.
 China also increased its market shares were in sectors where the Asian tigers
had previously experienced success. In this case, however, the dimension and velocity
of the change was even more dramatic (from 0.53% in 1980 to 4.42% in 1995), as
can be seen in table 7 in the Statistical Appendix. China's success was concentrated in
dynamic sectors such as apparel, footwear and other relatively less-sophisticated
manufactures, where they gained shares in all of their principal exports.
In other words, in Asia, where the dynamism of the improved international
competitiveness of "winner" countries was concentrated, certain differentiation is in
order with respect to the ASEAN countries and China. In flying wild goose fashion, the
migration of certain dynamic industries from “leader” to “follower” countries can be
perceived in terms of the changes of relative market shares. This appears to have been
the case in clothing, the assembly of electronic apparatus, electronic components and
other sectors, which Japan developed as strong export industries until they migrated
first to the Asian tigers and later to the ASEAN countries and China, based on their
improved competitive situations, according to the CAN statistics for 1980-1995.
With regard to the international competitiveness of Latin America and the
Caribbean, table 8 in the Statistical Appendix indicates that, in spite of important efforts
to specialize more in manufactures and thereby improve their competitive situation, the
Latin American countries have not had much success in taking advantage of the
mentioned opportunity of international trade. It is more than evident that it is not this
region which is gaining markets shares at the expense of the OECD countries. Nor do
these countries behave like "flying wild geese" in the Asian sense.
 While Latin American countries have more than doubled their exports of
manufactures (from 21.3% to 52.3% of total exports to OECD during 1980-1995),
especially manufactures not based on natural resources (from 13.7% to 45.1%), this
advance in the dynamic industries of international is not reflected in the region’s OECD
market shares (the overall share fell from 5.30% to 4.97% during 1980-95). Thus,
despite strong efforts to promote the export of manufactures to OECD, Latin America
was unable to reverse the trend toward its marginalization in international trade, given
that the region continued to specialize in natural resources such al petroleum, petroleum
products, certain agricultural products and mining.
The region’s market share for manufactures did increase, (from 2.07% in 1980
to 3.44% in 1995), but this advance was not achieved in manufactures not based on
natural resources. This is also reflected in the ten principal exports to the OECD of this
region. The region was gaining market share in seven of the ten products, but only three
of the products correspond to the most dynamic sectors of international trade. In other
words, Latin America and the Caribbean did not succeed in adapting well to the
opportunities available in the international trade field, unlike the more dynamic
developing Asian economies.
It is possible to distinguish two separate tendencies within Latin American and
Caribbean with regard to international competitiveness. One pertains to the bigger
countries (generally members of the LAIA) and the other to the smaller ones (generally
found in the Caribbean Basin).
The situation of LAIA members is demonstrated in table 9 in the Statistical
Appendix, which is quite similar to the overall situation of the region  as a whole and
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reflects the weight of the bigger countries in those statistics. In spite of a decrease in
the export of natural resources to OECD as a share of total LAIA exports (from 75.6%
in 1980 to 44.4% in 1995) and a significant increase in the export of dynamic
manufactures (from 23.1% to 52.9%), the overall market share of the region declined
somewhat (from 4.41% to 4.39%). That of manufactures improved only slightly (from
1.87% to 3.08%). Again, these larger countries reflect the difficult situation of the
region in terms of taking advantage of the opportunities of world trade, and the fact that
huge efforts at transforming the structure of their exports to OECD in favour of
manufactures have not yet translated into major market share gains. This is also
reflected in their ten principal exports to OECD:  of the seven areas in which the region
increased its market share, only four correspond to the dynamic sectors of international
trade.
The overall tendency in Central America and the Caribbean is even more
negative than that for the larger countries of the region, as can be seen in table 10 in
the Statistical Appendix. Exports to OECD from this subregion are still highly
concentrated in natural resources (85.1% in 1980 and 50.1% in 1995). A significant
shift towards manufactures (from 12.2% to 47.1% of the region's exports to OECD)
did not prevent the overall market share from collapsing (from 0.88% in 1980 to 0.58%
in 1995).
Central America and the Caribbean is still specialized in natural resources,
especially agricultural products, textile fibers and minerals. The region made few
significant gains in terms of international competitiveness. One exception was in the
category of manufactures not based on natural resources in which OECD import market
share doubled from 0.16% to 0.36% over the 1980-1995 period but this market share
is still very low. The ten principal export products capture this reality: with the
exception of clothing, market shares were lost in all of them.
In general, this subregion was unable to take advantage of the opportunity in
world trade which arose during this period.
The differences between developing Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean
could not be starker in respect of improving their international competitiveness in order
to fasten the dynamism of international trade to the local economic growth
performance. While the developing Asian economies led the way, the Latin American
ones generally lost ground. Compared to the “flying wild geese” of developing Asia, the
Latin American countries appeared more like “sitting ducks”.8
2. Competitive focal points in Latin America
Not all the developing Asian countries are winners, nor are all the Latin American ones
losers. There are a few new focal points of international competitiveness in the Latin
America and Caribbean region located in Mexico, the Dominican Republic and, to a
lesser extent, Costa Rica. A look at these cases allows one to better appreciate the
nature of these new signs of competitiveness in the region.
Mexico constitutes the principal exception with regard to the situation of the
LAIA countries during 1980-1995, product of its success in increasing and transforming
its exports to OECD (see table 11 in the Statistical Appendix).  This has been a very
significant process in which Mexico has succeeded in transforming the structure of its
                                                           
8 M. Mortimore, "Flying geese or sitting ducks? Transnationals and industry in developing
countries", CEPAL Review, No. 51, December, 1993.
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exports from two-thirds natural resources in 1980 to slightly more than two-thirds
manufactures in 1995. Mexico's overall market share increased (from 1.26% to
2.09%), as did that of manufactures (from 0.71% to 2.10%), especially those not
based on natural resources (from 0.65% to 2.17%).
The few dynamic exports of manufactures among the ten principal exports of
Latin America in general (see table 8) or of the LAIA countries in particular (See table 9)
(i.e., automobiles, automobile parts and electrical equipment) all came from Mexico. This
country exported a wide array of dynamic manufactures, including telecommunications
equipment, TV receivers, electrical apparatus for making and breaking circuits, and
internal combustion motors.
The restructuring of the Mexican automobile is the best example in Latin
America of the restructuring and internationalization of an existing industry dominated
by transnational corporations.9 In 1995, Mexico also registered very high world market
shares for certain products involving electrical and electronic assembly: meters and
counters (26.32%), material for distributing electricity (20.22%), TV receivers
(20.50%), electric power machinery (7.40%), radios (7.20%) and internal combustion
motors (6.38%). Effectively, nine of Mexico’s ten principal exports are dynamic ones,
and Mexico has gained market share in nine of its ten exports.
In other words, Mexico represents the best Latin American example of a large
country which has adapted well to the opportunities produced by international trade
during 1980-1995, and its success was centered on the automobile industry and the
assembly of electrical and electronic products.
The Dominican Republic also increased its total share of the OECD market (from
0.02% to 0.12% as table 12 in the Statistic Appendix points out.  In particular, non-
natural resource-based manufactures rose from 0.02% to 0.12%, although the country
continued to specialize in manufactures based on natural resources.  The Dominican
Republic’s success was primarily centered on clothing and a few assembly products
(e.g., electrical apparatus, medical instruments and apparatus and jewellery).  The
Dominican Republic gained market share in seven of its ten exports and seven of them
corresponded to the most dynamic in international trade.
 Certain of the Dominican Republic’s manufactures possessed very significant
OECD import market shares in 1995, considering that they came from such a small
country: leather manufactures (6.67%), men's outer wear (2.57%), knitted or crocheted
under garments (2.36%), medical instruments and apparatus (1.81%), women's outer
wear (1.04%), and jewelry (1.02%).
The Dominican Republic can thus be considered the most successful example,
within the Caribbean Basin, of adaptation to the changes in international trade during
this period.10
Another relatively successful case in Latin America, although less so than the
cases of Mexico and the Dominican Republic, was Costa Rica see table 13 in the
Statistical Appendix. It underwent a dramatic transformation of the structure of its
                                                           
   9 M. Mortimore, "Transforming sitting ducks into flying geese: the Mexican automobile
industry", Desarrollo Productivo, No. 26, Santiago, Chile, October 1995. See also A. Calderon,
M. Mortimore and W. Peres, "Mexico: Foreign investment as a source of international
competitiveness", in J. Dunning, and R. Narula (eds.), Foreign Direct Investment and
Governments: Catalysts for Economic Restructuring, Routledge, London, 1996.
10 M. Mortimore. H. Duthoo and J.A. Guerrero, "Informe sobre la competitividad
internacional de las zonas francas en la República Dominicana", Desarrollo Productivo, No. 22,
Santiago, Chile, October 1995.
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exports to OECD during 1980-1995, natural resources dropped considerably (from
91.2% to 60.4%), while manufactures grew strongly (from 8.0% to 38.5%), especially
those not based on natural resources (from 7.1% to 37.4%).
Costa Rica's overall market share increased (from 0.07% to 0.09%) and that
growth was concentrated in the 1985-1995 period. While the market share for
agricultural products improved somewhat (from 0.42% to 0.44%), that for
manufactures expanded rapidly from a small base (from 0.01% to 0.04%. In 1995, the
ten principal exports to OECD consisted of five agricultural exports (fruit, coffee,
vegetables, meat and prepared fruit) and five clothing manufactures (the only “dynamic”
items of the ten principal exports). Costa Rica gained market share in all ten of these
principal export items. Certain dynamic manufactures attained significant OECD import
market shares during 1995: knitted or crocheted under garments (1.43%), men's outer
garments (1.02%) and other under garments (0.91%).
Costa Rica's success in exporting apparel to OECD does not approximate that of
the Dominican Republic; however, it does represent a similar path towards international
competitiveness.
There are two ways to make relative these scarce examples of success in the
field of international competitiveness in Latin America and the Caribbean. One way is to
directly relate these changes in Latin America to the dynamic sectors highlighted in table
1, and the other is to analyse the countries’ performances using the CAN adaptability
index. Table 14 in the Statistical Appendix demonstrates the situation in Latin America
with respect to the dynamic industries of international trade during 1980-1995.
Clearly, Mexico is the leader in Latin America at gaining OECD import market
shares in these dynamic industries (computers, electrical machinery and electronic
equipment, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, automobiles and clothing.). That is,  Mexico
was the Latin American country which best took advantage of its international
competitiveness in the dynamic industries. The Dominican Republic had considerable
success in clothing and electric machinery and electronic equipment. Costa Rica had
some success, mainly in the clothing industry. The other Latin American countries
enjoyed few successes because minor gains in certain dynamic industries were offset by
losses in others.
The CAN adaptability index11 shows that, in general, these three countries
adapted relatively well to the changes in OECD imports over the 1980-1995 period.
Their adaptation in terms of contribution (i.e., the change in their OECD export
structures in favour of the fastest growing sectors) was superior to that of market
shares. Table 15 in the Statistical Appendix, which measures the variation from 1980 to
1995, indicates that  the adaptation of the Dominican Republic (1,305% for export
structure and 316% for market share) was superior to that of Mexico (792% for export
structure and 164% for market share) which in turn was somewhat greater than that of
Costa Rica (645% for export structure and 121% for market share).
                                                           
    11 This index measures how well the changes in country’s exports to the OECD compare
to the overall changes in OECD imports. A value of 1 indicates that the shift in the country’s
exports corresponded exactly to the overall shift in OECD imports. A value of more than 1
suggests that the country adapted well by increasing market share or export specialization in the
dynamic sectors of OECD imports, while a value of less than 1 suggests that the country did not
adapt well to those changes in OECD imports.
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3. The competitive situation of Costa Rica
Costa Rica represents one of the few exceptions in Latin America in the sense that to
some extent it took advantage of the opportunity available in international trade during
1980-1995. It adapted its exports relatively well to the important changes which took
place in the international market. That adaptation took two forms: on one hand, Costa
Rica radically altered the structure of its OECD exports in favour of manufactures and,
on the other hand, within the category of manufactures Costa Rica increased its market
shares in several of the more dynamic sectors. In this sense, Costa Rica can be
considered to have adapted relatively well to the main trends in international trade.
A powerful element of Costa Rica’s export success has been clothing exports,
especially those stemming from the use of special export regimes, such as temporary
admissions and export processing zones (EPZs), mostly by subsidiaries of foreign firms.
Nonetheless, information on clothing imports to the United States market for 1993-
1995 suggest that perhaps the Costa Rican clothing industry is losing competitiveness
in that market vis-à-vis Mexico and other Central American exporters.12 It is not clear
yet, if this situation is related to clothing firms which migrate from country to country in
search of cheaper labour or if it points to a more systemic problem within the Costa
Rican clothing industry.
It was this preoccupation for, and challenge to, the Costa Rica clothing industry
that provoked this study on its competitive situation.
                                                           
12 See R. Buitelaar, "La competitividad autentica en América Central y el Tratado de Libre
Comercio de América del Norte: Llueve sobre mojado?", document presented at the seminar on




COSTA RICAN INDUSTRIALIZATION AND THE COMPETITIVE
SITUATION OF ITS CLOTHING INDUSTRY
This chapter presents the Costa Rican policy framework with regard to its industrial
trajectory and the challenges facing it. The first section examines the nature of the
industrialization process, including the drastic changes and policy reorientation which
occurred during the crisis of the 1980s. That is followed by a short analysis of the
global tendencies of the world textile and clothing industry and their significance for the
Costa Rican clothing industry. Finally, the third section of this chapter concentrates on
the specific competitive situation of the Costa Rican clothing industry.
1.   Costa Rican industrialization
Costa Rica's growth and development trajectory has been influenced by various stages
of the industrialization process, primarily the substitution of industrial imports and the
opening up of the economy to import competition. Those two stages were separated by
the period of debt crisis which marked the 1980s. This section, which is essentially of a
descriptive nature, will present a vision of the Costa Rican industrialization process by
examining first the logic of the import substitution period up to about 1982, followed by
that of the adjustment and liberalization period.
(a) The import substitution process
The first attempts to promote industry in Costa Rica by way of import
substitution took place in 1940 in the form of the Law of New Industries, which
provided certain tax benefits to new manufacturing activities. These benefits were
available to firms with new activities in which less than 25% of total raw material
inputs came from outside of the country.13
Such initiatives did not produce an important effect in terms of industrial growth
at the time because the economy was enjoying a boom in traditional exports,
particularly coffee. It was not until the late 1950s that the idea took hold that the only
way to overcome the limits on foreign trade was to diversify the economy by using
import substitution to promote "development from within". The final objective was to
achieve a more diversified export structure that was capable of financing development.14
With this objective in mind, the Law for Protection and Industrial Development
was enacted in 1959. The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America
(ECLAC), which promoted industrial development in the region and economic integration
in Central America, assisted in the design of this new strategy.
                                                           
13 L. Sibaja, J. Rovira, A. Ulate and C. Araya, La industria: su evolución histórica y su
aporte a la sociedad costarricense, Camara de Industria de Costa Rica, San José, 1993.
    14 E. Alonso, Agenda para la modernización y competitividad industrial en Centroamérica.
Informe Costa Rica, ONUDI/CEPAL/FECAICA, San José, 1995.
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The Costa Rican Chamber of Industries also strongly supported the new law
which replaced the Law of New Industries of 1940. It was felt that without legislation
establishing the necessary instruments to promote industry local industrialists would not
be in a position to advance with regard to the subregional economic integration scheme
then being pursued.
The Law for Protection and Industrial Development provided a series of elements
which proved fundamental for the industrialization process. One element was a tax
which had the effect of tripling the existing tariff protection for imports which competed
with national products. Another was a tariff of 99% applied to all imports of machinery,
motors, and tools, raw materials and semi-elaborated products. A third consisted of
exemptions from certain municipal and territorial taxes.15
In addition to national efforts to promote industrial development through import
substitution and “development from within”, Costa Rica entered into the General Treaty
for Central American Integration in 1963. The other countries of the region signed this
Treaty in 1958 in Tegucigalpa, Honduras.
By signing the Treaty, the Central American countries initiated a dynamic
process that could create the conditions to improve trade and stimulate regional
development.
This integration scheme aimed at greater economic independence based on the
unified subregional market. In this manner, a solution was sought for the problem of
promoting industry based on small national markets so as to take advantage of greater
economies of scale and increased specialization. Once consolidated, this initiative was
to produce the diversification of national exports.16
Based on an import substitution perspective, the member countries instituted a
custom union based on two essential ingredients: a free trade zone and a common
external tariff. In order to reorient resources towards productive activities aimed at
supplying the subregional market, certain additional mechanisms to deal with financing,
tax incentives and infrastructure were established by international treaty and other
formal agreements.
The subregional industrial policy had the objective of  stimulating manufacturing
production and protecting it from international competition. Its principal components
were as follows:
- the establishment of common tariff and non-tariff barriers to imports from third
countries;
- the elimination of the majority of internal tariffs for industrial products
manufactured in the member countries;
- the provision of tax exemptions on imported raw materials and on income, and
subsidized interest rates for domestic and foreign investments in manufacturing;
- the promotion of the Central American Common Market to produce a larger
market, protected against imports from third countries, in  order to promote investments
in local manufacturing activities;
- the establishment of new sources of finance for industrial projects by way of
the creation of the Central American Bank for  Economic Integration (BCIE) coupled with
                                                           
    15 L. Silbaja, J. Rovira A. Ulate and C. Araya, op. cit.
    16 E. Alonso, Desgravación arancelaria, promoción de exportaciones y transformación
productiva: un enfoque integral, Instituto Centroamericano de Administración de Empresas,
Alajuela, 1991.
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the financial support of  the United States Government for the promotion of investment
in manufacturing in the region;
- the promotion of "integration industries", which sought to direct regional
industrial development by allocating certain industrial pursuits to particular countries;
and
- the creation of the Central American Institute for Industrial Research and
Technology (ICAITI) to assist the manufacturing sector to increase its productivity and
improve its international  competitiveness.
At the national level, Costa Rica added other elements to this industrial
development policy package in 1972. The Costa Rican Development Corporation
(CODESA) was created with public sector funding to assist in the establishment of new
manufacturing activities through technical assistance to new and existing companies,
direct financing for companies or projects that favoured industrial development and the
promotion of new enterprises.
The National Council on Scientific and Technological Research (CONICIT) was
also founded in 1972. It was the first non-university institution to advise the Costa
Rican Government on science and technology and to promote research (including the
construction of laboratories), create qualified human resources, and, generally, make
science and technology available to local industry.17
Of all the elements of the proposed industrial policy, in the short run, it was the
tariff protection in combination with the exchange rate policy (overvaluation of the
national currency) which proved to be the most important because it magnified the
attractiveness of the captive market for import substitutes. The effective protection was
much higher than the formal nominal limits established by the integration scheme.
Numerous studies and evaluations indicate that, in its first stages, the results of
the Central American Common Market progressed satisfactorily both at the subregional
and national levels.18
Unfortunately, the permanent application of the "inward-looking" development
scheme at both the regional and national levels provoked a number of structural rigidities
and, in spite of the industrial dynamism created, the limits of the regional market
produced the effect that the benefits began to grow less rapidly due to the increasing
costs that the model produced.19
The original idea was to limit tariff protection to the time frame necessary for
infant industries to consolidate their operations and become internationally competitive
outside of the Central American subregion. Authorities would then slowly reduce the
tariff protection and encourage the reorientation of the manufacturing sector to exports
outside Central America.
In the case of the integration industries, the selectiveness of that policy was
poorly applied and practically any industry was permitted with little concern for the
changes taking place in the international market and the nature of Central American
specialization. Many such industries were subsequently moth-balled because their scale
                                                           
    17 A. Cruz, "La vinculación universidad-sector productivo en Costa Rica" in G. Ary (ed.),
Cooperación empresa-universidad en Iberoamérica, CYTED, Sao Paulo, 1993.
    18 For example, see The World Bank, "Central America: Special Report on the Common
Market", No. 2325b-CA, Washington, D.C., September 1980; W. Cline and E. Delgado (eds.),
Economic Integration in Central America, The Brookings Institute, Washington, D.C., 1978; D.
McClelland, The Central American Common Market: Economic Policies, Economic Growth and
Choices for the Future, 1972; and J. Nugent, Economic Integration in Central America, 1974.
    19 Alonso, 1995, op. cit.
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was too small and the costs of their reconversion were too great in the time frame
contemplated.
The Costa Rican Government gradually abandoned the import substitution policy
and the associated institutional framework. The institutions did not receive either the
economic resources or the political support necessary to advance to the stage of
improving the international competitiveness of the manufacturing industry. In the end,
the industrial policy was transformed into a policy of maintaining protection and the
status quo. The objectives of improving productivity and attaining genuine
competitiveness were lost.20
Because of the degeneration of the industrial policy, the import substitution
framework became an end in itself instead of representing a dynamic mechanism for the
diversification of the productive apparatus and its exports.
The Costa Rican Government did implement a policy to promote exports,
however. The Export Promotion Law (Law 5/62) of 1973 incorporated several elements,
such as the Temporary Admission Regime, the Tax Credit Certificate and the Export
Increase Certificate.
The policy sought to reorient resources toward the non-traditional export sector
and toward the international market beyond the subregion. As such, it can be seen as an
element of the industrial policy pursued in the 1960s and 1970s. Unfortunately, in the
existing macroeconomic conditions associated with high tariffs and an overvalued
national currency, this export promotion policy could not completely compensate for the
anti-export bias contained in the inward-looking import subtitution policy, such that its
results were meager.21
Another policy failure concerned the Costa Rican Development Corporation. It
did not produce the desired effect in terms of assisting and financing new manufacturing
activities because its funds were directed primarily to the creation of State firms, which
were generally mismanaged. This led to the questioning of the Corporation’s purpose
and its contribution to the country’s industrial development.
Statistical tables and graphs aid in appreciating the structural changes which
have taken place in the Costa Rican economy. Table I.1 indicates the structural change
in the gross domestic product (GDP). Viewing the information for 1970-1985, it can be
seen that the manufacturing sector experienced a growing presence in the Costa Rican
economy, rising from 18.2% to 18.7% of the total.
Table I.2 presents similar information for the manufacturing sector alone. During
the 1970-1985 period, just one division--food products, beverages and tobacco (ISIC
31)--accounted for one-half of the total product for the manufacturing sector. The most
dynamic manufacturing division was that of chemicals (International Standard Industrial
Classification of all Economic Activities, ISIC 35), which increased from 12.1% to
21.3% of the total over the 1970-1985 interim.
While the paper products industry (ISIC 34) showed certain dynamism from
1980 to 1985, machinery and equipment (ISIC 38) and textiles and clothing (ISIC 32)
both lost ground in terms of their relative weight in GDP.
                                                           
    20 Muñoz, J.J., "La industrialización en Costa Rica: retos ante un nuevo entorno
económico" document presented at the seminar on "Costa Rican Industry: the challenges of
globalization and trade liberalization" held at San José on 27-8 April, 1995.
    21 Alonso, 1995, op. cit.
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TABLE I.1
COSTA RICA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY SECTOR, 1970-1995
(in percentages)
1970 1980 1985 1990 1995
Agriculture 22.5 17.4 18.8 15.7 18.0
Manufacturing 18.2 18.5 18.7 19.4 18.6
Commerce 21.0 20.0 20.5 20.1 20.0
Government 10.6 15.2 13.0 14.9 13.9
Construction 4.3 6.3 3.6 3.2 2.3
Transportation 4.2 4.1 5.0 5.1 5.3
Others 19.2 18.5 20.4 21.6 21.9
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100
Source: ECLAC, Anuario Estadístico de América Latina y el Caribe, 1994, Santiago,
1995, and Central Bank of Costa Rica.
TABLE I.2
COSTA RICA: THE PRODUCTION OF MANUFACTURES, 1970-1994
(in percentages)
ISIC 1970 1980 1985 1990 1994
31 Food products, beverages
and tobacco
54.4 49.4 50.5 48.6 46.0
32 Textiles, clothing, leather and
shoes
10.3 7.9 7.6 6.6 7.1
33 Wood products 5.7 5.0 4.2 3.8 3.3
34 Paper products, printing and
publishing
4.4 4.8 5.7 8.7 7.1
35 Chemicals, plastics, rubber
and pharmaceutical products
12.1 18.7 21.3 18.5 20.3
36 Non-metal mineral products 2.7 2.6 3.0 4.1 4.6
37 Basic metals 0.9 1.2 0.1 0.2 0.1
38 Machinery and equipment. 8.9 10.1 7.4 9.2 11.3
39 Other manufactures 0.8 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of the PADI computer programme, and the Costa Rican
Chamber of Industries.
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Figure I.1 indicates the export performance of the Costa Rican economy. It
should be mentioned that a consistent series of trade data demonstrating the
unequivocal trajectory of exports of manufactures could not be constructed. This figure
separates the principal four traditional agricultural exports (banana, coffee, meat and
sugar), which have historically dominated Costa Rica's exports, from the "others",
which are mostly manufactures (about 70% of the value of total exports recently).
Chart  I.1
[includes value added from temporary admission regime but not export processing zone regime exports]
 Costa Rica: total exports, 1975-1995
Source:   CENPRO and Costa Rican Chamber of Industries   [cr1-tot.prs]






Agriculture: 4 main items Others: mostly manufactures
As of 1986, it was possible to introduce consistent data on clothing exports via
the temporary admission regime. Solid data for the other important export regime—
export processing zones—was not encountered and is therefore not included in this
figure. Even considering the limits of this information, several aspects merit attention.
The period 1975-1980 saw a considerable upward tendency in the value of total
exports, including both the “others” and the main products. The process of
industrialization seemed to keep pace with the four major agricultural exports and,
undoubtedly, the hope was that the exports of manufactures would introduce an
element of stability into export performance which was traditionally characterized by
strong oscillations in the international prices of banana and coffee. The disruption of the
debt crisis in the early 1980s produced a temporary decline in the absolute level of
"other" exports, thereby quashing those hopes.
The available data on the textile and clothing industry indicate that there existed
one reality for exports during the period 1970-1984 and another thereafter. In the first
period, exports from this industry were relatively stable at the equivalent of around 10%
of all exports of manufactures. More than 90% of those exports were textiles (ISIC
321) rather than clothing (ISIC 322), and almost all those textiles exports went to the
Central American market. Textile exports reached about US $45 million in 1981 before
entering into a nose-dive from which they never recovered. In other words, the textiles
industry received an important impulse from the import substitution policy in both its
national and subregional contexts. It started from a small base and succeeded
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generating a rising stream of exports to the Central American Common Market. The
textile industry during this period employed a higher proportion of the national workforce
than did the clothing industry.
Beginning in the mid-1980s, the clothing industry experienced dynamic growth,
particularly in association with the temporary admission regime and the export
processing zones (EPZs).
Finally, although these data are also incomplete, it is evident that during the
import substitution phase, high and rising levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) were
flowing into the manufacturing sector.  Table  I.3  confirms  that while in the early
1970s more FDI went into agriculture (54% in 1970-1974) than manufacturing (35%),
during the last half of the 1970s a much higher proportion went to manufacturing
(59%) than agriculture (28%). The debt crisis of the 1980s reversed that trend, though,
not before the proportion of the stock of FDI in the economy shifted toward
manufacturing, which nearly equalled the stock of FDI in agriculture in 1980 (See table
I.4).
Table I.3
COSTA RICA: NET INFLOWS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT,
 BY SECTOR, 1970-1993
















1970-1974 54 35 1 100 34.7
1975-1979 28 59 7 100 60.8
1980-1984 69 12 12 100 57.4
1985-1989 46 36 12 100 94.7
1990-1993 48 28 20 100 203.4
1975-1993 48 33 14 100 82.6
Source: ECLAC, Directorio sobre Inversión Extranjera en América Latina y el Caribe
1993: Marco Legal e Información Estadística, Santiago, 1993.
a/ Annual averages by period in current values.
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Table I.4
COSTA RICA: STOCK OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, BY SECTOR,
1970-1990





(%) (%) Millions of
dollars a/
1970 53 32 14 100 201.2
1980 46 43 11 100 671.9
1990 59 37 12 100 1498.6
Source: ECLAC, Directorio sobre Inversión Extranjera en América Latina y el Caribe,
1993: Marco Legal e Información Estadística, Santiago,1993.
a/ Accumulated current values to 31 December.
The logic of the import substitution phase of the Costa Rican growth and
development trajectory never lived up to its promise. In terms of national policy, the
incentives of the industrial promotion policy were not limited in time for the purpose of
giving industrial firms a temporary boost in the export phase of the industrialization
process, and other severe problems of implementation limited its effectiveness. With
regard to the Central American Common Market, the integration industries did not
become strategic and exemplary elements of industrial development but rather examples
of poor financial decisions by the development bank. Industrial production tended to be
overpriced, of poor quality and lacking in international competitiveness. It did not
produce the foreign exchange needed to finance Costa Rican development. The debt
crisis of the 1980s obliged authorities to completely rethink their developmental
strategy.
(b) Crisis and adjustment
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a series of internal and external factors
highlighted the need for a new logic in the industrialization and development in the
country.
Some of the external factors which forcefully affected the economy were the
sharp increases in the international price of petroleum during the 1970s, the decline in
the international prices of Costa Rica's principal traditional exports, the political and
economic problems of the region (which led to the collapse of the Central American
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Common Market at the end of the 1970s), and the impact of the sharp rise in
international interest rates, on the debt service in 1980-1981.22
Internal politico-economic factors were also very much present. The existing
industrialization process was based on a narrow national market and an undependable
subregional one; Traditional exports, which formed the backbone of the productive
structure, suffered declining demand and unstable international prices; industrial exports
were then less profitable for industrialists than production for the national market; the
productive process was characterized, as now, by a lack of vertical integration and
dependence on imported inputs; technological and scientific development was limited;
and internal management of the political economy was by all accounts poorly executed.
All of these factors were present in the strong macroeconomic disequilibria of
the 1980s, which caused a stagnation of GDP growth, high inflation (it reached 80% in
1980), rising unemployment (urban unemployment surpassed 10%), a huge deficit on
current account, the rapid decline of international reserves and the subsequent collapse
of the national currency (from 9.24 to the dollar in 1980 to 50.45 in 1985). These
macroeconomic conditions translated into a significant reduction in general welfare.
This challenge to national welfare provoked a severe questioning of virtually all
aspects of the existing inward-looking industrialization and development strategy.
Proponents of new policies based on structural adjustment, on the one hand, and export
promotion, on the other, gained ground.
Those in favour of structural adjustment desired a freer and more agile
functioning of all markets for goods and services, such that prices would better reflect
the relative scarcity of resources. This orientation sought policy neutrality in terms of
eliminating the anti-export bias of existing policy, thereby exposing the basic
comparative advantages of the economy; however, it did not contemplate any kind of
special incentives for exports.
Those in favour of export promotion policy sought special incentives such as
tax, credit and exchange rate benefits for the exporters of certain specific products.23
Costa Rica applied a mixed policy as of 1984, one in which structural adjustment
initiatives ran parallel to a defined policy of export promotion.
Like many developing nations requiring emergency financing from multilateral
institutions, Costa Rica launched a structural adjustment programme.  This marked the
beginning of a new strategic approach to development, in which exports served as the
motor for economic growth. The structural adjustment programme began in earnest in
1985 with a Structural Adjustment Loan of US$80 million from the World Bank. This
was followed by a second initiative in 1987, with financial support of US$200 million.
As the central aim of these programmes, the country undertook a transformation of its
tariffs and export incentives.
With regard to tariffs, a gradual and progressive transition was defined to reduce
the effective protection of industrial activities and its dispersion. For 1992, the goal was
                                                           
   22 J. Salazar, and E. Doryan, La reconversión industrial y el Estado concertador en Costa
Rica, Corporación Costarricense de Desarrollo, San José, 1989.
    23 S. de Franco (ed.), Estrategias de crecimiento y orientación hacia afuera: dimensiones
económicas e institucionales, Editorial Universitaria Centramericana, San José, 1988. For an
update, consult M. Agosin, E. Gitli, and L. Vargas, “La promoción de exportaciones en Costa
Rica: diagnóstico y recomendaciones para la próxima etapa”, mimeo, February, 1996.
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to have a maximum tariff of 20% for consumer goods and a range of 5% to 10% for
intermediate and capital goods, depending on wether they were produced locally.
In 1984, new legislation on incentives for exports was implemented to produce
a rapid increase in the volume and diversification of exports and, consequently, greater
foreign exchange earnings.24 The objective was to complement the structural adjustment
process by accelerating the reorientation of resources toward the export sector.
Specifically, it provided financial support to companies engaged in export activities, and
compensated for the distortions produced by the previous strategy. This latter feature
included subsidies in the form of income tax exemptions, import tariff exemptions, and,
in the case of export contracts,25 the granting of Tax Credit Certificates (CAT) based on
the FOB values of exports to markets, outside the Central American subregion. An
export promotion fund (FOMEX) was established in the Central Bank. This export
promotion policy also aimed at attracting foreign investment to complement national
investment in productive activities, to obtain competitive technologies and modern
organizational and marketing practices, and to diffuse knowledge on foreign markets.
In institutional terms, the Export and Investment Programme of the Office of the
President of the Republic was established in 1983 to give political priority to promoting
the export of new products to new markets. With the assistance of the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID), the private sector Coalition for
Developmental Initiatives  (CINDE) was created, and its function was centreed on
attracting foreign direct investment. In 1986, the Ministry of Foreign Trade was created
to coordinate all initiatives by way of executing agencies, such as the Centre for the
Promotion of Exports and Investments (CENPRO) and the Corporation for Export Free
Zones.
Certain tension existed between the structural adjustment and export promotion
perspectives, in the sense that the export promotion policy did not eliminate distortions
but rather created new distortions to compensate for the existing anti-export bias to
economic policy. The harmonizing element was that the export promotion policy was to
be limited in time (for 12 years beginning in 1984). The export promotion policy was
viewed as a necessary short-term incentive to exports and investments, while the long-
term economic policy focused on the elimination of existing distortions.26
Recent studies suggest that much of the success met in transforming the Costa
Rican economy during the 1980s had more to do with the export promotion incentives
than the structural adjustment policy. For example, non-traditional exports, which
include manufactures, increased in meteoric fashion and underwent a remarkable
diversification. This policy also was successful in diversifying export markets,
significantly reducing the dependence on the Central American Common Market.
Other results of the period of crisis and structural adjustment can be appreciated
in the tables and charts used in the previous section on the import substitution period.
Table I.1 indicates that in 1985-1990 Costa Rica did not experience a process of de-
industrialization as did many other Latin American countries undergoing structural
reform. Rather, manufacturing continued to grow as a share in GDP. During 1990-1995,
                                                           
24 Law on Incentives for Nontraditional Exports. Chapter III of the Law on Financial
Equilibrium of the Public Sector, February 1984.
   25 Other related initiatives had to do with export promotion regimes involving the
temporary importation of inputs and the use of EPZs. These are examined in more detail below.
    26 Alonso, 1995, op. cit.
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however, a de-industrialization process did become apparent. The weight of the
manufacturing sector within GDP fell from 19.4% to 18.6%.
Figure I.1 clearly demonstrates that the manufacturing sector was exceedingly
dynamic in terms of generating exports. They exploded from about US$300 million in
1985 to about US$1.2 billion in 1995, representing the great bulk of the “other”
exports and  significantly surpassing the four, until then, dominant agricultural exports.
Over the 1975-1995 period, as table I.5 indicates, non-traditional exports jumped from
about one-third to almost 60% of the value of total exports. Exports of manufactures
were very prominent among these non-traditional exports.
The export situation of the textiles and clothing industry is particularly
interesting. This type of export held steady at about 10% of total exports of
manufactures before the crisis.  In this stage, exports originated almost exclusively from
the textile sector (ISIC 321) and were destined primarily for the Central American
market.  The debt crisis adjustment period caused a total transformation of the industry,
as shown in figures 1.2 and 1.3. Textiles exports went into more or less terminal
decline while clothing exports rocked from close to zero in 1984 to over US$160 million
in 1995 (excluding the value added via the EPZ regime but including the temporary
admission regime). Figure I.4 shows that the value added to clothing exports by way of
the temporary admission regime surpassed those of all other regimes (although data for
clothing exports by way of the EPZ regime are not available). These exports went
almost exclusively to the North American market.
Table I.5
COSTA RICA: TRADITIONAL AND NON-TRADITIONAL EXPORTS, 1975-1995












1975-9 476.5 742.7 64 36
1980-4 561.2 390.7 951.8 59 41
1985-9 632.9 583.7 1216.6 52 48
1990-4 786.4 1143.8 1930.2 41 59
1995 1116.6 1620.2 2736.8 41 59
Source: CENPRO, on the basis of official data.
In the 1990s, unlike the import substitution period, the clothing industry
employed more than double the labour of the textile industry. This industry would
appear to be an excellent example of the effect of the process of structural adjustment
and export promotion which took place in the Costa Rican economy during the post-
1982 period.
The information available on FDI is only useful for limited analysis of its role in
the process of adjustment. Annual net inflows doubled between 1980-1984 and 1985-
1989 and doubled again in 1990-1993, reaching over US$200 million. They went
increasingly to agriculture and services, however, rather than to manufacturing
activities. By 1990, the stock of FDI in manufacturing was a little more than a third of
the total for the country as a whole. Thus, it appears that FDI was not a central aspect
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of the adjustment undertaken in the manufacturing sector, although its impact on other
areas of the economy is harder to define.
The structural adjustment programmes produced gradual reductions in tariff
protection for manufacturing firms without offering any specific action to guide the
transformation taking place. For the few companies that were already accustomed to a
competitive environment, the effect of the tariff reduction was not important, except
perhaps that it meant cheaper imported inputs. This was not the case for the vast
majority of the manufacturers, which were not accustomed to a competitive
environment and which did not perceive, let alone react to, the threat of ever-increasing
import competition.
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The threat of extinction for these firms resulted in a policy initiative with regard
to industrial reconversion. Two policy options existed for stimulating changes in the
productive apparatus and specifically in the industrial sector:  the more liberal option
was to reduce tariffs drastically and thereby let market forces and competition
determine which local manufacturing firms would survive; the more interventionist
stance called for the State to work in concert with local business associations and
labour groups to provide a strategic vision for the overall process of economic and
institutional transformation.
The second option was implemented in the Government of Oscar Arias (1986-
1990). The first industrial reconversion programme was put in place,  establishing work
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groups with representatives from all three sectors to identify subsectoral problems and
propose solutions.
The idea was that diagnoses at the subsectoral level would provide specific
responses to particular problems. In practice, the industrial reconversion programme lost
credibility because it did not produce concrete actions and the support of the three
different sectors began to weaken. More to the point, the funds from the structural
adjustment loans which were originally assigned to industrial modernization were
eventually used for other purposes.
The Government of Rafael Angel Calderon (1990-1994) effectively ended the
existing industrial reconversion programme in 1990. This government put more
emphasis on foreign trade and directed financial support for strengthening existing firms
which already exported to markets outside of the Central American Common Market.
Thus, like the previous programme this programme had very limited effect.
This situation provoked considerable uncertainty and consternation on the part
of local business groups that felt that they no longer were a priority of industrial policy.
In addition, these companies faced increasing competition from imported products in the
national market, which consumers tended to prefer over domestic alternatives.
The Government of J.M. Figueres (1994-1998) decided to critically re-evaluate
the industrial reconversion programme of the Arias Administration. In a document
entitled "A Strategy for Industrial Modernization in Costa Rica", it laid out the principal
elements of that policy:
- the creation of a fund for industrial modernization in the form of specific credit
lines in the national banking system;
- the creation of a fund for partial guarantees for small firms;
- the establishment of a single administrative office for all industrial
  certificates;
- the installation of a service centre for businessman; and
- the formation of sectoral committees for industrial modernization  whose
objective was to channel the requests of industrialists and  formulate specific measures
for their industrial modernization.
In general, the period of structural adjustment has produced significant results in
Costa Rica. The export sector has been by far the principal beneficiary in terms of the
specific incentives given to compensate for existing distortions, the implementation of a
more realistic exchange rate policy27 and the general structural transformation which
favoured that sector. The firms facing the greatest difficulty in adapting to the structural
adjustment were manufacturing firms producing for the local or subregional markets.
The incorporation of Costa Rica in free trade agreements, such as that signed
with Mexico in 1994, will deepen those existing tendencies in terms of structural
adjustment. This suggests that government policy must begin to deal more directly with
topics such as reindustrialization and the more systemic aspects of Costa Rica's
international competitiveness,28 such as financial reform, investment in infrastructure,
institutional reform and the modernization of education.
                                                           
    27 Exchange rate policy has been crucial for the success of the export promotion
programme.  From 1984 to 1992 a system of mini-devaluations was implemented in an attempt
to maintain the real exchange rate. In 1992 a dirty float mechanism was used briefly until the
beginning of 1993, when the mini-devaluation scheme was reintroduced. This system continues
to be in use at present.
28 F. Fajnzylber, "Competitividad Internacional: evolución y lecciones", Revista de la
CEPAL, No. 36, Santiago, Chile, 1988.
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The Costa Rican process of industrialization, which was extended considerably
during the import substitution period up until the debt crisis of the 1980s, was
subjected to a strong challenge in the form of the structural adjustment of the economy
during the 1985-1996 period. The manufacturing sector surpassed agriculture in terms
of its participation in GDP, but roughly one-half of the manufacturing sector production
stems from agro-industrial pursuits. Exports of manufactures surpassed agricultural
ones; however, agro-industrial exports were still the principal exports.
Government policy underwent a wholesale transformation in the shift of focus
from import substitution to general structural adjustment. Tariff protection, an
overvalued national currency, an expanded subregional market and specific industrial
incentives were not replaced by a general preoccupation for industry, in particular.
Rather, authorities sought a structural adjustment which would highlight Costa Rica's
comparative advantages in the highly competitive international market, coupled with an
emergency policy to promote exports in the face of the foreign exchange crisis.
Although the process of industrialization flourished during the period of crisis and
adjustment, the excellent export results seem to be more an outcome of the incentives
offered non-traditional exports than any reflection of a genuine structural adjustment
based on international competitiveness. It is not clear how FDI affected these results.
While the roles of government policy and FDI in the general results of Costa
Rican industrialization and development during this period are less than transparent, that
is not the case for the textile and clothing industry. The industry more or less retained
its presence in Costa Rican exports of manufactures, but the composition of those
exports changed radically from the import substitution period to the structural
adjustment period. In the first period, exports peaked in 1981 at US$50 million, and
they consisted almost exclusively of textiles sent to the Central American market. In the
second period, exports reached about US$200 million in 1995 (the sum of US$70
million normal clothing exports plus US$113 million value added to clothing exports via
the temporary admission regime plus an estimated US$17 million value added via the
EPZ regime), and they consisted almost exclusively of clothing sent to the North
American market. The competitive situation of that industry will be dealt within detail
following a short analysis of the tendencies in the global textile and clothing industry.
2.  Aspects of the global textile and clothing industry
To better understand the competitive situation of the Costa Rican clothing
industry, it is useful to have a solid idea of the major tendencies in the global textile and
clothing industry, in general, and the changing nature of Costa Rica's principal market,
the United States, in particular. The principal tendencies have to do with increased
international competitiveness from new competitors, the new rules for trade in this
industry and innovations in producers' strategies. In this manner, it is possible to better
locate the Costa Rican situation within these global and regional tendencies.
(a)  General
The three main constituents of this industry are textile fibres (natural and
synthetic), cloth and final products (principally clothing). The most important tendencies
in this industry have been the explosion of synthetic fibre production in the 1950s and
1960s, the huge increase in international competition, especially the dramatic upsurge
of Asian clothing exporters in the 1960s and 1970s, and the new corporate strategies
of American and European producers in the 1970s and 1980s to restructure their
production in order to meet the Asian challenge.
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In general, the industrial countries have maintained their competitiveness in the
textile industry by way of technological innovation (mainly Japanese and European).
That has not been the case with apparel, however, especially that which is most labour
intensive (i.e., that in which wages represent 25-30% of the total cost). Attempts by
the industrial countries to restrain trade (via tariff barriers and quotas) and prolong their
existing competitiveness (via regional restructuring) in the face of the challenge of a few
super-competitive Asian countries (which came to hold a US market share of almost
50% by 1970) have for the most part defined the options open to other developing
countries.
Historically, the textile and clothing industry has been one of the most protected
and for the longest time.29 Tariffs are relatively higher than for other goods, and there is
a definite tariff progression, in which increasingly higher tariffs are assessed depending
on the degree of elaboration of the final product, as table I.6 suggests.
The use of quotas gives importing countries a notable bargaining power
compared to the developing country producers. Effectively, the systems of preference
result in a situation that is less fair or, indeed, frankly discriminatory in comparison with
that of other industries whose trade is not bound by such. Furthermore, special tariff
regimes in the industrial countries promote the assembly in developing countries of final
products based on cloth manufactured by the home country. These features serve to
counter continued home-market penetration, on the basis of comparative advantage, by
the competitive textile and clothing industries in developing countries. In an industry
with relatively low barriers to entry, this has had the effect of limiting the advance of
integrated industries encompassing textile fibres through to final products in those
countries.
Table I.6
SIMPLE AND WEIGHTED TARIFFS APPLIED TO IMPORTS OF MANUFACTURES,
IN GENERAL, AND TEXTILE PRODUCTS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES
BEFORE AND AFTER THE TOKYO ROUND OF GATT
(in percentages)
     United States
Before          After
  European Commuity
  Before         After
         Canada
 Before        After
Fibres
Average:
- simple  5.5  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  2.0
- weighted  7.0  3.5  0.5  0.5  4.0  3.0
Spun fibres
Average:
- simple 13.5  8.0  7.0  5.0 14.5  9.0
- weighted 14.5  9.0  8.0  7.0 16.0 13.0
Cloth
Average:
- simple 19.0 11.5 13.0  9.5 21.0 14.5
- weighted 16.0 11.5 14.5 10.5 25.5 21.5
                                                           
    29 G. Shepherd, Textile Industry Adjustment in Developed Countries, Thames Essays,





- simple 16.5  8.5 13.0  9.0 18.5 14.0
- weighted 13.5  7.5 11.5  7.5 23.0 20.0
Clothing
Average:
- simple 24.0 12.5 16.0 12.5 23.0 20.0
- weighted 27.0 22.5 16.5 13.5 25.5 24.0
All Manufactures */
Average:
- simple 11.5  6.5  9.5  6.5 13.0  7.5
- weighted  7.0  5.0  8.5  6.0 13.5  8.5
Source:    Grupo Asesor Internacional TROD S.A., "Recomendaciones de Negociación al Gobierno de Costa Rica
en el Grupo de Negociación sobre los Textiles y el Vestuario en la Ronda de Uruguay".
*/ Excluding textile and petroleum products.
The relatively high level of protection for producers in industrialized countries
was consolidated and internationalized in the short-term and long-term agreements of
the 1970s, which were converted into the first Multifibre Arrangement of 1974.  With
this arrangement the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) recognized the
exceptional situation of the industry in respect of industrial country imports by
permitting bilateral (importer-exporter) negotiations which, where agreement could not
be reached, resulted in importer-defined and importer-imposed quotas. While the first
Multifibre Arrangement contemplated a substantial increase in developing country
exports (in the order of 6% per year) and certain flexibility in the use of quotas, the
subsequent ones became more restrictive. The resulting accords were increasingly
discriminatory, less transparent and unpredictable.
The Asian challenge to the textile and clothing industries of North America and
Europe began with Japan, increased with the arrival of the competitive industries of
Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan (Province of China) in the 1960s and 1970s, and
continued thereafter with the initiation of serious exports from the ASEAN members and
China. The key to success for the first group of countries was the installation of a very
efficient integrated industry, while the second group of countries had more success with
subcontracting relationships based on clothing assembly via cheap labour.30 Figure I.5
presents these long-term tendencies in terms of OECD import market shares for clothing
(SITC 84). One of the major alterations evident in the figure is the free fall of Western
European country shares from 63% in 1963 to about 26% in 1995, with the decline
accelerating in the 1990s.
At the same time, Asian countries increased their shares from 17% in 1963 to
almost 50% in 1995. Japan, which reached 8% market share in 1963, practically
withdrew from international trade in clothing during this period, however. The Asian
challenge thus provoked a defensive reaction among the industrialized countries, which
slowed but did not stop the advance of the developing Asian economies.
                                                           
    30 C. Oman, New Forms of International Investment in Developing Countries: Mining,
petrochemicals, automobiles, textiles and food, OECD Development Centre, Paris, 1989.
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Some additional changes evident in figure I.5 merit further comment. First,
United States and Canadian clothing firms never possessed an important OECD import
market share (only 3.43% in 1963). As of 1985, however, they began to improve their
market shares, rising from 1.19% to 2.43% in 1985-1995. Second, other regions
experienced even more notable market share increases over the same period: Latin
America (from 1.49% to 6.59%), Eastern Europe (from 1.97% to 3.54%) and Africa
(from 1.54% to 3.77%). Finally, figure I.6 indicates that within Latin America, the
major winners during the period 1985-1984 were Mexico (with 1.85% in 1995) and the
Dominican Republic (1.31%), while others such as Costa Rica (0.58%), Guatemala
(0.51%) and Honduras (0.62%) also experienced important gains.
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The new strategies of the producers in industrialized countries were, on the one
hand, to seek further import protection in their home countries and, on the other, to
restructure their production facilities to become more competitive. The restructuring
strategy incorporated three primary elements: (i) improve efficiency through the
purchase of new machinery incorporating more modern technologies and organizational
practices;31 (ii) specialize in more exclusive market niches (i.e., high fashion);32 and (iii)
take advantage of the competitive advantages of developing countries through FDI
licensing or subcontracting of the assembly of the final product, often coupled with
special preference regimes in the importing country and special export regimes in the
assembly country.33 This last element was the principal feature of the
internationalization of clothing assembly in Latin America, Africa and Eastern Europe in
the last two decades; Europe's "special agreements" with Eastern European and
Mediterranean countries, and North America's agreements with Latin American
countries, were central features of such.
As a result of the Uruguay Round of GATT, the textile and clothing industry will
be integrated into normal trade relations and subject to the discipline of the World Trade
                                                           
31 As has been the case of Japanese producers, in particular according to D. Spinanger,
"La repercusión de los cambios estructurales y tecnológicos en el empleo de la industria del
vestido" in G. Van Liemt (ed.), La reubicación internacional de la industria: causas y
consecuencias, OIT, Geneva, 1994, pp. 114-115.
32 Italy is a good example here. See G. Barba Navaretti and G. Perosino, "Re-deployment
of production, trade protection and firms' global strategies: The case of Italy", in G. Barba
Navaretti, R. Faini and A. Silberston (eds.), Beyond the Multifibre Arrangement: Third world
competition and restructuring Europe's textile industry, OECD Development Centre, Paris, 1995;
and G. Fornengo Pent, "Diferenciación de productos e innovación de procesos en la industria del
vestido en Italia" in G. van Liemt (ed.) op. cit.
33 The best examples are Germany on subcontracting arrangements and the United
States on the use of FDI in whollyowned subsidiaries. See L. Piatti, and D. Spinanger, "Re-
deployment of production, trade protection and firms' global strategies: The case of Germany" in
G. Barba Navaretti, R. Faini and A. Silberston (eds.) op. cit.; y D. Spinanger, op. cit., p.127.
40
Organization (WTO).34 The existing restrictions, as of 31 December 1994, will be
phased out in four stages, with deadlines of 1 January 1995 (16% of total, by volume),
1998 (17%), 2002 (18%) and 2005 (the rest).
Most industrialized countries left until the last phase the items of most interest
to developing countries. The major innovation is that access to industrialized markets
will be administrated by the WTO Textiles Monitoring Body. Therefore, it is to be
supposed that international competitiveness will play a more preponderant role in the
definition of market share winners. Factors such as price, quality and rapid and sure
delivery will become more important for market access in the industrial countries.35
The WTO rules impose a concrete calendar for the integration of the textile and
clothing industry into world trade, and that obliges developing country producers to
react to this existing opportunity within the foreseen time frames.
(b)  The situation in the United States market
Because it is the principal export market for Costa Rican clothing, it is
convenient to explain in more detail some of the special characteristics that have
defined the competitive situation of the United States market. United States textile
firms have historically been less internationalized than European and, especially,
Japanese firms, and United States technologies in this field were relatively less
advanced. Also, the Asian challenge was felt with greater force. In fact, the quotas
imposed on Japanese clothing exports to the United States market provoked the
internationalization process by those firms in Asia; the phenomenon known as
subcontracting arose as an instrument for supplying the United States market by way of
third countries which faced no such quotas.
The United States reaction to the Asian challenge in the textile and clothing
industry was based on diverse new forms of protectionism. United States import tariffs
for most-favoured nations (MFN) on textiles (14%) and clothing (18%) are relatively
high for that market, where the weighted average is only about 5%. The United States
took the initiative in imposing increased restrictions in the Multifibre Arrangement in
response to the accelerating market penetration by Asian superexporters. These
protectionist measures were complemented by other measures, such as the provisions
of regulation 807 of the US tariff system and the implementation  of special regimes,
which aimed at helping United States textile and clothing producers face up to the
competition.
The provisions of regulation 807 of the United States tariff system, which is
now item 9802.00.80 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS), facilitated improved
competitiveness by United States producers within their own market36 by permitting
imports of clothing assembled outside of the United States but based on the
incorporation of domestically produced materials (i.e., cloth). In this way, United States
clothing producers could take advantage of cheap labour in developing countries, paying
tax only on the value added outside of the United States, not on the original United
States components. United States textile producers, clothing manufacturers and national
                                                           
    34 World Trade Organization, Trading into the Future, Geneva, 1995.
    35 This does not mean that access is now easy. For some of the complex aspects related
to quality, for example, see Centro de Comercio Internacional UNCTAD/GATT, Textiles y prendas
de vestir: introducción a los requisitos de calidad de diversos mercados, Geneva, 1994.
36 The members of the European Union have a similar programme called outward
processing trade quotas. G. Barba Navaretti, R. Faini and A. Silberston, op. cit., p. 19.
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distributors were the principal beneficiaries of this regulation. Two-thirds of the total
value of such United States clothing imports came from just three principal countries in
1993: Mexico (31%), the Dominican Republic (26%) and Costa Rica (11%).37
In addition to the HTS 9802 provisions, the United States employs special
regimes for the Caribbean Basin (since June 1986), Mexico (since January 1989), and
the Andean Community countries (since July 1992). These regimes offer the additional
benefit of Guaranteed Access Levels (GALs) in that they are practically free from
quotas, for clothing imports which incorporate cloth that is made and cut in the United
States. An initiative in 1992 to permit cloth made in the United States to be cut in the
partner country did not pass in the United States Congress.
Finally, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which unites the
United States, Canada and Mexico, produced some very important benefits for the latter
in the clothing industry. The principal benefit is tariff-free, quota-free entry for all
clothing incorporating regional inputs (i.e., originating in the United States, Canada or
Mexico) which have been transformed two or three times according to the rules of
origin, although certain significant exceptions exist.38 Other specific benefits for Mexico
concern access for clothing produced by in-bond assemblers (maquiladoras)
incorporating cloth made in third countries but cut in the United States (up to 25 million
square meters), as well as certain cotton and synthetic fibre clothing (up to 45 million
square meters) and certain wool clothing (up to 1.5 million square meters), even if they
are not from North American sources.39 In 1995, an initiative in the United States
Congress sought NAFTA parity for the countries of the Caribbean Basin; it did not meet
with any success, however, thereby continuing Mexico’s advantage in this regard.
The effect of this policy coupled with the new strategies of the United States
producers was to slow down the success of the Asian challenge in the United States
market and improve the competitive situation of several Latin American countries. In
fact, by 1996, the market share of Asian countries in United States clothing imports
under the Multifibre Arrangement dropped to 58.8% while that for Latin America rose to
28.5%.40 Figures I.7a and I.7b indicate the specific situation for United States imports
of knitted and crocheted clothing (HTS 61) and non-knitted and non-crocheted clothing
(HTS 62). Although the starting point is different in each case, the result is the same:
the decline in the developing Asian market share and the rise of the Latin American
market share.
                                                           
    37 International Trade Commission, "Production sharing: Use of US components and
materials in foreign assembly operations, 1990-3", USITC Publication 2886, Washington, D.C.,
May 1995, pp. 2-22.
    38 G. Bannister and P. Low, "Textiles and apparel in NAFTA: A case of constrained
liberalization", World Bank Working Paper, WPS 994, Washington, D.C., October 1992, p.14.
    39 S. Lande and N. Crigler, "The Caribbean and NAFTA: Opportunities and challenges",
IDB/ECLAC Working Paper on Trade in the Western Hemisphere, WP-TWH-51, July 1993, p. 22.
    40 United States International Trade Commission, "Annual Statistical Report on US
Imports of Textiles and Apparel, 1996”, Publication 3038, Washington, D.C., April, 1997, pp. 6-
8.
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Figures I.8a and I.8b point out which countries in Latin America have most
improved their market shares and to what extent they have done so. In the case of
knitted and crocheted clothing, Mexico has been the big winner, while Honduras has
exceeded Jamaica and El Salvador has caught up to Costa Rica. With regard to non-
knitted and non-crocheted clothing (HTS 62), Mexico is again the big winner, and the
Dominican Republic has also maintained an important market share. Guatemala and
Honduras have, just barely exceeded Costa Rica. In other words, only a handful of Latin
American countries have benefited from new strategies of the United States clothing
firms, which have been restructuring the United States clothing industry over the last 15
years.
Clearly, the Asian challenge produced a strong reaction in the United States
clothing market, both in terms of United States Government policy and the restructuring
strategies of national producers.41 This policy context allowed many of these firms to
take advantage of the strong devaluations in Latin America during the debt crisis of the
1980s, which had the effect of greatly reducing the cost of local wages measured in
dollars and, consequently, the total costs of production. Many United States firms
established subsidiaries in the Caribbean Basin, and this was a key ingredient in their
improved ability to compete with Asian imports in the United States market. Other firms
achieved the same effect by licensing or subcontracting local producers in Latin
America.
                                                           
    41 J. Ahmad, "Case study 1: The North American clothing industry", in The North-South
Institute, Trade, Protectionism and Industrial Adjustment: Three North American case studies,
Ottawa, September 1989, p. 33.
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Only a few Latin American countries were able to participate fully in this
process. The principal benefits for them were the dramatic increase in the volume of
their clothing exports to the United States market, the sharp rise in foreign exchange
earnings and new jobs created in the clothing industry. This phenomenon also produced
costs for these countries. As competition among investment sites intensified, companies
began to migrate, seeking out ever-cheaper labour and ever-greater incentives. The
negotiation capacity of these companies with regard to local governments and suppliers
was strong: some were so mobile that they could change investment sites and suppliers
frequently and easily.
Perhaps the most important cost to these countries was related to their inability
to create or reinforce a national integrated textile industry (i.e., from fibres to assembled
clothing). The United States legislation offered reduced-duty market access only to
clothing assembled from United States components, in the context of HTS 9802.00.80.
This drove a wedge between the achievements in improved international
competitiveness and the national processes of industrialization and development.42
                                                           
    42 M. Mortimore, "Paths towards international competitiveness: A CANalysis", Desarrollo
Productivo, No. 25, ECLAC/UNCTAD, LC/G.1869, Santiago, June 1995; A. Calderon, M.
Mortimore, and W. Peres, "Mexico: Foreign investment as a source of international
competitiveness" in J.H. Dunning and R. Narula (eds.), Foreign Direct Investment and
Governments: Catalysts for economic restructuring, Routledge Studies in International Business
and the World Economy, London, 1996; M. Mortimore, "Transforming sitting ducks into flying
geese: The Mexican automobile industry", Desarrollo Productivo, No. 26, LC/G.1865, October
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3. The competitive situation of the Costa Rican clothing industry
Strong export growth characterized the economic performance of the Costa Rican
clothing industry during 1980-1995. Using different versions of the CAN and MAGIC
computer programmes of ECLAC, it is possible to analyse the export growth in terms of
market shares in the OECD, North American and United States markets, as well as in
terms of the structure of Costa Rican exports. This analysis offers a better
understanding of the competitive situation of this industry and the challenges facing it.
(a) Dimensions
Table I.7 indicates the competitive situation in the OECD market in terms of the
import market shares of clothing, providing information at two, three and four digits of
the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), second revision. The market share
of the Costa Rican apparel and clothing accessories industry grew from 0.13% in 1980
to 0.53% in 1995. While only one industrial group--SITC 846--had a notable market
share (at 0.60%) in 1980, by 1995 three possessed such: 846 knitted or crocheted
under garments (1.31%); 842, men's and boys' outer garments of textile fabrics
(0.94%); and 844, other than knitted or crocheted under garments of textile fabrics
(0.87%). Only SITC 843 (women's, girls' and infants' outer garments of textile fabrics)
saw a decline in market share between 1990 and 1995. In other words, the export
performance of the Costa Rican industry measured in terms of OECD market shares was
impressive.
An examination of the ten principal export products, measured in terms of their
OECD market shares at four digits of SITC, indicates that the leader is, and has been,
brassieres, with about 4% of the market in 1994. The growth of this item was
concentrated in 1980-1985 unlike most of the other products in this list. With the
exception of corsets, corset-belts and brassieres (SITC 8465), all the other principal
export items started from zero or close to zero during this period. The external
projection and international acceptance of products such as men's and boys' trousers of
textile fabrics  (8423), men's and boys' suits (8422), men's and boys' under garments
(8442), cotton under garments (8462), men's and boys' jackets (8424) and men's and
boys' cotton shirts (8441), speaks well of the competitive situation of the Costa Rican
clothing industry, even though half of these ten items lost market share in 1995.
Table I.8 demonstrates the market shares of this industry in the North American
(United States and Canada) market at two and three digits of SITC. This information
confirms that the Costa Rican clothing industry has attained an overall market share of
somewhat less than 2% and that it more than tripled over the 1980-1995 period. It also
reiterates that it is the knitted and crocheted under garments (846) and men's and boys'
outer garments of textile fabrics (842) where Costa Rica has the largest market shares
(4.94% and 3.48%, respectively). As in the OECD market, women’s, girls’ and infants’
outer garments of textile fabrics (843) began to decline in 1990. The dimension of the
market shares shows that the North American market is the principal one for the Costa
Rican clothing industry.
                                                                                                                                                                   
1995; and M. Mortimore, H. Duthoo, and J.A. Guerrero, "Informe sobre la competitividad
internacional de las zonas francas en la República Dominicana", Desarrollo Productivo, Num. 22,
LC/G.1866, August 1995.
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The single most important national element of the North American market is that
of the United States. Table I.9 offers very detailed information on the competitive
situation of the Costa Rican clothing industry in terms of the United States market. This
information is provided in the Harmonized Tariff System classification, as it is generated
from the MAGIC computer programme which operates on the basis of data provided by
the United States Department of Commerce. It offers more detail (six digits) and is more
up to date (1996), but it covers a shorter period of time (1990-1996).
The data in table 1.9 confirms that the market share of the Costa Rican clothing
industry is about 2%. It grew considerably between 1990 and 1992 and stabilized
thereafter, before declining as of 1996. Not knitted or crocheted articles of apparel and
clothing accessories (HTS 62) were more important than knitted and crocheted items
(HTS 61) over the 1990-1996 period, but the latter was more dynamic.
Taken together, the 25 most important Costa Rican clothing products in the
United States market are found to possess a market share of 7% in 1996, about double
that of 1990. Products which enjoy a United States market share of 10% or more in the
base year (1994) include the following: slips and petticoats of man-made fibres (HTS
610811), briefs and panties of man-made fibres (610822), briefs and panties cotton
(610821), men's and boys' cotton singles, underpants and briefs (620711), babies'
garments and clothing accessories of synthetic fibres (611130), men's or boys' suits,
jackets and blazers or synthetic fibres (620333), brassieres, whether or not knitted or
crocheted  (621210) and men's and boys' cotton trousers (610342). With the
exception of brassieres and cotton trousers, all of these principal products have
improved their markets shares notably over the 1990-1994 period. In 1995-1996, three
fell below the 10% threshold (men's and boys' cotton trousers 610324; men’s or boy’s
cotton underwear, 620711; and brassieres, 621210), but these were replaced by two
other items (other cotton panty hose, 611592, and corselettes, 621230). Other
products which demonstrated significant dynamism in 1995-1996 are slips and
petticoats (610811) and brassieres and corsets (621230).
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Table I.7
COSTA RICA: MARKET SHARES OF OECD CLOTHING IMPORTS, 1980-1995
(in percentages)
SITC DESCRIPTION 1980 1985 1990 1994 1995
84 Articles of apparel and clothing
accessories
0.13 0.24 0.41 0.58 0.53
842 Outer garments, men's and boys', of
textile fabrics
0.04 0.32 0.69 1.09 0.94
843 Outer garments, women's, girl's and
infants', of textile fabrics
0.15 0.28 0.30 0.26 0.19
844 Under garments of textile fabrics, not
knitted or crocheted
0.01 0.43 0.52 0.79 0.87
845 Outer garments and other articles, knitted
or crocheted
0.02 0.03 0.16 0.25 0.24
846 Under garments, knitted or crocheted 0.60 0.62 1.08 1.44 1.31
847 Clothing accessories, of textile fabrics,
n.e.s.
- 0.05 0.10 0.33 0.36
848 Articles of apparel and clothing
accessories of other than textile fabrics
- 0.01 0.07 0.08 0.05
Ten most important products (4 digits of
SITC)
0.19 0.42 0.76 1.17 1.17
8465 Brassieres, corsets, corset-belts,
suspenders, garters, etc.
2.99 4.04 3.85 3.77 3.46
8423 Trousers, breeches, etc., men's & boys',
textile fabrics, not knitted
0.08 0.56 1.09 1.85 1.73
8442 Under garments, men's & boys', of
textile fabrics, not knitted
- 0.03 0.73 1.47 2.18
8462 Under garments, of cotton, knitted or
crocheted, not elastic
0.07 0.20 0.74 1.29 1.34
8422 Suits, men's & boys', of textile fabrics,
not knitted or crocheted
- - 0.69 1.04 0.86
8424 Jackets, blazers, etc., men's & boys', of
textile fabrics, not knitted
- 0.12 0.71 0.86 0.77
8441 Shirts, men's & boys', of textile fabrics,
not knitted or crocheted
0.01 0.43 0.53 0.78 0.80
8459 Other outer garments & clothing
accessories, knitted or crocheted
0.08 0.10 0.25 0.48 0.52
8471 Clothing accessories, of textile fabrics,
not knitted or crocheted
- 0.01 0.13 0.46 0.46
8484 Headgear and fittings therefor, n.e.s. - 0.10 0.56 0.40 0.27
            Source: ECLAC, on the basis of the CAN computer programme (versions 2.1 and  CANPLUS).
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Table I.8
COSTA RICA: MARKET SHARES OF NORTH AMERICAN
CLOTHING IMPORTS, 1980-1995
(in percentages)
SITC DESCRIPTION 1980 1985 1990 1994 1995
84 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories 0.50 0.61 1.36 1.75 1.76
842 Outer garments, men's and boys', of textile fabrics 0.20 1.02 2.69 3.75 3.48
843 Outer garments, women's, girls' and infants', of textile
fabrics
0.52 0.63 0.95 0.72 0.59
844 Under garments of textile fabrics, not knitted or
crocheted
0.03 0.85 1.47 1.94 2.32
845 Outer garments and other articles, knitted or crocheted 0.10 0.10 0.49 0.79 0.81
846 Under garments, knitted or crocheted 1.82 1.35 4.80 5.44 4.94
847 Clothing accessories, of textile fabrics, n.e.s. - 0.02 0.44 1.52 1.97
848 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories of other
than textile fabrics
- 0.03 0.21 0.19 0.14
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of the CANPLUS computer programme.
Note:  Includes Canada and the United States
Clothing products which have lost dynamism are briefs and panties (610822 and
610821), men's or boy's cotton underwear (620711), men's or boy's cotton overcoats
(620113), girdles and panty-girdles (621220), men's or boys' trousers of synthetic
fibres (610343) and jackets (620331 and 620339).
Turning now to the structure of Costa Rican clothing exports, that is, the
importance of clothing exports in Costa Rica's total exports to OECD, North America
and the United States, it is evident that the success at gaining markets shares is
reflected in a sharp change in the structure of Costa Rica's exports during 1980-1995.
Table I.10 indicates that in the case of exports to OECD, clothing exports
jumped from 4.7% of the total in 1980 to 24.5% in 1995. In the process, exports of
men's and boys' outer garments of textile fabrics (SITC 842) slipped ahead of knitted
and crocheted under garments (846) both with about 8% of total exports. Three
industrial groups each accounted for 2% to 3% of total exports: women’s girls’ and
infants’ outer garments of textile fabrics (843), knitted or crocheted outer garments and
other articles (845) and not knitted or crocheted under garments of textile fabrics (844).
Table I.9
COSTA RICA: MARKET SHARES IN UNITED STATES CLOTHING IMPORTS, 1990-1996
(in percentages)
HTS Description 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1995
Clothing industry (2 digits, 61 and 62) 1.64 1.82 2.05 2.12 2.05 2.09 1.85
61 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted 1.13 1.43 1.58 1.82 1.73 1.94 1.80
62 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted 1.95 2.06 2.32 2.28 2.23 2.18 1.88
25 most important products* (6 digits,  group of 25 ) 3.98 5.14 6.12 6.89 6.56 7.7 7.0
610811 Women’s or girls’ slips and petticoats, of man-made fibres 0 0 0 5.16 26.15 32.26 38.40
610822 Women's or girls' briefs and panties, of man-made fibres 14.33 22.82 21.43 26.1 21.08 19.47 17.47
610821 Women's or girls' briefs and panties, of cotton 15.32 19.41 21 23.13 19.7 16.81 12.92
620711 Men's or boys', underpants and briefs, of cotton 2.76 0.29 1.17 9.09 16.97 19.25 8.09
611130 Babies' garments and clothing accessories, of synthetic fibres 2.48 5.21 10.22 13.78 15.33 16.81 15.13
620333 Men's or boys' suits, jackets and blazers, of synthetic fibres 11.43 10.15 7.4 12.03 13.33 8.82 10.03
621210 Brassieres, whether or not knitted or crocheted 16.4 14.29 15.41 12.77 10.62 9.75 7.79
610342 Men's or boys' trousers, of cotton 10.68 11.9 13.86 12.81 10.27 2.74 2.11
611592 Other panty hose and tights, of cotton 0.16 1.43 0.93 3.35 9.56 12.97 13.49
621290 Other brassieres, girdles, whether or not knitted or crocheted 6.52 3.9 8.32 9.46 9.42 8.48 5.33
621510 Ties, bow ties and cravats, of silk or silk waste 1.28 3.41 4.35 5.25 8.49 6.44 7.01
610711 Men's or boys' underpants and briefs, of cotton 0.03 2.53 7.18 6.78 7.96 6.19 3.19
620113 Men's or boys' overcoats, car-coats, of man-made fibres 1.27 4.42 5.66 8.52 7.1 4.76 1.27
620342 Men's or boys' trousers, of cotton 4.77 5.64 6.59 7.41 7.06 5.81 5.09
621230 Corselettes, whether or not knitted or crocheted 0.44 9.18 11.47 18.1 7.01 17.18 19.06
621040 Other men's or boys' garments 0.67 1.48 2.06 4.57 5.84 5.42 1.24
610722 Men's or boys' nightshirts and  pajamas, of man-made fibres 0 0.35 1.36 6.15 5.32 5.1 9.09
620312 Men's or boys' suits of synthetic fibres 3.2 6.4 2.42 2.87 5.02 3.34 5.68
620343 Men's or boys' trousers, of synthetic fibres 2.68 2.95 4.75 5.03 4.18 4.61 3.95
620331 Men's or boys' suits, jackets and blazers, of wool or fine animal hair 6.92 5.63 5.33 5.31 3.97 3.79 2.10
620112 Men's or boys' overcoats, of cotton 1.7 4.06 2.45 3.71 3.71 6.15 4.34
621220 Girdles and panty-girdles 3.42 2.64 6.3 4.32 3.51 6.56 5.82
610343 Men's or boys' suits, trousers, of synthetic fibres 0.23 0.72 0.21 0.42 3.48 6.62 1.42
620311 Men's or boys' suits, of wool or fine animal hair 3.65 3.56 4.08 4.29 3.31 2.89 2.04
620339 Men's or boys' suits, jackets and blazers, of other textile materials 3.32 5.45 4.77 2.61 3.06 1.83 1.47
           Source: ECLAC, on the basis of the MAGIC computer programme.                                * Ordered by 1994 market share values.
Table I.10
           COSTA RICA: STRUCTURE OF CLOTHING AND APPAREL EXPORTS
    TO THE OECD, 1980-1995
 (in percentages)
SITC DESCRIPTION 1980 1985 1990 1994 1995
84 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories 4.7 10.7 20.9 25.5 24.5
842 Outer garments, men's and boys', of textile fabrics 0.3  2.3  6.1  8.3 7.5
843 Outer garments, women's, girls' and infants', of
textile fabrics
1.4 3.4  4.3  3.1 2.3
844 Under garments of textile fabrics, not knitted or
crocheted
... 1.3  1.8  2.7 2.9
845 Outer garments and other articles, knitted or
crocheted
0.2 0.4  2.0  2.7 2.6
846 Under garments, knitted or crocheted 2.8 3.2  6.3  8.0 8.3
847 Clothing accessories of textile fabrics, n.e.s. - 0.1  0.2  0.6 0.7
848 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories of other
than textile fabrics
- 0.01  0.4  0.3 0.2
Ten most important products (5 digits of SITC) 3.0 3.3 16.7 21.3 20.8
 8423 Trousers, breeches, men's and boys', of textile
fabrics
0.3 -  4.4  6.1 5.8
8462 Other under garments, knitted or crocheted, of
cotton
0.2 0.1  2.6  4.7 4.7
8465 Brassieres 2.0 2.3  2.9  3.2 3.1
8441 Shirts, men's and boys', of textile fabrics ... 0.9  1.6  2.2 2.2
8459 Other outer garments and clothing accessories 0.1 -  1.0  1.8 1.8
8439 Other outer garments, women's girls' and infants',
of textile fabrics
- -  2.6  1.7 1.6
8451 Jerseys, pullovers, slipovers, twinsets and cardigans,
knitted or crocheted
- - 0.8 0.8 -
8424 Jackets, blazers and the like, men's and boys', of
textile fabrics
- -  0.7  0.7 0.6
8442 Men’s underwear - - 0.2 0.5 0.6
8422 Suits, men's and boys', of wool or fine animal hair - -  0.6 0.5 0.4
                  Source: ECLAC, on the basis of the CAN computer programme (versions 2.2 and CANPLUS).
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The ten principal clothing exports to OECD, measured by their weight in total
exports, accounted for 21.3% of Costa Rica's total OECD exports in 1994. This
indicates that Costa Rica's clothing exports to OECD are almost completely accounted
for by the ten products listed in table I.10. Excepting brassieres (SITC 8465), all the
other principal clothing exports, hardly existed previous to the 1985-1994 period. The
accelerated growth of several items is shown in the table, such as men's and boys'
trousers of textile fabrics (8423), other knitted or crocheted under garments of cotton
(8462), men's and boys' shirts of textile fabrics (8441), other textile fabric outer
garments for women, girls' and infants' (8439), other outer garments and clothing
accessories (8459) and knitted or crocheted jerseys (8451). These items represented
the cutting edge of Costa Rican clothing exports to OECD, in terms of their weight in
the country's basket of total exports to that market. During 1995, several of these
items suffered major (8451) or minor (8423, 8465, 8439, 8424, 8422) setbacks.
Table I.11 demonstrates that Costa Rica's clothing exports to the North
American market grew from less than 9% of the total in 1980 to almost 38% in 1995.
Exports of men's and boys' outer garments of textile fabrics (842) slightly exceeded
those of knitted or crocheted under garments (846), both with about 12% of the total.
Table I.11
COSTA RICA: STRUCTURE OF EXPORTS OF CLOTHING INDUSTRY
TO NORTH AMERICA, 1980-1995
(in percentages)
SITC DESCRIPTION 1980 1985 1990 1994 1995
84 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories 8.6 16.8 33.2 38.2 37.7
842 Outer garments, men's and boys', of textile
fabrics
0.5  3.7  9.7 12.4 11.6
843 Outer garments, women's, girls' and
infants, of textile fabrics
2.6 5.4 6.8 4.6 3.5
844 Under garments of textile fabrics, not
knitted or crocheted
0.1 2.0 2.9 4.0 4.6
845 Outer garments and other articles, knitted or
crocheted
0.3 0.6 3.1 4.0 4.0
846 Under garments, knitted or crocheted 5.2 5.0 9.9 11.9 12.6
847 Clothing accessories of textile fabrics, n.e.s. - ... 0.3 0.8 1.1
848 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories
of other than textile fabrics
- 0.1 0.6 0.4 0.3
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of the CANPLUS computer programme.
During this period, one industrial group (846) consolidated its exports to the
North American market, doubling its share in total  exports from 5.2% to 12.6%. Three
other industrial groups (842, 845 and 844) began to export and by 1995 became
significant elements in Costa Rica's exports, with 12.4%, 4.0% and 4.6%, respectively.
Table I.12 points out the structure of Costa Rican clothing exports to the United
States market during 1990-1996. Over 41% of Costa Rican exports to the United
States were clothing, mostly of the not knitted or not crocheted variety. (HTS 62
52
represented 22% in 1996). These exports of clothing grew appreciably during 1990-
1992 then lost their dynamism. Knitted and crocheted items experienced the greatest
relative advance.
Again, these clothing exports are quite concentrated: the 25 principal products
accounted 31% (of a total of 36%) of Costa Rican exports to the United State in 1996.
Men's and boys' cotton trousers (HTS 620342) was, by far, the principal export item,
with over 7% of total exports. Products, which represented more than 2% of exports in
1994 included brassieres (621210), cotton briefs or panties (610821), men's or boys'
cotton shirts (620520) and man-made fibers briefs and panties (610822). Products,
which showed dynamism in 1995-1996, were panty hose (611592), babies’ garments
and accessories (611120), cotton knitted or crocheted shirts for men (610510) and
cotton T-shirts (610910). Products which experienced a severe loss of dynamism
included women's and girls' cotton trousers (620462), men's and boys' jackets and
blazers of synthetic fibers (620333) men's and boys' knitted and crocheted cotton
trousers (610342), brassieres (621210) and panties (610821).
The nature of the export success of the Costa Rican clothing industry can be
better appreciated by taking a closer look at the ten principal clothing exports to the
United State market. Costa Rica’s competitive situation is clearer when viewed in terms
of the principal competitors in that market. (See Tables I.13 through I.22).
Developing of Asian and Caribbean Basin countries dominate United States
Import in these ten product market. Their combined share of total imports for these ten
items increased from 80.46%, in 1990 to 85.33 % in 1996. The distribution of market
shares shifted forcefully in favour of Mexico and the Caribbean Basin countries, which
gained an average of 18.9 points, while Asian competitors lost, on average, 14.03
points. By 1995, the Caribbean Basin and Mexico held average market shares of 46% in
these ten products. The Asian countries, as a group, lost market share in each and every
one of these ten products, while the Caribbean Basin countries and Mexico gained
market share in each and every one.
Within the category of Asian competitors, relative newcomers tended to replace
the Asian Tigers (i.e. Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan province of China)
in these product markets. In other words, these ten principal United States product
markets for the Costa Rican clothing industry aptly reflect the general situation in the
United State market, in which competitors from the Caribbean Basin and Mexico are
replacing the dominant Asian competitors in competition with other Asian relative
newcomers.
In general, the Caribbean Basin countries and Mexico won United States market
share from the Asian competitors. While Mexico and the Dominican Republic led this
initiative, Costa Rica played an important role. With regard to the ten principal exports
represented in tables I.13 through I.22, Costa Rica increase its average market share
from 6.42% in 1990 to 9.76% in 1995.  Costa Rica enjoyed a market share of more
than 10% in women’s or girls’ briefs and panties, of man-made fibres (HTS 610822);
women’s or girls’ cotton briefs and panties ( 610821); men’s or boys’ cotton
underpants and briefs ( 620711); and babies’ garments and clothing accessories, of
synthetic fibres (611130).  These four categories represented some of the principal
product markets in which Caribbean Basin competitors won market shares from the
Asian countries.
Table I.12
COSTA RICA: STRUCTURE OF CLOTHING EXPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES, 1990-1996
(in percentages)
HTS Description 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Clothing industry (2 digits, the sum of 61 and 62) 37.5 37.6 41.1 41.9 41.3 40.9 35.5
61 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted 9.6 10.9 11.6 12.5 12.8 14.6 13.7
62 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted 27.8 26.6 29.5 29.3 28.6 26.3 21.8
25 most important products* (6 digits, sum of 25 products) 29.5 30.3 34.8 36.7 37 35.9 30.8
620342 Men's or boys' trousers, of cotton 6.3 7 8.2 9.2 9.2 8.3 7.4
621210 Brassieres, whether or not knitted or crocheted 5.3 5 5.6 4.8 4.4 4.5 3.1
610821 Women's or girls' briefs and panties, of cotton 1.7 2.6 3 3.7 3.6 3.4 2.7
620520 Men's or boys' shirts, of cotton 2.3 2.3 2.7 3.2 3.4 3.5 2.2
620462 Women's or girls' trousers, of cotton 3 2 3.3 2.7 2.8 1.5 2.0
610822 Women's or girls' briefs and panties, of man-made fibres 1.4 2.1 1.7 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.0
611130 Babies' garments and clothing accessories, of synthetic fibres 0.4 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.3
611020 Jerseys, pullovers, cardigans and waistcoats, of cotton 1.2 1.5 1.6 1.3 1.3 1 1.2
620343 Men's or boys' trousers, of synthetic fibres 1.3 1.2 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.2
620711 Men’s or Boy’s underpants and briefs, of cotton 0.1 0 0 0.3 0.8 1.2 0.6
620333 Men's or boys' jackets and blazers, of synthetic fibres 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.5
621510 Ties, bow ties and cravats, of silk or silk waste 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.6
610711 Men's or boys' underpants and briefs, of cotton 0 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.5
620311 Men's or boys' suits, of wool or fine animal hair 0.8 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5
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Table 12  (concl.)
610342 Men's or boys' trousers of cotton 0.4 0.6 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.2 0.1
621040 Other men's or boys' garments 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.1
620331 Men's or boys' suits, jackets and blazers, of wool or fine animal hair 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2
620640 Women's and girls' blouses and shirts, of man-made fibres 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.3
620530 Men's or boys' shirts, of man-made fibres 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3
611592 Panty hose, tights, other, of cotton 0 0 0 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.7
611120 Babies' garments and clothing accessories, of cotton 0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6
610510 Men's or boys' shirts, knitted or crocheted, of cotton 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.8 1.5
620463 Women's or girls' trousers, bib and brace overalls, of synthetic fibres 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.3
610910 T-shirts, singlets, tank tops and similar garments, of cotton 1.6 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.3 1.2 0.8
610462 Women's or girls' trousers, of cotton 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1
Ordered by 1994 market share values.
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of the MAGIC computer programme.
Table I.13
COMPETITIVE SITUATION IN UNITED STATES MARKET FOR MEN'S
AND BOYS' COTTON TROUSERS (HTS 620342), 1990-1996
(selected countries with market shares > 1% in 1994)
Country 1990 1992 1994 1995 1996
A. Developing Asia 53.88 42.06 33.51 31.24 30.32
Hong Kong 16.12 12.51 10.79 8.97 8.29
Republic of China 10.82  8.87  5.32  5.23 4.18
Philippines  6.97  2.85  3.29  2.85 3.18
Bangladesh  2.38  2.88  3.15  3.49 3.63
Indonesia  4.06  3.52  2.14  2.84 3.89
Sri Lanka  2.76  1.72  2.03  1.65 2.06
Taiwan (Province of
China)
 4.02  2.98  1.98  1.61 1.61
Macao  1.87  1.74  1.37  1.03 0.91
Singapore  2.86  2.57  1.27  1.06 0.58
Thailand  0.98  1.29  1.10  1.28 1.15
Malaysia  1.04  1.13  1.07  1.23 0.84
B. Caribbean Basin
and Mexico
29.20 40.99 50.18 52.65 52.65
Mexico  8.37 12.62 17.29 22.43 26.09
Dominican Republic 12.06 13.65 16.72 14.84 11.21
Costa Rica  4.77  6.59  7.06  5.81 5.09
Honduras  1.64  4.37  4.17  4.23 4.21
Guatemala 1.70 2.49 3.50 3.83 4.06
Colombia  0.66 1.27 1.44 1.51 1.99
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of the MAGIC computer programme.
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Table I.14
COMPETITIVE SITUATION IN THE UNITED STATES MARKET FOR BRASSIERES,
WHETHER OR NOT KNITTED OR CROCHETED (HTS 621210), 1990-1996
(selected countries with market shares > 1% in 1994)
Country 1990 1992 1994 1995 1996
A. Developing Asia 32.16 34.34 31.41 27.68 29.62
Philippines 17.99 16.63 10.59 8.29 8.26
Republic of China  5.40  5.91  7.11  5.31 6.76
Thailand  1.33  2.19  4.09  3.20 3.23
Hong Kong  2.75  3.91  3.80  3.33 2.46
Indonesia  2.81  3.47  2.77  3.11 2.89
Sri Lanka  0.61  1.05  1.94  2.63 4.12
Macao  1.27  1.18  1.11  1.81 1.90
B. Caribbean Basin and
Mexico
56.12 57.58 61.37 64.31 60.70
Dominican Republic 17.98 16.46 19.45 19.93 16.96
Mexico 13.54 16.63 18.54 20.11 22.43
Costa Rica 16.40 15.41 10.62 9.75 7.79
Honduras 4.08 4.11 7.60 9.20 8.42
Jamaica 3.82 3.16 2.89 2.06 1.58
Colombia 0.27 1.37 1.28 1.35 0.64
El Salvador 0.03 0.44 0.99 1.91 2.88
        Source: ECLAC, on the basis of the MAGIC computer programme.
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Table I.15
COMPETITIVE SITUATION IN THE UNITED STATES MARKET FOR WOMEN'S OR GIRL’S
BRIEFS AND PANTIES, OF COTTON (HTS 610821), 1990-1996
(selected countries with market shares > 1% in 1994)
Country 1990 1992 1994 1995 1996
A. Developing Asia 37.08 31.79 30.4 25.05 21.75
Hong Kong 28.14 18.28 15.18 8.52 9.62
Bangladesh  5.12  9.14 9.62  9.46 7.21
Thailand  0.80  1.67 1.60  1.09 0.93
Sri Lanka  2.73  1.89  1.51  1.13 1.14
Bahrain  0.01  0.45  1.35  1.61 1.30
Macao  0.28  0.36  1.14  3.24 1.55
B. Caribbean Basin and
Mexico
44.27 55.3 54.72 55.91 55.69
Costa Rica 15.32 21.00 19.70 16.81 12.92
Dominican Republic 16.28 10.30 9.20 7.32 8.34
Jamaica 7.55 11.99 9.01 9.34 7.81
Honduras 0.79 1.88 5.59 8.87 9.32
El Salvador 0.00 1.85 4.92 4.81 8.40
Mexico 3.08 7.33 4.91 7.08 5.74
Colombia 1.25 0.95 1.39 1.68 3.16
     Source: ECLAC, on the basis of the MAGIC computer programme.
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Table I.16
COMPETITIVE SITUATION IN THE UNITED STATES MARKET FOR MEN'S OR BOYS'
SHIRTS,  OF COTTON (HTS 620520), 1990-1996
(selected countries with market shares > 1% in 1994)
Country 1990 1992 1994 1995 1996
A. Developing Asia 76.47 72.67 62.59 58.40 61.00
Hong Kong 22.07 17.43 14.24 12.56 13.64
Bangladesh 4.84 7.11 6.73 6.16 7.58
India 6.80 6.04 6.31 7.12 7.66
Malaysia 5.89 7.04 6.22 6.02 5.88
Taiwan (Province of
China)
8.05 7.22 5.95 4.36 5.23
Indonesia 2.94 3.99 4.72 5.05 5.90
Philippines 3.52 3.97 3.86 3.03 2.81
Singapore 6.79 5.03 3.75 2.77 1.43
Republic of China 6.57 4.50 3.32 2.80 3.00
Sri Lanka 3.48 4.20 2.57 3.42 3.17
Republic of Korea 3.33 3.32 2.05 2.37 2.14
Macao 1.57 1.64 1.48 1.57 1.31
Pakistan 0.62 1.18 1.39 1.17 1.25
B. Caribbean Basin
and Mexico
10.72 14.15 17.53 20.21 19.28
Guatemala 1.81 3.65 4.12 4.58 3.85
Honduras 1.72 2.97 3.95 4.60 4.48
Costa Rica 2.25 2.37 2.63 2.71 2.06
El Salvador 0.17 0.07 2.24 3.25 3.28
Dominican Republic 2.76 2.81 1.77 1.93 1.97
Jamaica 0.94 1.20 1.65 1.50 1.33
Mexico 1.07 1.08 1.17 1.64 2.31
     Source: ECLAC, on the basis of the MAGIC computer programme.
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Table I.17
COMPETITIVE SITUATION IN THE UNITED STATES MARKET FOR WOMEN'S OR GIRLS'
TROUSERS, OF COTTON (HTS 620462), 1990-1996
(selected countries with market shares > 1% in 1994)
Country 1990 1992 1994 1995 1996
A. Developing Asia 54.9 53.76 45.26 44.94 45.32
Hong Kong 26.62 24.73 19.92 20.18 19.50
Republic of China 6.33 7.64 5.63 5.92 7.38
Philippines 3.70 3.39 4.04 4.00 2.93
Sri Lanka 1.98 1.72 2.84 3.01 2.93
Bangladesh 2.68 2.88 2.79 2.47 2.57
Indonesia 2.28 2.29 2.48 2.40 3.64
Taiwan (Province of China) 5.70 4.63 2.18 2.02 1.82
Singapore 2.75 2.56 1.95 1.33 0.68
Thailand 0.72 1.49 1.07 1.59 1.55
Macao 1.21 1.09 1.32 1.09 1.57
Oman 0.93 1.34 1.04 0.98 0.75
B. Caribbean Basin and
Mexico
17.51 25.51 33.38 37.08 38.34
Mexico 6.36 9.51 12.88 18.69 22.06
Dominican Republic 3.14 5.27 6.43 5.47 5.63
Guatemala 2.72 3.05 4.13 3.19 3.64
Colombia 2.29 3.47 3.22 1.68 1.47
Costa Rica 2.34 2.73 2.65 1.58 1.95
Honduras 0.23 0.72 2.28 2.36 2.63
El Salvador 0.43 0.76 1.79 1.75 0.96
     Source: ECLAC, on the basis of the MAGIC computer programme.
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Table I.18
COMPETITIVE SITUATION IN THE UNITED STATES MARKET FOR WOMEN'S OR
GIRL’S BRIEFS AND PANTIES, OF MAN-MADE FIBRES (HTS 610822), 1990-1996
(selected countries with market shares > 1% in 1994)
Country 1990 1992 1994 1995 1996
A. Developing Asia 32.57 22.22 16.70 18.39 16.25
Republic of China 5.18 2.53 5.54 6.80 5.17
Hong Kong 19.09 9.10 4.77 3.76 3.03
Philippines 6.23 6.68 3.05 2.98 2.28
Taiwan (Province of China) 2.02 2.71 1.17 0.83 0.61
Bangladesh 0.00 1.13 1.09 0.58 0.44
Sri Lanka 0.05 0.07 1.08 3.44 4.72
B. Caribbean Basin and
Mexico
52.91 64.95 77.98 75.88 74.02
Costa Rica 14.33 21.43 21.08 19.47 17.47
Mexico 17.62 16.39 20.60 19.11 26.24
Dominican Republic 14.20 14.35 16.20 14.12 11.87
Colombia 1.44 2.79 7.09 7.50 3.49
Honduras 1.16 4.45 6.72 6.48 10.82
El Salvador 3.15 1.94 4.15 7.34 2.51
Jamaica 0.75 2.73 1.16 0.83 0.40
Panama 0.26 0.87 0.98 1.03 1.22
    Source: ECLAC, on the basis of the MAGIC computer programme.
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Table I.19
COMPETITIVE SITUATION IN THE UNITED STATES MARKET FOR BABIES' GARMENTS
AND CLOTHING ACCESSORIES, OF SYNTHETIC FIBERS,
(HTS 611130), 1990-1996
(Selected countries with market shares > 1% in 1994)
Country 1990 1992 1994 1995 1996
A. Developing Asia 68.05 58.83 50.03 43.15 59.50
Taiwan (Province of
China)
26.97 28.90 24.90 22.58 19.69
Philippines 32.28 22.19 19.42 14.57 13.36
Thailand 0.75 1.43 2.54 2.72 2.31
Republic of Korea 5.76 3.52 1.90 1.72 1.71
Malaysia 2.29 2.79 1.27 1.56 1.64
B. Caribbean Basin and
Mexico
13.47 28.13 43.44 45.43 46.37
Costa Rica 2.48 10.22 15.33 16.81 15.13
Dominican Republic 4.95 8.75 10.46 9.57 10.45
Mexico 2.48 5.55 8.78 6.87 5.97
Guatemala 0.08 0.75 3.61 4.90 8.76
Colombia 0.31 0.77 2.72 3.65 3.42
Jamaica 3.17 2.00 1.49 1.58 0.71
El Salvador 0.00 0.09 1.05 2.05 1.93
        Source: ECLAC, on the basis of the MAGIC computer programme.
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Table I.20
COMPETITIVE SITUATION IN THE UNITED STATES MARKET FOR JERSEYS,
PULLOVERS, CARDIGANS AND WAISTCOATS, OF COTTON
(HTS 611020), 1990-1996
(selected countries with market shares > 1% in 1994)
Country 1990 1992 1994 1995 1996
A. Developing Asia 68.19 61.96 58.62 55.95 54.16
Hong Kong 18.34 16.81 14.03 12.51 11.27
Republic of China 8.87 5.78 6.19 5.22 6.05
Macao 5.90 4.69 4.66 3.87 3.77
Pakistan 3.66 5.39 4.55 4.91 4.19
India 1.09 2.46 4.23 4.47 4.00
Thailand 4.40 4.97 3.59 3.53 2.93
Philippines 3.67 3.29 3.55 4.02 3.90
Republic of Korea 6.06 4.14 3.47 3.86 3.57
Indonesia 2.98 3.65 3.38 3.05 3.70
Malaysia 3.03 2.56 3.38 2.72 2.97
Taiwan (Province of
China)
5.33 3.67 2.80 3.07 3.04
Singapore 2.38 2.45 2.50 2.29 2.34
Sri Lanka 2.48 2.10 2.29 2.43 2.43
B. Caribbean Basin and
Mexico
4.23 9.54 13.29 16.59 17.78
Honduras 0.1 2.19 4.12 5.20 6.14
Dominican Republic 2.05 2.27 2.14 2.04 1.86
Mexico 0.36 0.44 2.07 4.55 4.77
El Salvador 0.18 1.10 1.95 2.64 2.60
Guatemala 0.63 2.18 1.91 1.33 1.42
Costa Rica 0.91 1.36 1.10 0.83 0.99
           Source: ECLAC, on the basis of the MAGIC computer programme.
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Table I. 21
COMPETITIVE SITUATION IN THE UNITED STATES MARKET FOR MEN'S OR BOYS'
TROUSERS, OF SYNTHETIC FIBRES, (HTS 620343), 1990-1996
(selected countries with market shares > 1% in 1994)
Country 1990 1992 1994 1995 1996
A. Developing Asia 70.76 57.90 54.96 53.86 52.54
Republic of China 13.71 12.20 15.41   17.11 15.46
Taiwan (Province of
China)
21.85 13.88  9.95 7.63 8.37
Indonesia  4.16  6.16  8.11  7.51 5.59
Bangladesh  4.68  4.69  4.48  5.93 5.72
Thailand  2.17  2.30  3.59  3.32 4.65
Hong Kong  5.38  3.81  3.48  3.02 2.82
Republic of Korea  7.93  4.61  3.01  2.69 2.32
Sri Lanka  3.94  4.24  2.89  1.96 2.94
Malaysia  2.56  3.31  2.45  2.59 2.85
Philippines  4.38  2.70  1.59  2.10 1.82
B. Caribbean Basin and
Mexico
17.93 33.36 39.09 38.57 38.11
Dominican Republic  5.56 15.97 21.55 18.77 16.15
Mexico  8.66  9.80  9.56 10.68 13.37
Costa Rica  2.68  4.75  4.18  4.61 3.95
Honduras  0.58   1.70  2.80  3.72 3.94
Colombia  0.45  1.14  1.00  0.79 0.70
            Source: ECLAC, on the basis of the MAGIC computer programme.
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Table I.22
COMPETITIVE SITUATION IN THE UNITED STATES MARKET FOR MEN’S
OR  BOYS’ UNDERPANTS AND BRIEFS, OF COTTON
 (HTS 620711), 1990-1995
(selected countries with market shares > 1% in 1994)
Country 1990 1992 1994 1995 1996
A. Developing Asia 43.92 55.62 51.26 39.00 35.86
Hong Kong 32.45 30.03 24.53 12.24 9.20
Thailand  0.15  2.89  7.99 4.74 1.02
Philippines  0.10  5.15  4.45 4.74 5.36
Bangladesh  0.59  1.01  3.40  3.39 1.97
Indonesia  0.00  0.00  2.87  4.54 4.47
Sri Lanka  0.00  2.38  2.59  1.96 1.89
Republic of China 10.60 13.31  2.29  1.33 5.39
Macao  0.00  0.50  1.85  5.35 5.87
Malaysia  0.03  0.35  1.29  0.55 0.69
B. Caribbean Basin and
Mexico
20.25 27.58 40.06 48.94 50.33
Costa Rica  2.76  1.17 16.97 19.25 8.09
Honduras 16.78 18.03  7.93  10.89 13.65
Jamaica  0.00  0.27  4.32  5.86 5.55
El Salvador  0.00  0.00  4.29 5.25 15.35
Guatemala  0.00  4.28  3.60  5.22 5.33
Dominican Republic  0.71  3.83  2.95  2.47 2.36
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of the MAGIC computer programme.
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However, there also existed a subregional dynamic within the Caribbean Basin,
one in which Costa Rica faced ever-stronger competition from other Central American
countries, such as, Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala. In fact, during 1996 Costa
Rica lost market share in eight of these items.
(b)      Analysis
Costa Rica's success in exporting clothing and apparel derives from numerous
factors. This section defines these factors in order to  understand the sense and nature
of the challenges now facing the Costa Rican clothing industry.
International market factors have played a very significant role in Costa Rica's
emergence as a clothing supplier to the United States market. In particular, the Asian
challenge in that market provoked the restructuring of the clothing industry on the part
of the United States firms interested in defending their national market shares.
That response took the form of new corporate strategies by which these firms
attempted to improve their ability to compete against the Asian challenge in their own
market by engaging in certain offshore assembly activities. Thus, they began assembling
basic garments characterized by standardized production runs, low-skilled tasks, few
styling changes, and reasonably predictable consumer demand at sites close to the
United States market which were eligible for United States trade preferences and where
cheaper manpower was available. The huge devaluation implemented by many Latin
American countries in the context of the international debt crisis of the 1980s coincided
with that trend. In this fashion, international market factors and new corporate
strategies combined to improve the attractiveness of many Latin American countries as
possible offshore sites for the assembly of clothing for the United States market.
This alternative was facilitated by national policies. On the one hand, the United
States Government facilitated this process by way of the production sharing mechanism
(TSUS 807, later HTS 9802) in the context of agreements permitting special access to
the United States market for offshore assemblers i.g.the Caribbean Basin Initiative,
NAFTA and the Andean Community. Bilateral agreements in the context of the
Multifibre Arrangement put the brake on Asian clothing imports and constituted a legal
framework for offshore assembly operations based on domestically made components,
mainly cloth. On the other hand, the countries where the offshore assembly took place
facilitated these activities through tax and trade incentives in the form of EPZs, and
other regimes for assembling imported inputs for export.
In the particular case of Costa Rica, the country did not already possess a
significant international market share the clothing industry. The existing industrial policy
was based on an inward-looking import substitution format in which the priority was to
promote industrial production, which later would be converted into more export-
intensive activities. The increase in textile and clothing production was based on the
promotion of exports for the regional Central American market.
The Costa Rican textile and clothing industry took advantage of the expanded
regional market, which enjoyed substantial common external tariff protection, and
consequently, severely limited external competition. The crisis of the Central American
Common Market coupled with Costa Rican decisions to diverge from import substation
policies toward a more open economy meant that, in principle, the textile and clothing
industry, like others, was obliged to improve its international competitiveness and seek
out external markets.
In 1983, the Government created the export and investment programme of the
Office of the President, which provided strong political support for the promotion of
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exports of new products to new markets. The aim was to lay the legal foundation to
implement incentives for a new export-based development strategy.
This was reflected in the Law for Financial Equilibrium of the Public Sector in
1984 by which the export contract mechanism was created and the temporary
admission regime was modified.
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The export contract is designed primarily for national companies to take
advantage of the General System of Preferences (GSP), which requires a minimum
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Costa Rican value added of 35% of the value of the apparel exported to the United
States. Such companies have access to Costa Rican tax credit certificates, that is,
export subsidies.
The temporary admission and EPZ regimes are two variants aimed primarily at
firms whose apparel exports enter the United States under the production sharing
programme (HTS 9802.00.80). The operational element of that programme is that the
clothing must be made from fabric formed and cut in the United States. In the Costa
Rican legislation, the benefits are primarily tax and duty relief or exemptions, which
further facilitated these assembly operations.
In 1994, about 700 companies were operating in the Costa Rican textile and
apparel industry and they represented about 15% of all companies in the manufacturing
sector. Of these 700 firms, 138 were registered as exporters. These companies adhered
to the following regimes:
61 (44.2%) qualified under the temporary admission regime; 30 (21.7%) were
located in EPZs; 25 (18.1%) operated under an export contract; and 22 (16.0%) did not
receive any of these incentives.  In other words, 91 of the 138 exporters (66%) were
directly related to preferential access to the United States market under HTS
9802.00.08.
In 1993, 90% of United States apparel imports from Mexico and 80% of those
from the Caribbean Basin countries took place via HTS 9802.00.80. In the case of
Costa Rica 84% of apparel exports to the United States entered by way of HTS
9802.00.80. In other words, special access to the United States market, was the
principal factor behind the export boom in the Costa Rican apparel industry in which the
value added to apparel exports, including via the temporary admission regime, jumped
from less than $10 million in 1985 to $160 million in 1995. Costa Rican national policy
simply facilitated that phenomenon.
The following section assesses the challenges facing the Costa Rican clothing
industry. Above and beyond its export success, this industry is important for other
reasons: it directly employs about 40,000, people which is equivalent to almost a third
of employment in manufacturing, and it accounts for 5%of industrial production.
(c) Challenges
First and most important, challenge has to do with the national integration of the
industry. This is a problem of industrial growth and development.43 Unfortunately, the
explosion of exports emanating from the industry did not correspond to its consolidation
as a competitive integrated industry stretching from natural and/or synthetic textile
fibres through textile yarns and fabric to articles of apparel and clothing accessories.
The success of the industry is concentrated almost solely in the assembly of apparel
from United States components, which have privileged access to the United States
market. The Costa Rican textile and clothing industry has not achieved integrated
development base on competitive advantages (i.e., qualified labour, the generation and
innovation of technologies and designs, high quality natural resource inputs, etc.).
In spite of the efforts aimed at a significant structural adjustment of the Costa
Rican economy to reveal its fundamental comparative advantages, the clothing industry
has been converted into a "cost centre" by mainly foreign companies whose competitive
advantages lie in low wages, fiscal incentives and privileged export market access.
                                                           
43 Rodriguez, E., "Costa Rica: A development path in the 1990s", The North-South
Institute, Ottawa, 1993, mimeo, pp.27 and 33.
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While the use of the EPZs made sense as instrument to generate exports, create
economic activity and attract foreign direct investment during the debt crisis of the
1980s, it would appear that the national clothing industry has stagnated.  Costa Rica
has not been able to use these EPZs to obtain results similar to the Asian experience by
targeting foreign technology and boosting national companies, many developing Asian
countries slowly converted their national industries into significant global competitors;
national policy could then focus on more profound industrial pursuits, related to more
sophisticated instruments like science and technology parks, with less emphasis on
EPZs.44 The Asian companies could rely on a national strategy for deepening the
industrialization process in order to articulate an integrated industry characterized by
strong competitive advantages over the long term.
A second challenge has to do with the present situation in which the Costa
Rican apparel export industry is losing competitiveness in comparison to other
assemblers in the Caribbean Basin, because of rising wages in Costa Rica. Labour costs
are one of the central determinants for atracting and maintaining foreign investment in
this industry.  In Costa Rica, labour costs are about 30% of the total cost of production
for textile products, and the prevailing hourly wage does not make Costa Rica
particularly attractive in an area of high demand in the international market ( See table
1.23).
Table I.23 makes clear that the hourly wages in Costa Rica in 1994 were about
double those in Honduras, more than 50% more than those of El Salvador, and about a
20% more than those of Mexico (before the 1995 devaluation). Costa Rica is losing
international competitiveness in an industry in which this factor is fundamental.
                                Table I.23
    CARIBBEAN BASIN: HOURLY WAGE RATES IN APPAREL  ASSEMBLY, 1994








              Source: CATECO, Costa Rica.
A related problem has to do with the particular advantages enjoyed by the
Mexican clothing industry within the ambit of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA). Clothing assembled in Mexico enters the United States market duty free,
while those assembled in Costa Rica (and other participating Caribbean Basin countries)
face an effective tariff about of 6% on the value added outside North America. 45 The
countries of the Caribbean Basin have solicited equal treatment with Mexico in this
industry. United States Congress has not been willing to provide it, however.
 In addition to this tariff advantage, Mexico is not subject to quotas in the
United States market as are the Caribbean Basin countries. Mexico's exports to that
                                                           
44 ESCAP/UNCTAD, Transnational Corporations and Technology in Export Processing
Zones and Science Parks, United Nations, ST/ESCAP/1410, New York, 1994.
45 US International Trade Commission, USITC Publication 2886, Washington, D.C., May
1995, pp. 3-8 to 3-13.
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market are governed by the NAFTA rules of origin.46 This advantage, like the previous
one, could easily produce a diversion of FDI from the Caribbean Basin countries to
Mexico.47 Some of the principal apparel assemblers operating in Costa Rica, such as
Warnaco and Sara Lee, have opened new plants in Mexico.48
Differential wage rates unfavourable to Costa Rica and the advantages of
Mexico within NAFTA were undoubtedly manifest in the new phenomenon evident in
Tables I.13 to I.22: that Costa Rica's competitors in Mexico and the Caribbean Basin
recently are gaining market shares in many of Costa Rica's principal apparel exports to
the United States. These elements were also present in the study cited in the
Introduction.49
A third challenge facing the Costa Rican clothing industry has to do with the
United States, its principal trade partner. One of the prickliest areas in that relationship
concerns the application by the United States Government of unilateral restrictions on
access to the United States market, in the form of quotas and "calls". In 1994, over
one half of Costa Rican apparel exports to the United States were subject to quotas,
and that figure rose to almost two thirds in 1995 due to the calls applied to under
garments and pajamas. These import quotas, which are implemented for a period of two
years by the United States Government, arose from complaints by a domestic apparel
companies operating in the United States  that "market disruption" i.e., unduly rapid
import expansion was taking place.  They represent new limits on exports, which are
administrated by the National Council for Textile and Apparel Quotas established in
Costa Rica in 1988.
 The 1995 calls were applied to many of the most important clothing export
items of Costa Rica (See table 1.24). In the case of underwear, the limit imposed was
14.4 million dozen. It represented a direct challenge to the future expansion of this part
of the clothing industry.
                                                           
    46 G. Bannister, G. and P. Low, "Textiles and Apparel in NAFTA: a case of constrained
liberalization", Working Paper WPS 994, The World Bank, Washington, D.C., October, 1992.
47 S. Lande and N. Crigler, “The Caribbean and NAFTA:  Oportunities and Challenges”,
working papers on Trade in the Western Hemisphere, WP-TWH-51, ECLAC/IDB, Washington
D.C., July 1993, P.3; and ECLAC. “Centrooamérica y el TLC: efectos inmediatos e implicancias
futuras”, LC/MEX/R.494(SEM.68/3), 14 October 1994, p. 73.




R. Buitelaar, “La competitividad auténtica en América Central y el Tratado de Libre
Comercio de América del Norte: llueve sobre mojado?”, p.8.
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Table I.24
COSTA RICA: CATEGORIES OF CLOTHING SUBJECT TO QUOTAS
Category Description
340-640 Men's cotton and synthetic fibre shirts
342-642 Cotton and synthetic fibre slips
347-348 Cotton trousers and shorts for men and women
443 Men's wool suits
447 Men's wool pants
352-632* Cotton and synthetic fibre under garments
351-651* Cotton and synthetic fibre pajamas
* Calls made in March, 1995
Source: Office of Textile Quotas
The Costa Rican response to the United States  calls, unlike that of the other
affected countries, was a combative one. It decide to take the conflict to the WTO,
where it represented the first case for textiles. In June 1995, the United States
implemented the limits they had threatened. In July, the WTO Textile Monitoring Body,
which oversees disputes in this sector during the transition phase of the implementation
of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (to 2005), decided by a 9-0 vote that the
United States  had not proved that such Costa Rican imports represented a serious
damage to the United States industry. However, this body could not reach consensus on
whether it represented a threat of such. In a revealing vote, developing countries (India,
Indonesia, Pakistan, Brazil, and South Korea) voted that it did not, while industrialized
countries (Canada, the European Union, Japan and Norway) voted that it did.
 The affected parties were advised to continue bilateral negotiations. While
Honduras came to a separate agreement with the United States in this area (and saw its
limits lifted), Costa Rica notified the WTO in December 1995 that its negotiations had
failed and requested that a formal dispute settlement panel be formed. The Costa Rican
goal, apparently, was that the WTO recommend duty-free, unconditional access to the
United States market for its underwear exports. The panel's decision, in September
1996 went in Costa Rica’s favour.
In conclusion, the competitive situation of the Costa Rican clothing and apparel
industry improved enormously over the 1980-1995 period and served an important
purpose in terms of generating foreign exchange during the debt crisis and  fastening an
export orientation onto the developmental strategy. Costa Rica was one of the principal
"winners" in the United States clothing market which succeeded in gaining market share
from the Asian tigers. Nevertheless, those successes apparently did not have a solid
base, and, Costa Rica has seen its competitive situation in that market begin to erode as
other Central American assemblers gain market share.
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The challenge to Costa Rican competitiveness in this industry has at least three
dimensions. The first concerns the quandary that the export success of the apparel
assembly business seems to have taken place at the expense of a vertically integrated
textile and clothing industry. Short-term gains, in a crisis framework, might have been at
the cost of long-term industrialization needs.
 The second dimension has to do with the loss of relative international
competitiveness within the Caribbean Basin and Mexico. Costa Rican wage rates appear
to be pricing the country out of the assembly market.
 Third, the United States apparel assembly business depends more than anything
else on trade preferences in the United States market, and the United States has proved
a difficult partner that likes to have its own way. In the case of underwear imports, the
conflict arising from the United States position had to be resolved in WTO.
Given the complex and challenging competitive situation of the Costa Rican
clothing industry, it was decided to administer a detailed questionnaire to a
representative group of companies operating there in order to gain greater insights into
the phenomena. The following chapter summarizes the results.
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CHAPTER II
RESULTS OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE ADMINISTERED TO CLOTHING FIRMS IN
COSTA RICA
This chapter presents the results of a questionnaire administered to a representative
group of clothing companies operating in Costa Rica. The idea is, on the one hand, to
examine their contribution to the competitive situation of the Costa Rican apparel
industry and, on the other hand, to better appreciate the principal factors which have
influenced the behavior and performance of these firms in the context of their particular
competitive situations.
1. The sample
In April 1995, 22-page questionnaire containing 72 questions was administered
to 16 clothing firms in Costa Rica. It consisted of four sections: each company's
evaluation of the international competitiveness of Costa Rica during 1985-1989 and
1990-1995; an analysis of the corporate strategies of these companies and their
headquarters; detailed information on the competitive situation of each firm in the
context of the global restructuring of the industry; and quantitative information
necessary to construct a profile of each company. The sample of firms interviewed was
very representative and has, for the most part, accounted for the major changes in the
competitive situation of that industry.
(a) Characteristics of the sample
The principal criteria for the selection of a sample of firms from the universe of
clothing firms operating in Costa Rica was that their principal activity be the production
or assembly of clothing, that they be important exporters, that they include firms using
one of the major export regimes (temporary admission, EPZs and export contracts) and
that both foreign and national firms be represented. Table II.1 presents the basic
information of this sample in terms of the major analytical factors.
The 1995 information on the analytical factors permits three kinds of statistical
distribution: the total number of firms (16); the percentage distribution of the gross
value (including imported components) of their total exports (about US$150 million); and
the percentage distribution of the total number of employees (about 13,000). They
correspond to about 23% of all clothing exports and about one-third of the total













1. Principal activity:   total 16 100 100
     SITC 846 5 62 63
     SITC 842 5 14 20
     other SITC 84 categories 6 24 17
2. Firm size (exports/employees):  total 16 100 100
     large 5 62 63
     medium 5 27 20
     small 6 11 18
3. Year established:    total 16 100 100
     before 1983 ("old firms") 8 43 62
     1983 or after ("new firms") 8 57 38
4. Type of firm:       total 16 100 100
     foreign firms 12 93 91
     national firms 4 7 9
5. Source of FDI:      total 16 100 100
     North America 10 79 81
     Asia 2 14 11
     no FDI 4 7 9
6. Export regime:       total 16 100 100
     temporary admission 7 41 51
     export processing zone 6 55 44
     export contract 3 4 5
7. Principal export market: tpta; 16 100 100
     United States 15 99 99
     other 1 1 1
8. United States market  access instrument:
total
16 100 100
     HTS 9802 13 96 95
     other 3 4 5
9. United States market access restrictions:
total
16 100 100
     quotas 6 21 22
     "calls" in 1995 5 62 63
     none 5 17 15
10. Competitive situation, 1990-5: 16 100 100
     improved 11 81 81
     not improved 5 19 19
Source: Company interviews.
In the first instance, this information indicates that the sample of firms
corresponds very well to the principal activities of the Costa Rican clothing industry,
that is, mainly SITC chapters 846 (knitted or crocheted undergarments), 842 (men's and
boys' outer garments of textile fibers) and others. Five of the 16 firms produce under
garments, which accounts for over 60% of both the total exports and the total
employment of the sample. Five others produce men and boys' outer clothing, which
accounts for 14% of total exports and one-fifth of the total employment of the sample.
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The six remaining firms carry out other clothing activities, which correspond to about
one-quarter of the exports of this group of companies and 17% of total employment.
 The enterprises were categorized by size using a compound measure based on
export values and employment. The five largest firms, all of which assemble under
garments, contributed over 60% of both exports and employment of the sample. The
five medium-sized companies account for 27% of the exports and one-fifth of the
employment of the group. The six small enterprises represent 11% of exports and 18%
of employment. Large firms dedicated to under garment assembly are particularly
prominent in the sample.
With regard to their age, the companies are evenly divided between old firms
(which initiated activities in Costa Rica before 1983) and new ones (those that started
up in 1983 or later). The old companies began under the import substitution regime,
while the new ones started operations during the Costa Rican economy adjustment to a
more open trading environment. The eight old companies account for less than one half
(43%) of total exports but more than one-half (62%) of total employment. The eight
new firms correspond to more than one-half (57 percent) of total exports but much less
than one-half (38 percent) of total employment. In other words, the new firms tend to
be much less labour-intensive than the old ones of the sample.
With regard to the type of company, twelve are foreign owned and four are
national firms. The foreign enterprises account for over 90% of total exports and
employment of the group. In other words, foreign firms, dominate this sample, as is the
case for the Costa Rican clothing industry itself.
Referring to their source of FDI, ten of the twelve foreign companies are North
American, and they contribute about 80% of exports and employment. Two Asian firms
account for 14% of exports and 11% of employment. The four national companies, as
mentioned, produce less than 10% of total exports and employment of the sample.
In terms of the Costa Rican export regime, seven companies use the temporary
admission regime;  they contribute less than one-half (41%) of all the exports of this
group but more than one-half of employment (51%). The six firms adhering to the EPZ
regime produce more than one-half (55%) of all exports but less than one-half (44%) of
total employment. Three national firms using the export contract mechanism account for
about 5% of total exports and employment. The foreign companies located in the EPZ
are less labour intensive than the enterprises using the temporary admission regime.
Fully 15 of the 16 companies have North America as their principal export
destination. The one small national firm which exports principally to Central America
which accounts for about 1% of the exports and employment of the sample. Thus, the
sample exports almost exclusively to the dynamic United States market, as is the case
for the Costa Rican clothing industry as a whole. The Central American market is
increasingly marginal.
The primary market access instrument in the United States market is the United
States production sharing mechanism (HTS 9802), which is used by 13 enterprises.
These companies account for about 95% of total exports and employment. Three
national firms using other instruments contribute about 5% of exports and employment.
In terms of restrictions faced in the United States market, six firms producing in
SITC category 842 face quotas; they account for about one-fifth of total exports and
employment. Five firms producing in SITC category 846 faced calls in 1995; they
contribute the lion's share of exports and employment (over 60%). Five firms, which
face no restrictions in the United States market, make 17% of the exports and employ
15% of the workforce of the sample.
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Finally, with regard to the competitive situation of these companies in 1990-
1995, 11 improved the international market share for their principal product, and they
contribute about 80% of the exports and employment. Five others experienced no
change in their international market shares or saw them diminish. These are mostly
producers of SITC 842 items carrying quotas; the correspond to one-fifth of exports and
employment.
(b) Three distinct situations
The careful examination of these analytical factors allows one to classify the
sample into three separate groups of companies, each of which share certain essential
characteristics. A first group consists of five large foreign companies which assemble
under garments (SITC 846) for the United States market (and, thus, face calls) and
which access that market by way of HTS 9802. All improved their market share during
1990-1995. This homogeneous group of enterprises completely share eight of the ten
analytical factors. The factors not shared are age (3 old, 2 new) and export regime (3
export processing zone, 2 temporary admission). These five companies account for
almost two-thirds of the exports and employment of the sample as a whole.
The other two groups are not as homogeneous, as they completely share only
three of the ten analytical factors. The second group is comprised of the other seven
foreign firms which service the United States market by way of HTS 9802. These firms
also mostly share other characteristics: six of them are new enterprises and five are
based on United States FDI. (Two are Asian.) Certain diversity was encountered with
regard to the other analytic factors: activity (3 for SITC 842, 4 other), size (4 medium,
3 small), export regime (4 temporary admission, 3 export processing zone), US market
restrictions (4 with quotas, 3 with no restrictions) and market share (4 not improved, 3
improved). These smaller foreign firms which are less labour intensive, account for 31%
of the exports and 28% of the employment of the sample. They have not been as
successful as the firms in group I.
The third group is composed of the four old national firms. These companies are
mostly small (3 of 4), use the export contract regime to service the United States
market by non-HTS means (3 of 4) and have improved their market share (3 of 4). Two
enterprises produce SITC 842 goods and thus face quotas in the United States market,
while two do not. These four firms account for only 7% of the sample's exports and
9% of total employment.
These three groups can be identified as follows:
Group I: large subsidiaries of United States transnational corporations (TNCs)
assembling under garments for export to the United States market via HTS 9802. They
faced calls in 1995, but all improved their international market shares considerably
during the 1990-1995 period. An indicator of their success, aside from their domination
of Costa Rican clothing exports, is that their employment doubled between 1985 and
1990 and doubled again between 1990 and 1995.
roup II: other, mostly new, foreign subsidiaries which assemble mainly clothing
subject to quotas in the United States market, which they access via HTS 9802. They
had a less successful performance in general during 1990-1995. This group accounts
for an appreciable portion of Costa Rican clothing exports, and the employment of this
group grew by 50% between 1985 and 1990 and by about 40% between 1990 and
1995. These employers are smaller and less dynamic than Group I companies.
Group III: old mostly small national firms which use the export contract regime
and which access the United States market via non-HTS mechanisms. They had some
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success improving their international market shares in 1990-1995. Their exports are not
significant in the context of the Costa Rican clothing industry. While the employment of
these companies doubled between 1985 and 1990, it fell by one-third between 1990
and 1995. Their national market shares have been collapsing because of increased
import competition.
These three groups will be used in the following sections to analyse several
relevant aspects of the Costa Rican clothing industry.
2. Questionnaire results
One of the most interesting aspects of the questionnaire administered to these
sixteen companies of the Costa Rican clothing industry was their opinions on how three
sets of factors affected their international competitiveness.
These three sets of factors are international market factors (e.g. the effects of
the restructuring of the global industry, new technological advances, the arrival of new
competitors), corporate strategies (i.e., the manner in which the companies tried to use
international market factors and national policy to gain international market shares) and
national policy (i.e., the effect of Costa Rica's efforts to establish a competitive
environment, both in general and within the clothing industry, in particular). These
elements provide the framework for the present chapter, which examines the
international market challenge, corporate strategies (including a detailed analysis of the
companies' competitiveness) and the impact of national policy.
(a) International market challenges
The firms were asked to rank, from most important to least important, the above
three groups of factors as they influence international competitiveness. The results can
be found in table II.2. In general, the enterprises feel that international market factors
are most important (40.6% of total replies), corporate strategies are the second most
important (34.4%) and national policy is the least important (25%). The fact that
international market factors was ranked first suggests that these firms give primary
importance to the changes taking place in the industry, such as the restructuring
process taking place in the global clothing industry. The companies react by way of their
corporate strategies to the severe international market challenges, and  they feel that
national policy in Costa Rica is not backing up their corporate strategies to the extent
that they consider necessary. In this sense, they feel that they are mostly on their own
in facing up to the competitive challenge of the international clothing market.
Table II.2
QUESTIONNAIRE: RANKING OF COMPETITIVE FACTORS
All companies
(%)






40.6 International market 43.3 40.5 37.5
34.4 Corporate strategies 30.0 31.0 45.8
25.0 National policy 26.7 28.6 16.7
Source: company interviews
While all feel threatened in some way, the three different competitive situations
analysed previously are clearly present in this evaluation. A first notable observation is
that Group III firms (i.e. national companies) give more importance to corporate
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strategies (45.8%) than to international market factors (37.5%). They also give much
less importance to national policy (16.7%). This undoubtedly reflects the fact that these
firms generally have no influence on international prices and compete for contracts from
large United States buyers. They possess no international corporate network as do the
foreign firms, and they  feel abandoned by national policy, which they believe does not
correct any of the central competitive disadvantages that they have in comparison to
the foreign companies. All have experienced difficulties in their national market shares,
as, they are facing stiff competition from imports.50 Their competitive situation is
considerably distinct from that of the foreign subsidiaries operating in Costa Rica.
The foreign firms in Group I (i.e., large under garment assemblers) and Group II
(i.e., small and medium-sized assemblers of other clothing items) both consider
corporate strategies (30-31%) to be less important than international market factors;
there was a degree of difference, however, in the importance given the latter by Group I
enterprises (43.3%) and Group II firms (40.5%). Concomitantly, Group I firms give
somewhat less importance to national policy (26.7%) than do Group II companies
(28.6%). These differences stem from many aspects. Group I companies are more
specialized in terms of products, pertain to much more extensive United States
corporate networks with significant operations in other Caribbean Basin countries and
export almost exclusively to their parent company. In contrast, Group II firms
correspond to much smaller corporate networks, are less specialized and have begun to
export more to non-associated companies.
It is interesting to note that the Group II enterprises are generally newer and
possess a much more focused view as to what is the central function of the Costa
Rican subsidiary, and that is to take advantage of cheap labour and HTS 9802 access to
the United States market.
roup II companies appear to experience much more severe competitive pressures
in the international market and to be much more aware of the specific competitive
advantages which Costa Rica does or does not offer them. Like national firms, Group II
foreign companies identify their principal competitors in terms of assemblers operating in
other Caribbean Basin countries and exporting to the United States, whereas Group I
firms identify their principal competitors in terms of major US firms in the United States
market. They have tended to define their own competitive advantages and those of their
rivals more in terms of labour costs and competitive prices than in terms of corporate
flexibility, as is the case for Group I. Tables II.3 and II.4 provide complete information on
the competitive advantages of these firms.
Table II.3 contains information on the competitive advantages of all the
companies, comparing the situation 1985-1989 with that in 1990-1995. First, the
opinions for the recent period, 1990-1995, are stronger than those for the previous
period, 1985-1989, in that four elements account for over one-half of all responses. In
general, the two periods do not show major changes: product quality and competitive
prices figure in the lists of principal competitive advantages for both periods. Within this
context, certain differences should be noted. In the first period, these businessmen felt
that their four primary advantages--product quality, low wages, access to international
markets and competitive prices--had about equal importance. In the more recent period,
product quality had become by far the major advantage. In addition, while competitive
                                                           
50   An important component of this competition comes from contraband, under-invoicing
practices and used clothing. See G. Fernandez, La industria textíl y de confección en Costa Rica,
Cámara Textíl de Confección, (CATECO), San José, 1994.
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prices are still important, the top four advantages now include rapid delivery and flexible
production. In other words, the principal competitive advantages of these firms are
roughly similar, but they have increased in sophistication over time.
Table II.3
QUESTIONNAIRE: COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES FOR ALL




48.0 1985-1989: All firms
13.5 Product quality
11.5 Low wages
11.5 Access to international markets
11.5 Competitive prices




10.4 Flexible production process
Source: Company interviews.
Table II.4 demonstrates that there is considerable diversity by group. First, the
opinions of the Group III national firms (in which four factors account for over three-
quarters of their total replies) and those for the Group I large assemblers of  under
garment (over two-thirds) are considerably stronger than the Group II newer foreign
assemblers of other clothing (less than one-half). With regard to the opinions of the
Group III national firms, it can be said that their world of competition has been vastly
transformed. In 1985-1989, that world consisted of producing cheaply and gaining
access to the United States market (accounting for over 58% of their total responses);
quality did not appear as a principal competitive advantage. In 1990-1995, however
cost concerns were superseded by concerns for quality and service (i.e., rapid delivery),
which now account for one-half of their responses to this question. This undoubtedly
reflects their need to compete for contracts from major United States buyers in order to
compensate for the increased difficulty in maintaining their national market shares.
Purchased process technology is another important new ingredient in their competitive
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The competitive advantages of Group II (i.e., newer foreign assemblers of other
clothing) were firmly based on wage and productivity concerns during the 1985-1989
period, with product quality and market access playing secondary roles. By 1990-1995,
product quality had become the principal advantage, and rapid delivery had also become
80
significant. The competition faced by these firms has intensified considerably. This
probably reflects (with the exception of the two Asian firms) the role of these
subsidiaries as relatively large production components of relatively small United States
companies facing extremely fierce foreign competition in their home markets.
Finally, the competitive advantages of Group I (i.e., large United States
assemblers of under garments) suffered less disruption. Quality and a flexible production
process were already among their principal competitive advantages in 1985-1989 and
they continued to be so during the following period. Low wages and market access
became less important and were replaced by competitive prices and fewer defects. In
other words, the evolution of the competitive advantages of these companies was
largely to improve on existing ones or replace those that were no longer sustainable. As
mentioned above, these large subsidiaries of major United States under garment
producers sell almost exclusively to their parent  companies, and they form part of a
relatively extensive corporate network in the Caribbean Basin. They possess the
capability to add or close  assembly lines according to the relative competitive situations
of their various operations. This represents international competitiveness in a corporate
framework.
The competitive advantages of the three different groups of companies change
in accordance with the competitive situations they face in the international market. The
national firms face more severe challenges than do the foreign ones. Within the category
of foreign firm, the large assemblers of under garments have experienced fewer
difficulties than the newer assemblers of other clothing (especially those with quotas in
the United States market). How these companies have taken on the international market
challenges is reflected in their corporate strategies.
(b) General corporate strategies
The corporate strategies of these clothing companies operating in Costa Rica
during 1990-1995 capture central aspects of their responses to the new competitive
situation. Ten of the firms classify their corporate strategies as expansive, four view
them as neutral and two see them as defensive. In general, these firms have taken an
aggressive attitude toward the international market challenges that they face. More
revealing is the distribution of this information by group, as table II.5 attests. All of the
Group I firms have expansive strategies. The Group II has a more mixed experience,
with the majority of firms (4) possessing neutral strategies and the minority (3)
expansive ones. Group III is split between two firms with expansive strategies and two
with defensive ones. The managers’ opinions on their corporate strategies square well
with their opinions on their competitive situation during 1990-1995, that is, changes in
the international market shares of their principal product.
The principal elements of the international strategies of the companies operating
in Costa Rica and those of their parent firms (where pertinent) are largely the same.
Table II.6 indicates that improving quality, improving production efficiency and
expanding operations in Costa Rica figure as three of the four elements in both cases.
The only difference is that the parent corporations give greater emphasis to quality,
while the subsidiaries in Costa Rica give more to efficiency. Furthermore, the latter
mention the need for more specialization, while the parent companies give greater
priority to increasing international market share.
81
Table II.5




Group I Group II Group III
10 Expansive 5 3 2
4 Neutral - 4 -
2 Defensive - - 2
16 Total 5 7 4
                Source: Company interviews.
Table II.6







9.4 Improve efficiency of production
8.3 Expand operations in Costa Rica
8.3 Increase international market shares
(25.0) National firms (not applicable)
48.0 Subsidiaries in Costa Rica
17.7 Improve efficiency of production
11.5 Improve product quality
9.4 Expand operations in Costa Rica
9.4 Increase specialization
      Source: Company interviews.
Table II.7 distinguishes the different groups of companies with regard to the
parent corporations. It can be assumed that the international strategy elements
represent indications of where these parent corporations feel they must improve their
performance. The elements mentioned by the parent corporations of the Group I firms
emphasize improved production efficiency (20% of responses), more specialization
(20%) and increased international market share (16.7%). These would appear to
represent incremental improvements on their already good performance.
The parent corporations of the Group II firms emphasize first and foremost
improving quality (23.8%), followed by improving the production process (11.9% for
rationalization it and 9.5% for modernization). These considerations do not indicate an




QUESTIONNAIRE: PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL




56.7 Group I parent corporations
20.0 Improve efficiency of production
20.0 Increase specialization
16.7 Increase international market share
54.7 Group II parent corporations
23.8 Improve quality
11.9 Rationalize production by cost reduction
9.5 Expand operations in Costa Rica
9.5 Modernize production process
100 Group III (national firms)
100 Not applicable
                Source: Company interviews.
These parent corporations specifically refer to expanding operations in Costa
Rica, an indication of the greater relative importance of the country in the Group II
international production network.
The views of the Costa Rican subsidiaries on the principal elements of their
international strategies are found in table II.8. The first three elements of the
international strategy of Group I firms are identical to those ascribed to their parent
corporations. More emphasis is given to improving production efficiency (30% of
responses) and somewhat less given to increasing international market share (13.3%).
However, the major difference is the inclusion of expanding operations in Costa Rica
(13.3%). This suggests that those operations are important but not fundamental for the
parent corporations, as they possess similar operations in other Caribbean Basin
countries.
Group II firms, on the other hand, demonstrate certain differences in their
international strategies as compared with those of their parent corporations. Modernizing
the production process is considered of equal importance (16.7% of responses) as
improving quality, for example, and improving the efficiency of production (11.9%)
figures in the subsidiaries’ list but not in that of the parent firms. The expansion of
operations in Costa Rica is of greater importance (11.9%) for them than for their parent
corporations. These subsidiaries feel responsible for improving the overall corporate
production process, in which they represent a relatively larger component.
Group III national enterprises do not have parent corporations their own
international strategy must therefore compensate for that fact. These firms stress the
need to specialize their disperse national operations (20.8%), and to acquire what a
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30.0 Improve efficiency of production
20.0 Increase specialization
13.3 Increase international market share
13.3 Expand operations in Costa Rica
69.1 Group II
16.7 Improve product quality
16.7 Modernize production process
11.9 Improve efficiency of production
11.9 Expand operations in Costa Rica
11.9 Rationalize production by cost reduction
54.2 Group III
20.8 Increase specialization
16.7 Acquire world-class technology
16.7 Improve product quality
Source: Company interviews.
The influence of the parent corporation in the operations of the Costa Rican
subsidiaries is demonstrated in table II.9. Generally, all foreign companies feel that
influence in two principal areas: the setting of production targets and product marketing.
Group I and Group II differ with regard to the selection of technology (21.4% in the
case of Group II firms) and quality control (16.7% in the case of Group I enterprises).
Quality control is more important to Group I firms because they assemble more
sophisticated products in which quality, design and fashion are essential aspects in
buyer preferences. Group II firms put greater emphasis on technology because they are
under particularly intense pressure to reduce production costs. Furthermore, they place
somewhat less importance on marketing the product (14.3%) as a parent corporation
function since some of them sell directly to clients in the United States market, whereas




QUESTIONNAIRE: PARENT CORPORATION INFLUENCE IN





14.6 Setting of production targets
12.6 Technology selection (incl. capital goods)
11.5 Product marketing
(25.0) Not applicable (national firms)
53.4 Group I




21.4 Technology selection (incl. capital goods)
19.0 Setting of production targets
14.3 Product marketing
100 Group III (national firms)
100 Not applicable
        Source: Company interviews.
Table II.10 indicates the managers’ opinions on the advantages of being part of
an international corporate network. They generally stress the same aspects--product
quality and access to international markets--but with different emphasis. Product quality
is the most important for all foreign companies, but Group II firms emphasize it much
more (33.3%) than do Group I enterprises (23.3%). At the same time, Group I
companies give more weight (20%) to international market access than do Group II
firms (11.9%). For Group II enterprises, high productivity and flexible production process
are more important. Group I companies include increased specialization (16.7%)
alongside product quality and international market access. These opinions probably
reflect the fact that Group I companies have already achieved a higher level of product
quality than have Group II firms. Aside from their greater need for improved quality, the
Group II companies portray more of a "cost centre" mentality than do Group I
enterprises.
It will be recalled from table II.6 that improving the efficiency of production is
the principal element of the international strategy of these clothing firms operating in
Costa Rica. Table II.11 elabourates on the means used to achieve it. All companies
identify three principal means: improving labour by way of incentive-based productivity
increases (26%) or more training (18.8%), acquiring better technology (22.9%) and
applying foreign organizational practices (16.7%). The emphasis changes considerably
by group. The foreign companies stress improving labour and acquiring technology but in
different ways. Group I firms put their maximum effort into improving the performance
of labour through training (33.3%) and incentives (26.7%). Group II firms put labour
incentives in first place (31%), but technology (23.8%) and organizational practices
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(23.8%) taken together are more important. Finally, the Group III national enterprises
rank the attainment of foreign inputs, such as technology (29.2%) and organizational
practices (25%), ahead of  improving labour by way of incentives (16.7%) or training
(16.7%). This reflects the national firms' lack of a transnational network.
Table II.10




Advantages of transnational network
49.0 All firms
21.9 Product quality
11.5 Access to international markets
8.3 Flexible production process
7.3 Increased specialization
25.0 Not applicable (national firms)
60.0 Group I
23.3 Product quality





11.9 Flexible production process
11.9 Access to international markets
      Source: company interviews.
This section on corporate strategies has effectively shown that these strategies
are important, but they vary considerably according to the international market challenge
or competitive situation faced by the different companies.
The large United States assemblers of under garments employ expansive
strategies. The foreign assemblers of other clothing are divided between those with
neutral and those with expansive strategies. The national firms are split between those
with expansive and those with defensive strategies. These distinct situations are evident
in all aspects of their corporate strategies, including the principal elements of parent
corporations and local firms, the parent corporations’ influence in the subsidiaries’
operations, the advantages of transnational networks and the means of improving the
efficiency  of production. The next section analyses the differences in the competitive
advantages of these distinct groups of companies.
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Table II.11






26.0 Better labour productivity via incentives
22.9 Better technology
18.8 Better labour productivity via training
16.7 Foreign organizational practices
76.7 Group I
33.3 Better labour productivity via training
26.7 Better labour productivity via incentives
16.7 Better technology
78.6 Group II
31.0 Better labour productivity via incentives
23.8 Better technology
23.8 Foreign organizational practices
87.6 Group III
29.2 Better technology
25.0 Foreign organizational practices
16.7 Better labour productivity via incentives
16.7 Better labour productivity via training
      Source: Company interviews.
(c)  Detailed aspects of corporate strategies
This part of the study provides a more detailed analysis of certain aspects of the
international competitiveness of these firms, namely human resources, work
organization, technology, procurement and market access. These factors permit an even
better appreciation of the nature of the corporate strategies of these firms and some of
the difficulties they face in specific areas.
 The companies in the study clearly consider the improvement of human
resources as a central element in their strategy to become more efficient.  Table II.12
outlines what they consider to be the problems in this area. In general, the three
difficulties most often cited are high rotation of personnel (28.1% of total responses),
the lack of skilled workers (21.9%) and the high cost of social security (20.8%). The
different groups of companies view in somewhat different ways their principal problems
with regard to human resources.
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Table II.12






28.1 High rotation of personnel
21.9 Lack of skilled workers
20.8 High cost of social security
80.0 Group I
43.3 High rotation of personnel
16.7 Lack of skilled workers
10.0 High cost of social security
10.0 Resistance to modernization
78.5 Group II
33.3 High cost of social security
21.4 High rotation of personnel
11.9 Lack of skilled workers
11.9 Impact of labour laws
79.1 Group III
45.8 Lack of skilled workers
20.8 High rotation of personnel
12.5 Cost of social security
      Source: company interviews.
The large United States assemblers of under garments in Group I see the high
rotation of workers (43.3%) as the primary problem, with the lack of skilled workers
(16.7%), the cost of social security (10%) and labour resistance to modernization (10
percent) playing much smaller roles. The Group II foreign assemblers of other clothing
complain most about the cost of social security (33.3%), while the high rotation of
personnel (21.4%), the lack of skilled workers (11.9%) and the impact of labour laws
(11.9%) are of secondary importance. Finally, the Group III national enterprises focus on
the lack of skilled workers (45.8%), while other factors such the high rotation of
personnel (20.8%) and the high cost of social security (12.5%) carry much less weight.
In other words, each group of companies has a very particular view as to the central
problem with human resources: for Group I, it is the high rotation of personnel; for
Group II, it is the high cost of social security; and for Group III, it is the lack of skilled
workers.
The use of incentives to increase labour productivity is clearly one means of
addressing the principal problem, of the high rotation of personnel. This problem affects
all firms, but it is especially difficult for those with intensive labour practices, notably
the large Group I companies.
In Table II.11, training and foreign organizational practices are also mentioned as
means to deal with these problems. With regard to training, it comes as a surprise that
few of the companies (five of sixteen) invest the equivalent of more than 1% of their
sales in training, and almost all of the training which takes place is in-house, such that
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existing staff does not receive any kind of formal training in educational institutions.
This is also reflected in the fact that there has been no perceptible change in the
structure of employment of these firms, in which 85% the work-force are workers.
More serious still, there has been no alteration in the proportion of skilled and unskilled
workers. In other words, the training that takes place seems to be almost exclusively
the short-term preparation of newly contracted personnel. The constant rotation of
personnel in search of higher wages is a strong disincentive here.
With regard to work organization, automation does not play any significant role
in dealing with the existing human resources problems. Only three firms have any
appreciable level of automation in their operations, and they are mainly in the
receivables and shipping departments, not in production itself. Major innovations in
production have been limited to the use of programmemable sewing machines, which is
rather widespread. Little in the form of numerically controlled machinery, robots or
programmemable transport equipment is found in these enterprises. Thus, automation is
not a means used by these companies to increase efficiency and thereby improve
international competitiveness.
The principal change in the companies’ work organization has come from the
application of foreign organizational practices, as shown in table II.13. In general, these
changes involve making the production line more flexible (21.9%), forming work teams
(15.6%), implementing statistical control processes (14.6%) and adopting just-in-time
(JIT) inventory controls (11.5%). These factors vary according to group. For example,
the more labour-intensive Group I companies stress factors such as  statistical control
processes (20%), training labour to peform multiple tasks (16.7%) and the use of work
teams (16.7%) in their efforts to improve efficiency. The Group II firms give similar
weight several factors, including making the production line more flexible (19%),
forming work teams (16.7%), implementing JIT inventory controls (14.3%) and
statistical control processes (14.3%), while the Group III enterprises center all efforts on
making the production line more flexible (41.7%). The national firms have also
implemented quality control circles (16.7%). Fifteen of the sixteen companies have
made major innovations in the work organization of their firm; significant differences by
group are apparent.
The results obtained from these innovations in work organization are presented
in table II.14. For all firms taken together the principal benefits are found in improved
quality (22.9%), increased productivity (16.7%) and faster delivery (13.5%). Improved
quality is the principal benefit for foreign firms in general, although the other benefits
display important differences.
The Group I companies also benefit from reduced non-production costs (13.3%)
and better labour relations (10%), while the Group II enterprises have attained faster
delivery (19%) and higher productivity (16.7%). The benefits obtained by the group III
firms are concentrated in increased productivity (33.3%), better quality (25%) and
lower labour costs (16.7%). For all firms, work organization innovations have led to
improved quality (the principal element of the parent corporations’ international strategy
mentioned in table II.6) and distinct aspects of the efficiency of their production; (the
principal element of the subsidiaries’ international strategy).
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Table II.13
QUESTIONNAIRE: CHANGES IN WORK ORGANIZATION,
 BY GROUP, 1990-1995
Percent Changes Implemented
63.6 All firms
21.9 Production line flexibility
15.6 Work teams
14.6 Statistical process control
11.5 Just-in-time inventory control
53.4 Group I




19.0 Production line flexibility
16.7 Work teams
14.3 Just-in-time inventory control
14.3 Statistical control process
75.1 Group III
41.7 Production line flexibility
16.7 Just-in-time inventory control
16.7 Quality control circles
Source: company interviews.
Table II.14
QUESTIONNAIRE: RESULTS FROM CHANGES IN WORK
ORGANIZATION, BY GROUP, 1990-1995
Responses Results from changes in work organization






13.3 Reduced non-production costs








16.7 Lower labour costs
          Source: company interviews.
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Better technology is the second most important means of improving the
efficiency of production mentioned by these companies in table II.11. Thirteen of these
sixteen firms also feel that technology is fundamental for their international
competitiveness. In terms of the level of their technology, fourteen of these clothing
enterprises consider that their technology is as good as, or better than, their principal
competitors. Twelve of them even consider their technology to be "world class".
Technology, then, is an important competitive advantage for these companies.
Given the importance of technology for these companies, it is particularly
relevant that the source of technology for all the foreign companies is their parent
corporation. National firms, obtain their technology from unrelated foreign producers and
other sources, such as suppliers and international fairs. The function of the foreign
companies is to apply the process and product technology. Only four firms have adapted
the technology in any significant way, and  all four are Group II foreign assemblers of
other clothing. Only four firms of the sixteen, two of them national, make a discernible
effort in terms of research and development. Thirteen of the sixteen companies feel that
their principal product improved during 1990-1995, mainly in terms of design, quality,
fashion, etc., and these changes are directly linked to the technology used.
Table II.15 lists the reasons for the selection of the technology employed.  In
general, as has been indicated, the technology employed primarily results from
decisions by the parent corporations of the foreign companies. This occurs much more
frecuently in the case of Group II (42.9%) than Group I (30%) companies. Other
reasons for choosing technology have to do with quality (13.5%), price (7.3%) and
technical aspects (7.3%). Foreign companies also consider technical assistance to be
significant. For national enterprises, which have to select technology in a more
independent fashion, quality (25%), the reputation of the technology (12.5 percent) and
its acceptance in international markets (12.5%) determine their choice. The groups of
companies thus display clear differences, with national firms representing a qualitatively
distinct situation.
For the sixteen enterprises taken together, the principal benefits of the selected
technology are improved international competitiveness (20.8%), reduced production
costs (17.7%) and increased production capacity (14.6%) (see table II.16). The
distribution of factors by group, however, demonstrated certain significant differences.
For national companies, the principal benefit, by far, of the technology selected
was improved international competitiveness (45.8%).  This factor is of equal importance
with reduced production costs (21.4% each) for Group II. Group I, in contrast does not
mention improved competitiveness among the principal benefits, which are instead
centered on production cost factors. Moreover, the selection of technology by national
firms included benefits which the foreign companies considered to come from being part
of a transnational network, such as access to markets and the incorporation of new
products.
This information on technology as a competitive advantage offers considerable
insight into the distinct operating conditions and competitive situations of these three
groups of clothing companies in Costa Rica.
91
Table II.15
Questionnaire: reasons for technology selection, by group, 1990-1995
Responses % Reasons for selecting this technology
56.2 All firms





30.0 Instructions of parent corporation
13.3 Technical aspects
10.0 Reputation of technology
10.0 Technical assistance included
71.4 Group II
42.9 Instructions of parent corporation
14.3 Quality
7.1 Price
7.1 Technical assistance included
50.0 Group III
25.0 Quality
12.5 Reputation of technology
12.5 Acceptance in international market
Source: Company interviews.
Table II.16




17.7 Reduced production costs
14.6 Increased production capacity
63.3 Group I
26.7 Reduced production costs
23.3 Increased production capacity
13.3 Improved labour performance
61.8 Group II
21.4 International competitiveness
21.4 Reduced production costs
19.0 Improved labour performance
91.6 Group III
45.8 International competitiveness
20.8 Access to specific markets
12.5 Increased production capacity
12.5 Incorporation of new products
Source: Company interviews.
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The Group I subsidiaries operate in a more mature setting in which a relatively
small number of large United States companies have long since restructured their
industry by way of offshore production. These companies operate in various production
sites simultaneously. For them, world-class technology is important for attaining
international competitiveness, but, all of them possess it. The international
competitiveness of these companies depends as much on quality and service as on
production efficiency and specialization. A significant degree of competition takes place
among the distinct production sites of the same corporation.
At the other extreme are the national companies. Possessing no parent
corporation and pertaining to no transnational network, they look to foreign technology
as one of the principal means of attaining international competitiveness and acceptance.
Technology is a central feature in their ability to survive.
The Group II foreign producers of other clothing are found in an intermediate
position.  With the exception of the two Asian firms they have smaller, less well-
positioned parent corporations. They have established their off-shore production sites
more recently than the large producers of under garment and they operate in industry
segments in which technology is crucial to their international competitiveness. Thus,
technology is far more important to them and the Group III national firms than to the
Group I companies.
Evidently, these companies relate their international competitiveness primarily to
human resources, work organization and technology. They were also consulted about
other competitive factors, such as local procurement and international market access.
The lack of importance attributed to these factors needs to be explained.
In 1990-1995 only four of the 16 companies increased their level of local
physical inputs, and these included two national firms, one foreign assembler of under
garments and one foreign assembler of other clothing. Put the other way around, four of
five Group I companies, six of seven Group II enterprises and two of four national
companies did not increase local procurement during that period. On average, the Group
I and II companies sourced over 95% of their physical inputs in-house, whereas two
national companies locally sourced about 30% of their physical inputs. The foreign
companies do not feel that they could improve their international competitiveness
through local sourcing.
The little national sourcing that takes place is mostly in the form of purchases of
inputs, such as packaging materials, thread or buttons, from local suppliers. Very little
subcontracting is registered for foreign companies. Two national firms have appreciable
levels of such, which they explain in terms of reducing costs by way of further
specialization. The reasons that these clothing enterprises do not subcontract more are
contained in table II.17. According to these managers, local subcontractors are not
competitive with regard to quality control (22.9%), price (11.5%) or punctual delivery
(11.5%). Most national firms and some Group II companies also cite the fact that local
subcontractors do not possess the necessary technology. Only a few national companies




QUESTIONNAIRE: PERCEIVED IMPEDIMENTS TO SUBCONTRACTING
IN COSTA RICA, 1990-1995
Responses
%
Impediments: local subcontractors are not...
45.9 All Firms
22.9 Competitive in quality control
11.5 Price competitive
11.5 Trustworthy for punctual delivery
60.0 Group I
33.3 Competitive in quality control
20.0 Price competitive
6.7 Trustworthy for punctual delivery
38.1 Group II
14.3 Competitive in quality control
11.9 Price competitive
11.9 In possession of the necessary technology
58.4 Group III
25.0 Competitive in quality control
16.7 In possession of the necessary technology
16.7 Trustworthy for punctual delivery
     Source: Company interviews.
With regard to international market access, all of these clothing firms feel that
they possess preferential access to the United States market. Thirteen define that
access in terms of the HTS 9802 production sharing mechanism, while three national
firms cite other instruments, such as the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and Guaranteed
Access Levels (GAL). It might be recalled from tables II.9 and II.10 that the principal
influences of the parent corporations and the advantages of pertaining to a transnational
network include market access and the marketing of the subsidiaries' output. For this
reason, the foreign subsidiaries operating in Costa Rica do not attribute much
importance to market access as a factor in their international competitiveness. National
firms were in a distinct situation.
With regard to possible changes in the nature of their market access, the
national firms are generally more knowledgeable than the foreign subsidiaries the Interim
Trade Programme for phasing out the Multifibre Arrangement. As to the foreseeable
impact of NAFTA, which gives certain advantages to assemblers located in Mexico, the
foreign firms perceive more clearly that it could endanger their subsidiary (but not
necessarily their parent corporation, as many have assembly facilities in Mexico). Seven
of the foreign companies think that it will cause their parent corporations to postpone
further investments in Costa Rica.
The companies surveyed do not consider market access restrictions to be a
significant aspect of international competitiveness. When asked about limits on further
exports from their Costa Rican operations, these companies stress not quotas and calls,
but unfavourable tendencies in local costs; and the fact that the parent corporations
make those decisions. Table II.18 indicates the nature of their responses. The principal
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limits on further exports are the overvalued local currency (16.7%), noncompetitive local
salaries and the nature of the parent corporation decisions (12.5 percent). The foreign
companies, both Group I and Group II, stress these three factors (in different order).
Table II.18
QUESTIONNAIRE: CONSTRAINTS ON INCREASING EXPORTS,
BY GROUP,  1990-1995
Responses
%
Constraints on increasing exports
34.8 All Firms
16.7 Overvalued local currency
15.6 Noncompetitive wage rates
12.5 Parent corporation decision
60.0 Group I
23.3 Overvalued local currency
20.0 Parent corporation decision
16.7 Noncompetitive wage rates
45.2 Group II
21.4 Noncompetitive wage rates
14.3 Parent corporation decision
9.5 Overvalued local currency
79.1 Group III
37.5 Lack or high cost of local capital
20.8 Overvalued local currency
12.5 Lack of export financing
8.3 High duties on imported inputs
        Source: Company interviews
The national firms, however, have quite different opinions as to the limits they
face: the lack or high cost of local capital (37.5%), the overvalued local currency
(20.8%), the lack of export financing (12.5%) and the high duties on imported inputs
(8.3%). This again draws attention to the distinct competitive situation of national
firms.
Overall, in terms of the particular aspects of production efficiency and
international competitiveness, these companies strongly emphasize human resources,
work organization and technology. Local sourcing (via suppliers or subcontracting) is of
secondary importance, as are preoccupations with market access or restrictions.
Nevertheless, foreign and national companies face distinct operational conditions and
competitive situations. Within the category of foreign firms, the large assemblers of
under garments demonstrate several important differences in comparison to the
assemblers of other clothing in Costa Rica.
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(d)  The impact of national policy
Of the three major sets of factors affecting the international competitiveness of
these firms (i.e., international market factors, corporate strategies, and national policy),
National policy was considered the least important. This does not mean that national
policy is unimportant, only that it is less important to these enterprises than the other
two sets of factors.
Using the categories of The World Competitiveness Report, the companies were
asked to indicate which had the most influence on the systemic international
competitiveness of Costa Rica. Their opinions demonstrate with no degree of doubt that
human resources is by far the most important element, (with 31.3% of the responses
for 1990-1995).  Other factors such as the internal economic situation of the country
(12.5 percent) and the role of Government (12.5%) are secondary to human resources.
Furthermore, the factors selected, their order and their values changed little from 1985-
1989 to with 1990-1995. All groups of companies put human resources in first place,
well ahead of other factors, and there were no major differences across groups or over
time (see table II.19).
Another indication of the central importance of human resources to Costa Rica's
systemic international competitiveness and the key role it plays in the operations of
these clothing firms is manifest in their replies concerning what would motivate the
transfer of their plants in Costa Rica to competitor countries in the Caribbean Basin.
Eight of the sixteen companies gave a single reply: cheaper labour.
The companies pointed out that Costa Rica possessed many salient competitive
advantages over the other Caribbean Basin (especially Central American) competitors in
the 1980s because many of those countries were experiencing great social turmoil and
political instability and their labour forces were less educated and less disciplined. By the
mid-1990s, Costa Rican production costs (especially wages and social security
contributions) had become less competitive, and the competitor countries had narrowed
the gap with regard to political stability. These managers give the clear message that in
their opinion, Costa Rica's systemic international competitiveness has weakened,
although the principal competitive advantage remains the same.
These enterprises have clear views about which policies favoured and which
policies undermined their operations in 1990-1995 (see table II.20). In general,
favourable policies were related to the opening up of the economy (16.7% of
responses), trade policy (10.4%) and exchange rate policy (10.4%).
The Group II companies hold basically the same opinions as the sample as a
whole. The Group I and  Group III national firms, however, display notable differences.
The former mostly cite very specific policies, such as human resources policy (16.7%)
and FDI policy (13.3%), while the latter refer to quite general policies, such as foreign
policy (25%) and macroeconomic policy (12.5%).
The companies display considerable diversity with regard the national policies
which undermined their operations. For national firms, lack of credit is the principal
problem. For the large United States assemblers of under garments, production cost
factors manifest in the exchange rate and labour costs are foremost. The other foreign
assemblers mention shortcomings in the areas of transport, communications and
infrastructure. Thus, there were significant differences among these groups of











68.8 All firms 72.9 All firms





12.5 Internationalization 14.6 Internationalization
12.5 Government 13.5 Government
70.0 Group I 80.0 Group I




16.7 Government 23.3 Internal economic
situation
59.6 Group II 59.6 Group II
26.2 Human resources 28.6 Human resources
16.7 Government 16.7 Internationalization
16.7 Science and technology 14.3 Administration
70.8 Group III 79.2 Group III
37.5 Human resources 29.2 Human resources






The companies’ opinions as to the national policy elements that have been
consequential in the increase in their exports over the 1985-1995 period are found in
table II.21. The sample as a whole identifies three principle factors: the EPZ and
temporary admission export regimes (17.7% in 1985-1989) and 19.8% in 1990-1995),
the exchange rate (16.7% and 11.5%), and tax incentives (13.5% and 11.5%). In
general, there is little variation over time, and the policies identified have to due with
duty free importation, tax advantages and the exchange rate.
More diversity is evident when the responses are viewed in terms of the distinct
groups of companies. Foreign enterprises obviously appreciate the advantages that they
enjoy, but which are unavailable to national companies. Within the group of foreign
firms, they emphasized the same policy inputs but in a distinct order.  Group II put much
greater emphasis on the export regimes in 1990-1995 (33.3%) than did Group I. The
groups of companies demonstrated relatively little change in their opinions over time.
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Table II.20
QUESTIONNAIRE: NATIONAL POLICIES THAT, FAVOURED OR
UNDERMINED, BY GROUP, 1990-1995
Responses
%




37.5 All firms 35.5 All firms
16.7 Opening up the economy 14.6 Credit policy
10.4 Trade policy 11.5 16.7
10.4 Exchange rate policy 9.4 Infrastructure
policy
43.3 Group I 43.3 Group I





13.3 Opening up the economy 10.0 Social security
policy
10.0 Fiscal policy
66.7 Group II 47.6 Group II
23.8 Opening up the economy 19.0 Transport/commun
ications
14.3 Trade policy 14.3 Infrastructure
policy
14.3 Exchange rate policy 14.3 Exchange rate
policy
14.3 Export promotion policy
50.0 Group III 66.6 Group III
25.0 Foreign policy 50.0 Credit policy
12.5 Exchange rate policy 8.3 Infrastructure
policy
12.5 Macroeconomic policy 8.3 Labour policy
    Source: Company interviews.
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Table II.21
QUESTIONNAIRE: NATIONAL POLICIES THAT PROMOTED INCREASED






54.3 All firms 47.9 All firms
19.8 EPZ/TA regimes a/ 17.7 EPZ/TA regimes a/
11.5 Exchange rate 16.7 Exchange rate
11.5 Tax incentives 13.5 Tax incentives
11.5 Liberal trade policies
66.8 Group I 70.1 Group I
16.7 Exchange rate 26.7 Exchange rate
16.7 Tax incentives 26.7 EPZ/TA regimes a/
16.7 EPZ/TA regimes a/ 16.7 Tax incentives
16.7 Liberal trade policies
52.3 Group II 38.0 Group II
33.3 EPZ/TA regimes a/ 21.4 EPZ/TA regimes a/
11.9 Exchange rate 9.5 Exchange rate
7.1 Tax incentives 7.1 Tax incentives
54.2 Group III 70.9 Group III
25.0 Liberal trade policies 29.2 Liberal trade policies
16.7 Tax incentives 25.0 Tax incentives
12.5 Exchange rate 16.7 Exchange rate
Source: Company interviews.
a/  Export processing zone (EPZ) and temporary admission (TA) export regimes.
Their views on the benefits of the FDI policy, found in table II.22, are similar:
tax advantages Are by far the most prominent element (26%), followed by the right of
entry and establishment (13.5%), and several other factors (6.3% each) mostly related
to fair and just treatment or national treatment. Few FDI policy elements undermine their
operations; these are mostly minor irritants related to the authorizations required and a
few operational restrictions. FDI policy, like other national policies, is viewed primarily in
terms of the incentives and advantages they offer.
One particularly interesting aspect of the opinions of these clothing enterprises
has to do with their evaluation of Costa Rica as a host for FDI (see table II.23). Their
opinions are ranked from excellent (a score of 5) to very bad (a score of 1). In general,
their view of Costa Rica as an FDI host is favourable, although it declined from good in
1985-1989 to average in 1990-1995.
99
Table II.22





58.4 Total- All firms
26.0 Tax advantages
13.5 Entry and establishment
6.3 Property and control
6.3 National treatment
6.3 Fair and just treatment
25.0 national firms (not applicable)
       Source: Company interviews.
Table II.23
QUESTIONNAIRE: COSTA RICA AS HOST FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, BY
GROUP OF COMPANIES, 1985-1995
1990-1995 1985-1989
All firms 3.5 4.0
Group I 3.6 4.5
Group II 3.5 3.8
Group III 3.2 3.7
Source: Company interviews.
Two observations are relevant here. First, Group I gives the most favourable
evaluation of Costa Rica as a host for FDI for the period 1985-1989 but that evaluation
falls to about average for 1990-1995. Second, the national firms have the least
favourable opinion of Costa Rica as a FDI host, and their opinion has also fallen. The
perspective that Costa Rica's position as a FDI host has deteriorated over 1985-1995 is
shared by all firms, in a very forceful way.
National policy is considered to be less important than international market
factors and corporate strategies in defining the international competitiveness of these
companies, but it is far from unimportant. For these enterprises, Costa Rica's principal
advantage is its labour force, primarily in the form of relatively cheap labour. National
policies which assist these firms are, in general, the opening up of the economy and the
cheap local currency, coupled with specific national policies in the form of trade
advantages (i.e., the EPZ and temporary admission regimes) and fiscal incentives. FDI
policy is also considered beneficial for the same reason the tax incentives. Policies
which hinder these firms vary according to group. Group I mentions policies affecting
production costs; Group II emphasizes infrastructural deficiencies; and Group III focuses
on the lack of credit. Interestingly, all groups share the view that Costa Rica's
competitive advantages are deteriorating, as is its stature as an FDI host.
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3.  Analysis
The aim of carrying out a detailed questionnaire of representative clothing companies in
Costa Rica was to examine the nature of their contribution to the successes of that
industry, identify future challenges and better understand the factors influencing the
firms’ behavior. The sample corresponds to about 33% of the total employment and
about 20% of the exports of the Costa Rican clothing industry. It aptly reflects the
importance of firms producing under garments (SITC 846) and men's and boys' outer
wear (SITC 842) because this group of companies is responsible for the major changes
which have taken place in the industry. Thus, the sample can be considered important,
the information gathered is revealing and the analytical factors proved extremely
meaningful.
In particular, the analysis indicates that the interplay of three groups of factors
relating to international competitiveness--the international market, corporate strategies
and national policies--defines the principal elements of three distinct competitive
situations of the sample: the homogeneous group of large United States  assemblers of
under garments (Group I), the group of national firms producing primarily men's and
boys' outer wear (Group III), and the other foreign assemblers of similar outer wear and
other clothing products (Group II). The definition of these separate competitive
situations brings to light a significant coherence in the opinions of the companies of the
sample, resulting in a useful analytical instrument to comprehend the changes which
have taken place and the challenges which the companies must face in the future. Each
competitive situation has a certain inner logic to it.
The very homogeneous Group I firms (i.e., the large United States assemblers of
under garments) operate in a well defined competitive situation. In terms of the
international market, the parent companies of these subsidiaries faced a severe
challenge from Asian competitors in the United States market more than a decade ago.
They responded by establishing off-shore assembly operations in nearby Latin America,
making use of cheap labour in the context of the specific incentives offered by those
countries (mostly duty free import facilities and tax free status) and privileged  access to
the United States market (via the HTS 9802 production sharing mechanism). They were
thus able to meet the Asian challenge head-on. The exports of under garments from the
Caribbean Basin, especially Mexico, the Dominican Republic and Costa Rica, grew
exponentially, and  these United States producers were better able to defend their
United States market shares.
Interestingly, these companies have established widespread assembly networks
in the Caribbean Basin. They tend to have several assembly operations in a number of
countries, which gives them a great capability to respond to changes in the competitive
situation of each cost center. Each individual assembly plant is a relatively small part of
a large organization. With similar assembly operations in several countries, they are able
to add or drop production lines according to the efficiency displayed by each plant, and
only in extreme conditions must they completely abandon any particular site.
International competitiveness for the plant is mainly an internal corporate affair. Today,
most of these firms consider other United States companies, to be their principal
competitors. These strategic elements have produced significant security for the
integrated production system of the parent corporation. They vanquished the Asian
challenge.
With regard to the operational aspects of the corporate strategies, these
companies tend to be increasingly specialized in their production, sophisticated in terms
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of quality and, at the same time, more labour intensive than the rest of the sample in
Costa Rica.
They are more aggressive in terms of corporate strategy and more "corporate" in
their outlook, because they understand their specific role in the integrated international
production system of their parent corporation. Quality is especially important because
they export to their headquarters, which then markets the product. Thus, quality is as
important as production costs in the competition among subsidiaries of a single
corporation.
In their labour-intensive operations, the major problem is the rotation of
personnel. Because they strive for increased efficiency, they focus particularly on labour
productivity, which they improve through training and monetary incentives. They have
implemented sophisticated initiatives in terms of work organization, including statistical
control processes, multitasking and work teams. The high rotation means the loss of
some of their investments in training. The companies claim that these initiatives result in
improved quality and better labour relations. In other words, these companies improve
their ability to compete by way of labour productivity, quality and service. The gains in
labour productivity presumably help to offset the increased costs of labour  (i.e. wages
and social security), especially in view of the appreciating national currency. Also
notable is the fact that technology is viewed as a "given" within the corporate context,
and it is not adapted to the local situation. The labour force is trained to meet corporate
standards of performance. Virtually no local physical inputs (via local sourcing or
component subcontracting) enter into the production process. Each assembly plant is a
self-contained element of the corporate network, producing a small range of identical
items in a highly competitive manner.
This situation has produced very significant results in Costa Rica. The under
garment industry  has become the principal source of clothing exports from Costa Rica
to the United States. It includes three operations established before 1982 and two other
operations established in the late 1980s, all corresponding to what we have defined as
Group I firms. These enterprises account for over 60% of the exports and total
employment of the sample. Measured by the number of employees, their operations
doubled during 1985-1989 and doubled again during 1990-1995. They have been
extremely successful with their expansive corporate strategies.
A glance at the ten principal Costa Rican clothing exports to the United States in
1994 (as shown in table I.12) reveals that four of those items fall into the under
garments category: brassieres (HTS 621210), cotton panties (610821), synthetic fiber
panties (610822) and cotton underpants (620711). The corresponding tables of the
United States market shares for these items indicate that in each and every case, the
Asian market shares fell (on average from 36% to 27.5%) and Latin American shares
increased (on average from 43% to 65.5%) during the 1990-1995 interim. At the same
time, these tables indicate that Costa Rica lost market share for these products in 1995,
except in the case of cotton underpants. Other Latin American countries were gaining
significant market shares in these items (for brassieres, the Dominican Republic and
Mexico; for cotton panties, Honduras and Mexico; and for synthetic fibre panties,
Colombia, Honduras and El Salvador). In other words, these and other assemblers of
under garments have accelerated their use of off-shore operations in the Caribbean Basin
in the context of the mentioned corporate strategy.
A cloud on their horizon and that of Costa Rican under garment exports is that
the sharp increase in the United States imports provoked complaints by domestic
producers.  United States authorities responded by imposing calls in 1995, something
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which will undoubtedly dampen the further expansion of these operations even
considering the favourable WTO ruling.
At the other extreme within the sample is the competitive situation of the four
national companies, which we have labeled the Group III enterprises. This is a
homogeneous group of mostly small, old producers of men's and boys' outer wear (SITC
842) and other clothing, they operate via the export contract regime in order to export
to the United States market, where some of their goods face quotas. These companies
were created during the import substitution phase. Since the policy reorientation of the
1980s, they have experienced collapsing national market shares because of import
penetration and have been obliged to adapt by seeking out contracts with foreign
buyers, mainly large department stores or trademarked clothing producers. They
compete with the rest of the world for relatively short-term contracts in which price is
the principal determinant. They have none of the advantages of the transnational
corporations (TNCs) which assemble in Costa Rica. Distinct from the foreign firms,
corporate strategies are more central to their competitiveness than international market
factors. They tend to adopt defensive stances and have experienced mixed results. One
national firm in this group went bankrupt in 1996.
It is of considerable relevance to point out the disadvantages of these national
companies compared to the TNCs. First, the transnational network allows better
programmeming of individual plant capacities to accommodate sporadic and changing
demand for their relatively more specialized products. In this way, it is much more
flexible. Second, the parent company in the transnational network takes care of many
aspects of the operations, including the selection and purchase of technology,
marketing, acquiring new organizational practices and quality standards. Third, the
network possesses more mobility because it can easily add new production lines in more
competitive sites or, if necessary, migrate to them. Fourth, the TNCs have the financial
capacity to offer or guarantee loans for local expansion or adaptation. Considering that
the national firms define their principle competitors as foreign firms with assembly
operations in the Caribbean Basin, they are in a very difficult situation.
Their opinions on national policy are also relevant. These enterprises hold that
national policy is considerably less importance to their competitiveness than it is for
foreign firms, even though it could conceivably level some of the disadvantages they
face vis-à-vis their foreign competitors, which are mainly installed in EPZs in the
Caribbean Basin. They view their single most important impediment to further exports to
be the lack of local financing and its high cost which they identify as the principal failure
of national policy. Several feel  abandoned by their own Government.
The operational aspects of their corporate strategies reflect the lack of both a
transnational network and an accommodating national policy. These companies
generally, are less specialized, less sophisticated in terms of quality and, at the same
time, less willing to improve on their principal advantage. Cognizant of the fact that
cheap labour is their principal comparative advantage, they bemoan the lack of skilled
labour but do little to create it through training. Rather, they see their international
competitiveness as dependent mainly on the acquisition of foreign technology, which
they select on the basis of quality, reputation and acceptance in the United States
market but which they have to adapt to their local operations.
Efficiency is improved primarily by way of foreign technology and the use of
foreign organizational practices. These practices help make their production lines more
flexible, improve quality and lower labour costs. Some of these enterprises possess high
levels of local procurement, but they do not considered this to be basic to their
international competitiveness. Other companies feel that they must look to foreign
103
sources to resolve the mounting problems they encounter in terms of productions costs.
They appear to be trying to acquire the means to make significant improvements in
quality to compensate for rising deficiencies in competitive pricing. With regard to their
exports, these firms can be characterized as relatively low cost producers of mostly
short runs of simple, standardized clothing items for international contractors.
This second group of companies plays a relatively minor role in the context of
the sample. They correspond to less than 10% of employment and exports. In 1985-
1989, these companies were as successful as the Group I firms: both groups doubled
their labour forces. During the 1990-1995 interim, however, the Group III firms  down
sized by one-third. Moreover, their national market shares fell in the face of import
liberalization. As mentioned, this group has had  mixed success.
The cloud on their horizon is that they have all their marbles in Costa Rica, an
assembly site which seems to be losing its cheap labour advantage to other Caribbean
Basin countries.
The third competitive situation in this analysis concerns all the remaining foreign
companies in the sample, referred to as Group II. This is a less homogeneous group than
the others. Generally, it consists of new, smaller, foreign (5 United States, 2 Asian)
assemblers of men's and boys' outer clothing (SITC 842) and other clothing which
export to the United States using EPZs, the temporary admission regime the HTS 9802
mechanism. Many of their products face quotas. These enterprises are found in a
competitive situation located between that of the Group I large United States
assemblers of under garments and that of the Group III national firms, and they share
elements of both.
Like the Group I companies, they possess a corporate network with many
advantages, but they generally represent bigger, less specialized components of smaller,
less extensive corporate networks. They identify their competitors and their competitive
situation more like the national firms: their competitors are other assembly operations in
the Caribbean Basin, and the nature of the competition is cut-throat price competition
for contracts or defending the flagging market shares of their parent corporations. They
have a more stark cost centre mentality. Five of the seven enterprises state that their
principal motive for leaving Costa Rica, if the situation were to arise, would be to obtain
cheaper labour elsewhere. One Asian company shifted from being a supplier to its
corporate sales network in the United States to being a relatively independent
competitor for contracts with unrelated major buyers.
More than half of these companies have neutral corporate strategies, although,
none have defensive ones like some national firms. The essence of their corporate
strategy in Costa Rica is similar to that of the national firms, solidly based on cheap
labour with a recent preoccupation for quality. Also like national companies, they face a
harsh renewal in which the modernization and rationalization of production are crucial.
This can be appreciated in certain of their operational aspects. They seek to
improve efficiency in the same fashion as national companies, using monetary incentives
for labour and the acquisition and implementation of foreign technologies and
organizational practices. Although their principal human resources problem (i.e., the high
cost of social security) is somewhat different from that of national firms, they seek the
same work organization improvements: a more flexible production line. Moreover, the
results have been the same as for national firms: lower production costs and higher
quality.
Like the large United States assemblers in Group I, these companies receive their
technology from the parent corporation; like the national companies, however, they
adapt it to the local setting. They also mention rapid delivery as one of their competitive
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advantages, again similar to national firms, but they feel that productivity is an
advantage which derives from their corporate network. Three of the seven companies
complain that their principal competitors have access to cheaper labour than they do,
which the Group I companies also mention.
These enterprises are important, and they represented over 30% of the exports
and the employment of the sample. They have not done nearly as well as the Group I
foreign firms in terms of expanding their employment in 1990-1995, which increased by
one-half; nevertheless, that figure is appreciably better than the performance of the
Group III national firms. In terms of international market share, three companies
improved during 1990-1995 and four did not. Major export items which tended to lose
some of their dynamism in 1995 include men's and boys' suits, men's and boys' pants
and women's pants.
Quotas in the United States market on many of their products is a constant
cloud on their horizon because it permits only a moderate and measured expansion of
exports. In addition, NAFTA represents a new challenge for these companies. Given that
few of these corporate networks include operations in Mexico, the operations of
competitors in that country are considered to have significant advantages. The
uncertainty surrounding the impact of NAFTA could significantly limit further
investments on their part in Costa Rica.
In sum, the analysis of the successes of challenges to the Costa Rican clothing
industry is facilitated by examining the three distinct competitive situations of different




CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY OPTIONS
1.  Conclusions
Costa Rica constitutes one of the few countries of Latin America that in some way took
advantage of the opportunities available in international trade in 1980-1995. It adapted
relatively well to the important changes which occurred in the international market. That
adaptation took two forms: first, Costa Rica radically altered the structure of its exports
to OECD in favour of manufactures, and second within the category of manufactures
Costa Rica increased its market share in several of the more dynamic categories.
Costa Rica's success in exporting clothing derives from numerous factors, most
notably the international market, corporate strategies and national policy elements. Each
of these areas has been important in some manner.
The international market  has played a very significant role in Costa Rica's
emergence as a clothing supplier to the United States market. After all, it was the Asian
challenge in that market which provoked a strong response in terms of restructuring on
the part of the United States firms interested in defending their own faltering national
market shares.
That response took the form of new corporate strategies by which United States
firms attempted to improve their ability to compete against the Asian challenge in their
own market by engaging in certain offshore assembly activities. These activities
generally involved assembling basic garments characterized by standardized production
runs, low-skilled tasks, few styling changes and reasonably predictable consumer
demand, choosing sites close to the United States market which were eligible for United
States trade preferences and where cheaper manpower was available. For both the large
United States companies assembling garments for their parent corporations and the
small national firms, other factors also influenced their corporate strategies.
The general reaction was very much facilitated by national policies. For its part,
the United States Government contributed to this process through the production
sharing mechanism (TSUS 807, later HTS 9802) in the context of bilateral agreements
permitting special access to the United States market for offshore assemblers. At the
same time, the Governments of the host countries in which the offshore assembly took
place promoted these activities through tax and trade incentives in the form of EPZs and
other regimes for assembling imported inputs for export.
Thus, international market factors, new corporate strategies and national policies
were causal elements in the vast improvement of the international competitiveness of
the Caribbean Basin clothing industry.
As a result, Costa Rica became one of the principal "winners" in the United
States clothing import market, gaining market share even from the Asian tigers.
Nevertheless, those successes perhaps were not founded on a solid base, and,  Costa
Rica has recently seen its competitive situation in that market begin to erode as other
Central American assemblers gain market shares.
The challenge to Costa Rican competitiveness in this industry has at least three
dimensions. The first concerns the affirmation that the export success of the apparel
assembly business seems to have occurred at the expense of an integrated textile and
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clothing industry. Short-term gains, in the framework of the debt crisis of the 1980s,
might have been at the cost of longer-term industrialization requirements.
The second has to do with the loss of relative international competitiveness
within the Caribbean Basin and Mexico. Costa Rican wage rates and social security
expenses appear to be pricing the country out of the garment assembly market.
Third, this apparel assembly business depends more than anything else on
preferential access to the United States market, and the United States has proved a
difficult partner. In spite of its commitment to use "as sparingly as possible" the
traditional safeguard provisions of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing and not to impose new quantitative restrictions, it has done just that in the
case of underwear and pyjama imports. Its attempt to pressure exporters into accepting
"voluntary restraints" met opposition in Costa Rica;  the case went before the WTO
Textiles Monitoring Body, which ruled in favour of Costa Rica. Thus, the Costa Rican
clothing industry faces a complex and multifaceted set of challenges.
The aim of carrying out a detailed questionnaire of representative clothing
companies in Costa Rica was to examine the nature of their contribution to the
successes of that industry, identify future challenges and better comprehend the factors
influencing their behavior. In particular, the analysis defines the principal elements of
three distinct competitive situations: the homogeneous group of large United States
assemblers of under garments (Group I), the group of national firms producing primarily
men's and boys' outer wear (Group III) and the other foreign assemblers of similar outer
wear and other clothing products (Group II).
The Group I firms operate in a well defined competitive situation. In terms of the
international market, the parent companies of these subsidiaries faced a severe
challenge in the United States market more than a decade ago. Manufacturers
responded by establishing off-shore assembly operations in nearby Latin America,
making use of cheap labour in the context of the specific incentives offered by those
countries and privileged access to the United States market. Interestingly, these
companies have established more widespread assembly networks in the Caribbean
Basin. They tend to have several assembly operations in a number of countries, which
gives them a great capability to respond to changes in the competitive situation of each
cost centre.
These Group I enterprises tend to be highly specialized in their production,
sophisticated in terms of quality, and, at the same time, more labour intensive than the
rest of the sample in Costa Rica. They apply more aggressive corporate strategy and are
more "corporate" in their outlook, because, they understand their specific role in the
integrated international production system of their parent corporation. Quality is
especially important because they export to their headquarters, which then  market the
product.
They improve their ability to compete by way of increases in labour productivity,
quality and service. The gains in labour productivity, presumably, help to offset the
increased costs of labour (i.e. wages and social security), especially in viewed in
appreciating national currency. Also notable is the fact that technology is viewed as a
"given" within the international market context, and it is not adapted to the local
situation. The labour force is trained to meet corporate standards of performance.
Virtually no local physical inputs (via local sourcing or component subcontracting) enter
into the production process. Each assembly plant is a self-contained element of the
corporate network, producing a small range of identical items in a highly competitive
manner.
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At the other extreme, the companies in Group III were created for the most part
during the import substitution period. Since the reorientation of macroeconomic policy in
the 1980s, they have experienced collapsing national market shares because of import
penetration and have been obliged to adapt by seeking out contracts with foreign
buyers, mainly large department stores or trade marked apparel companies in the United
States. They compete with the rest of the world for relatively short-term contracts in
which price is the principal determinant. Distinct from the foreign firms, their own
corporate strategies are considered more central to their competitiveness than
international market factors. They tend to adopt defensive stances and have experienced
mixed results.
It is of considerable relevance to point out their disadvantages compared to the
TNCs.  First, the transnational network allows better programming of individual plant
capacities to accommodate sporadic and changing demand for their relatively more
specialized products. In this way, it is much more flexible. Second, the parent company
in the transnational network takes care of many aspects of the operations, including the
selection and purchase of technology, marketing, acquiring new organizational practices
and quality standards. Third, the network possesses more mobility because it can easily
add new production lines in more competitive sites or, if necessary, migrate to them.
Fourth, the TNC have the financial capacity to invest in or guarantee local plant
expansion or adaptation. Considering that the national firms define their principle
competitors as foreign firms with assembly operations in the Caribbean Basin, they are
in a very difficult situation.
These companies hold that national policy is considerably less important to their
competitiveness than it is for foreign firms, even though it could conceivably  level some
of the disadvantages they face vis-à-vis their foreign competitors, which are mainly
installed in EPZs in the Caribbean Basin. They view their single most important
impediment to further exports to be the lack of or high cost of local financing, which
they identify as the principal failure of national policy.
Generally, these companies are less specialized, less sophisticated in terms of
quality and, at the same time, less willing to invest in what can clearly be considered
their principal comparative advantage: cheap labour. Rather, they see their international
competitiveness as more dependent on the acquisition of foreign technology, which they
select on the basis of quality, reputation and acceptance in the United States market but
which they have to adapt to their local operations.
They seek to improve their efficiency primarily through foreign technology and
the use of foreign organizational practices. These practices help make their production
lines more flexible, improve quality and lower labour costs. Some of these enterprises
possess high levels of local procurement, but they do not consider this to be basic to
their international competitiveness. They are trying to acquire the means to make
significant improvements in quality to compensate for increasing shortfalls in
competitive pricing. With regard to their exports, these firms can be characterized as
relatively low-cost producers of mostly short runs of simple,  standardized clothing items
for international contractors.
The Group II enterprises represent the middle ground. They are bigger, less
specialized components of smaller, less extensive corporate networks. Their competitors
are other assembly operations in the Caribbean Basin, and the nature of the competition
is cut-throat price competition for contracts or defending the flagging market shares of
their parent corporations. They moved off-shore more recently than the Group I firms.
They have a more stark cost-center mentality. The essence of their corporate strategy in
Costa Rica is similar to that of the national firms, solidly based on cheap labour with an
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emerging preoccupation for quality. Also like national companies, they face a harsh
renewal in which the modernization and rationalization of production are central aspects
of their corporate strategies.
They seek to improve efficiency in the same fashion as national firms, using
monetary incentives for labour and the acquisition and implementation of foreign
technologies and organizational practices. Although their principal human resources
problem (i.e., the high cost of social security) is somewhat different from that of
national firms, they seek the same work organization improvements: a more flexible
production line. These companies receive their technology from the parent corporation;
like the national companies, however, they adapt it to the local setting. They also
mention rapid delivery as one of their competitive advantages, again similar to national
firms, but they feel that productivity is an advantage which derives primarily from inputs
from their corporate network.
Thus, it can be appreciated that the problems of the Costa Rican garment
industry do not affect all firms equally. Corporate strategies allow for different reactions
to the various challenges faced by the industry.
The large subsidiaries of the generally well-known TNCs which make up the
Group I companies already possessed an integrated international production system, so
they can adapt to changing competitive situations by expanding a production line in one
country and reducing another in a second country. They do not have to physically shift
production from one location to another. The Group II subsidiaries of smaller, less well-
known TNCs do not have those advantages. Also they often do not produce for direct
sale to their parent corporation but rather for international buyers, usually the big
department stores or specialist clothing companies. They face a more direct competitive
situation, in general, and a growing cost differential among distinct production sites can
result in the physical transfer of plant and equipment to another location. Finally, the
Group III national firms possess neither the integrated international production system of
the former nor the footloose capabilities of the latter. Born for the most part during the
import substitution era, they have seen their national market shares collapse in the face
of new imports and have been forced to compete for assembly-based export contracts.
This has the effect of truncating their vertical integration and weakening the
underpinnings of the Costa Rican industrialization process.
Costa Rican national policy makers thus face certain challenges at the national,
sectoral and company levels with regard to the clothing industry.
2.  Policy options
The Costa Rican authorities face three important decisions with regard to the clothing
industry. The first decision is whether to do something about the competitive situation
of the industry or to do nothing, leaving it to slowly disintegrate as Costa Rica’s low
wage competitive advantages degenerate. If they decide to do something, a second
decision concerns what to do, and finally how to do it.
Rather than taking a hurried decision based on conjectural, extraordinary or
ideological factors, the situation of the garment industry requires contemplation. One
must look toward the future in taking these decisions. In less than ten years, the
international situation may be considerably distinct: formal import quotas in the major
importing markets could be eliminated, as could the formal incentives for assembly-type
activities in the form of EPZs and the like. Thereafter, import market shares should come
to reflect basic competitive advantages, such as efficiency and innovation.
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In the case of Costa Rica, existing advantages in terms of low wages are
diminishing. This suggests that the foreign firms under the most competitive stress,
such as those of the Group II companies operating in Costa Rica, may find, the country
increasingly less attractive. Nevertheless, the apparel industry in Costa Rica will
probably still contain a large number of enterprises and a lot of manpower, depending on
the extent of the impact of the disappearance of the national export contract regime.
The industry is too important to let it slowly disintegrate, and something be done about
it by way of national policy. This situation can be looked at as an opportunity rather
than as a disaster.
A do-something policy can be outlined according to its national, sectoral and
company level components. At the national level policy should promote systemic
international competitiveness. This implies a coordinated policy package with concrete
targets, such as establishing macroeconomic stability, improving existing infrastructure
(i.e., road, ports, airports, telecommunications, energy sources, etc.) and increasing the
efficiency and workability of national institutions and the regulatory framework. Other
priority areas concern the renovation of the whole educational system for the purpose of
raising the level and results of the labour force. A very serious decision has to be taken
with regards to the role of the manufacturing industry in the national economy, but that
question escapes the limits of the present analysis.
These systemic factors are important determinants of foreign direct investment
inflows. The national FDI policy should move away from incentives, except to the extent
that it might be desirable to channel FDI to very capital-intensive activities such as high
technical mining, tourism or infrastructure.51 In this regard, the privatization policy
should be aimed at improving systemic competitiveness,  not at resolving the financial
problems of the Central Government.
The size of the task facing policy makers is reflected in Table III.1. If one
presumes that an internationally competitive economy will export mostly the same
products to all markets, then Costa Rica suffers extreme deficiencies, except perhaps in
respect to its comparative advantages in natural resources (which are not  very dynamic
in foreign trade). Examining the import market shares of Costa Rica in four separate
regional markets (plus the OECD total), it is apparent that in 1994 only in the North
American and Latin American markets was Costa Rica’s share in any way significant,
with greater than one-tenth of 1% of the total imports of those markets.
Costa Rica’s principal market shares are in natural resources, where it has
doubled its shares in the North American (to 0.61%), Western European (to 0.25%) and
Latin American (to 0.26%) markets, but does not export much to Japan (0.02%). Its
market shares in manufacturing, on the other hand, have increased fivefold and are
concentrated totally in the North American (0.16%) and Latin American (0.17%)
markets. Within the manufacturing sector, the clothing industry is very dynamic, but
only in one market – North America. Although Latin America is promising, clothing is
not among the top ten products exported to that market. Only in the case of the North
American market does this industry figure prominently, as shown in table III.1. In other
words, the clothing industry cannot be considered systemically competitive.
The central purpose of the sectoral level policy should be to make the clothing
industry systemically competitive, which means converting the sector’s somewhat
spurious international competitiveness into something more authentic. This entails
                                                           
51 Presently in Costa Rica, the 1% tax on assets operates as a distinct disincentive to
foreign investors in capital-intensive activities.
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relying less on the previous framework, which consists of low wages,  general export
incentives, and United States market preferences and more on modernizing the clothing
industry in order to face up the competitive challenges. The phasing out of the Multifibre
Arrangement provides a huge opportunity for the developing countries prepared to
“invest” in it. This is a formidable task and, as is apparent, the Asians possess a
considerable head start.
A first priority is to link the export performance of the industry to the national
industrialization process. The intention of such policy would be to improve on the
production process not simply to increase sales. This entails, where feasible,
conditioning export incentives to increases and improvements in national value-added,
improving labour through training, increasing and diffusing the use of world-class
technology and applying international standards of quality, among other things. In this
sense, Costa Rican incentives must now be united in a “third generation” of incentives
based on improving the international competitiveness of Costa Rican garment
production.
Aside from linking incentives to factors improving the national production
process and not simply to increasing exports, much can be done to improve the
competitive situation of national producers. For example, contraband and dumping in the
national market must be controlled if national producers are to have a reasonable
opportunity to supply their own market. National firms must have at least the same
competitive conditions as foreign companies operating in Costa Rica in terms of facilities
to import inputs and export finish products.
The same general situation holds for the financial aspects of their operations,
specifically taxes. To the extent possible, all garment firms (national and foreign) should
be pre-qualified for financial incentives or tax relief insofar as they reach policy goals in
terms of national value added, labour training, access to technology and quality
standards which imply qualitative, as well as quantitative, advances in the national
productive base for garments.
One might also contemplate concrete cooperation to link the activities of Group I
and Group III enterprises. One such programme might establish centres for training
labour, and for advancing quality, design and technology transfer. If Costa Rica is to
take advantage of the existing industry and adapt it to the foreseeable new international
competitive situation, it must be prepared to invest in its restructuring and upgrading.
This could also form the basis of technical assistance programmes from donor countries
which purchase Costa Rican garments.
Finally, at the company level, the role of Costa Rican policy comes down to one
element: the promotion of excellence. Such a policy necessarily requires the combining
of horizontal aspects affecting all firms in the industry with selective, time-bound
subsidies for certain companies, mainly in Group III. These subsidies will finance the
restructuring and upgrading of operations so that companies can approximate world
standards over a reasonable period of transition. The training centres and design,
technology transfer and quality centres could play important roles as catalysts in this
field if they attain a closer working relationship between Group III and Group I
enterprises. Mutual benefits are clearly possible in this area, particularly if Costa Rica
eventually forms part of any extension of NAFTA and the rules of origin work in its
favour. That would be more feasible if NAFTA-based firms were more clearly aware of
the authentic competitive advantages available in Costa Rica. That is an important
responsibility of Government policy.
Table III.1
COSTA RICA’S EXPORT PERFORMANCE IN INTERNATIONAL MARKETS, 1980 AND 1995
 (percentages)
OECD North America Western Europe Japan Latin America
1980 1995 1980 1995 1980 1995 1980 1995 1980 1995
Market Share 0.07 0.09 0.15 0.23 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.18
 Nat. Res. 0.14 0.25 0.31 0.6 0.11 0.25 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.26
 Manuf. 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.17
Export Structure 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
 Nat. Res. 91.2 60.4 85.2 41.8 97.8 93.8 98.7 87.9 25.0 26.6
 Manuf.  8.0 38.5 13.5 56.6  1.8  6.2  0.5 11.4 75.0 73.2
 Others  0.8  1.1  1.3  1.6  0.4  0  0.8  0.8  0  0.2




SITC   %
95.8
SITC   %
91.5
SITC   %
41.1
057 33.6 057 24.3 057 51.8 071 38.2 541  9.1
071 12.5 846 12.6 071 26.8 037 23.3 642  4.4
846  8.3 842 11.6 292  9.2 292 15.6 562  4.3
842  7.5 844  4.6 792  2.3 291  3.0 893  4.2
292  4.7 071  4.1 792  1.9 057  2.7 098  4.1
844  2.9 845  4.0 036  1.1 845  2.2 424  3.8
845  2.6 843  3.5 037  0.9 553  2.0 625  3.1
843  2.3 897  2.7 772  0.6 058  1.7 665  2.8
058  1.9 011  2.6 424  0.6 846  1.4 583  2.8
054  1.8 054  2.5 611  0.6 072  1.4 591  2.5







INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN GOODS: THE 50 MOST DYNAMIC GROUPS








I. COMPUTER INDUSTRY 1.4 5.3 3.6 276.2
752 Automatic data processing machines and units thereof 0.9 3.3 2.3 284.8
759 Parts, n.e.s. of and accessories for groups 751 or 752 0.5 2.0 1.3 262.5
II. OTHER ELECTRICAL MACH. AND ELECTRONIC
EQPT.
4.1 9.1 5.0 123.2
776 Thermionic, cold cathode and photo-cathode valves 0.8 2.7 0.9 236.3
773 Equipment for distributing electricity 0.2 0.5 0.3 194.6
771 Electrical apparatus and parts 0.1 0.4 0.3 149.6
764 Telecommunications equipment, parts and accessories 0.8 1.9 1.1 123.4
778 Electrical machinery and apparatus 0.8 1.4 0.6 89.1
772 Electrical apparatus for making and breaking electrical
circuits
0.6 1.1 0.5 84.8
761 Television receivers 0.3 0.4 0.1 51.0
775 Household type equipment 0.5 0.7 0.2 41.7
III. CLOTHING 2.0 3.4 1.4 71.4
846 Under garments, knitted or crocheted 0.3 0.6 0.3 87.3
843 Outer garments, for women, girls and infants, of textile
fibers
0.6 1.1 0.5 75.2
845 Outer garments and accessories, knitted or crocheted 0.6 1.0 0.4 74.5
842 Outer garments, for men and boys, of textile fibers 0.5 0.7 0.2 52.6
IV. CHEMICALS AND PHARMACEUTICALS 3.8 6.3 2.5 67.5
553 Perfumery, cosmetics and toilet preparations 0.1 0.4 0.2 181.7
541 Medical and  pharmaceutical products 0.7 1.6 0.9 126.3
514 Nitrogen-function compounds 0.3 0.7 0.4 92.1
533 Pigments, paints, varnishes and related materials 0.2 0.3 0.1 65.8
513 Carboxylic acids and their derivations 0.2 0.4 0.2 46.5
583 Polymerization and copolymerization products 0.9 1.2 0.3 43.8
515 Organic-inorganic and heterocyclic compounds 0.3 0.5 0.1 39.7
598 Other chemical products 0.5 0.7 0.2 37.8
582 Condensation, polycondensation and polyaddition prod. 0.4 0.6 0.2 37.4
V. AUTOMOBILESS 6.6 9.8 3.2 48.6
781 Passenger vehicles 3.8 5.9 2.1 53.0
713 Internal combustion piston engines and parts 0.8 1.2 0.4 49.2
784 Parts and accessories n.e.s. of motor vehicles 2.0 2.7 0.8 39.7
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Table 1 (concl.)
VI. NON-ELECTRICAL MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT 3.5 5.0 1.5 42.5
714 Non-electric engines and motors and their parts 0.4 0.7 0.3 60.8
741 Heating and cooling equipment and their parts 0.3 0.5 0.2 55.7
716 Rotating electric plant and parts 0.3 0.4 0.1 49.7
743 Pumps and compressors, fans and blowers, etc. 0.4 0.6 0.2 48.4
749 Non-electric parts and accessories of machinery 0.8 1.1 0.3 37.5
742 Pumps for liquids and liquid elevators 0.3 0.3 0.1 36.4
728 Other specialized machinery for particular ind. 0.6 0.8 0.2 33.2
744 Mechanical handling equipment, and parts 0.4 0.6 0.2 30.4
SUB TOTAL 21.3 38.9 17.5 82.6
VII. OTHER 6.8 12.0 5.1 75.3
931 Special transactions and commodities not classif. by kind 0.9 2.2 1.3 143.3
898 Musical instruments and parts and accessories 0.3 0.7 0.4 141.0
872 Medical instruments and appliances 0.2 0.4 0.2 130.3
893 Articles of plastics and resins (Division 58) 0.5 1.0 0.5 107.3
812 Sanitary, plumbing, heating and lighting fixtures 0.2 0.3 0.2 87.2
831 Travel goods, shopping bags, handbags, etc. 0.2 0.4 0.2 87.0
894 Games, sporting goods, toys and baby carriages 0.6 1.1 0.6 85.2
821 Furniture and parts 0.7 1.1 0.5 68.9
897 Jewelry, goldsmiths' and silversmiths' wares 0.3 0.4 0.2 59.4
642 Articles of paper and paperboard 0.3 0.4 0.1 54.1
899 Other miscellaneous manufactured articles 0.3 0.4 0.1 50.0
036 Crustaceans and mollusks, fresh 0.3 0.5 0.2 47.1
672 Ingots and other primary forms  of iron or steel 0.3 0.4 0.2 45.0
034 Fresh fish, chilled or frozen 0.4 0.6 0.2 43.2
874 Measuring, checking, analyzing instruments 0.8 1.1 0.3 39.2
684 Aluminum 0.7 1.0 0.3 31.0
TOTAL 28.1 50.8 22.7 80.6
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of the CANPLUS computer programme.
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Table 2
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD): ASPECTS
OF ITS INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS IN OECD
1980 1985 1990 1995
I. Market share 65.81 72.33 75.72 72.71
Natural Resources 1/+2/+3/ 40.73 49.73 55.54 57.62
    Agriculture 1/ 65.88 66.26 70.63 69.24
    Energy 2/ 23.93 35.58 35.81 38.62
    Textile fibers, minerals and metal mines 60.06 61.51 64.65 61.96
Manufactures 4/+5/ 86.08 84.35 82.70 77.49
    Based on natural resources 4/ 70.25 68.77 67.91 61.53
    Not based on natural resources 5/ 87.89 85.61 83.85 78.60
Others 6/ 60.48 69.03 72.88 60.85
II. Contribution (structure of its exports to 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Natural Resources 1/+2/+3/ 27.0 23.1 18.2 17.2
    Agriculture 1/ 14.4 12.0 11.3 11.5
    Energy 2/ 9.3 8.7 4.9 4.1
    Textile fibers, minerals and metal mines 3.3 2.4 2.1 1.6
Manufactures 4/+5/ 71.2 74.5 79.4 80.5
    Based on natural resources 4/ 6.0 4.5 4.7 4.2
    Not based on natural resources 5/ 65.3 70.0 74.8 76.3
Others 6/ 1.7 2.4 2.3 2.3
III. 10 Principal exports to the OECD by a/ b/ 19.3 25.3 25.0 28.0
781 Passenger motor cars * - 5.8 7.7 7.6 7.8
784 Parts and accessories n.e.s. of motor * - 2.9 3.6 3.1 3.6
752 Automatic data processing machines * - 1.3 2.3 2.6 3.0
776 Thermonic, cold cathode and photo- * - 0.8 1.2 1.4 2.2
641 Paper and paperboard - 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.1
541 Medical and pharmaceutical products * + 1.0 1.1 1.4 2.1
759 Parts for automatic data processing * - 0.8 1.5 1.7 1.9
764 Telecommunication equipment, parts * - 1.1 1.4 1.6 1.8
583 Polymerization and copolymerization * - 1.4 1.4 1.7 1.7
792 Aircraft and associated equipment, and + 1.4 1.4 2.2 1.7
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of CANPLUS computer programme.
Groups based on the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC Rev.2).
1/ Sections 0, 1 and 4; divisions 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 29.
2/ Section 3.
3/ Groups 26, 27 and 28.
4/ Divisions 61, 63 and 68; groups 661, 662, 663, 667 and 671.
5/ Sections 5, 6 (minus the divisions and groups mentioned in footnote 4), sections 7 and
8.
6/ Section 9.
a/ (*) Groups corresponding  to the most dynamic ones, 1980-1995.
b/ Groups in which these countries increased (+) or decreased (-) their market share during
1980-1995.
OECD: Australia, Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece,  Holland, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United States, United Kingdom and Yugoslavia.
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TABLE 3
JAPAN: ASPECTS  OF ITS INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS IN OECD
1980 1985 1990 1995
I. Market share 4.86 8.16 7.40 7.05
Natural Resources 1/+2/+3/ 0.18 0.28 0.23 0.23
    Agriculture 1/ 0.41 0.53 0.31 0.24
    Energy 2/ 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.15
    Textile fibers, minerals and metal mines 3/ 0.38 0.58 0.48 0.50
Manufactures 4/+5/ 8.74 12.53 9.99 9.18
    Based on natural resources 4/ 1.68 2.06 1.17 1.01
    Not based on natural resources 5/ 9.54 13.37 10.68 9.75
Others 6/ 1.32 2.22 3.13 2.61
II. Contribution (structure of its exports to
the OECD)
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Natural Resources 1/+2/+3/ 1.7 1.2 0.8 0.7
    Agriculture 1/ 1.2 0.8 0.5 0.4
    Energy 2/ 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2
    Textile fibers, minerals and metal mines 3/ 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1
Manufactures 4/+5/ 97.8 98.2 98.2 98.3
    Based on natural resources 4/ 1.9 1.2 0.8 0.7
    Not based on natural resources 5/ 95.9 97.0 97.4 97.6
Others 6/ 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.0
III. 10 Principal exports by contribution a/ b/ 41.0 51.2 55.6 58.1
781 Passenger motor cars * - 22.1 22.1 20.7 17.0
752 Automatic data processing machines
and units thereof
* + 0.7 3.7 6.6 7.9
776 Thermionic, cold cathode and photo-
cathode valves and tubes
* + 1.7 2.8 3.9 7.1
784  Parts and accessories n.e.s. of motor
vehicles
* + 2.8 2.9 4.5 5.3
764 Telecommunication equipment, parts
and accessories
* - 4.2 5.3 6.6 5.1
759 Parts for automatic data processing
eqpt. and office machinery
* + 0.8 2.7 3.7 4.6
778 Electrical machinery and apparatus,
n.e.s.
* + 1.6 2.0 2.8 3.6
713 Internal combustion * + 1.1 1.6 2.3 3.5
772 Electrical apparatus for making and
breaking electrical circuits
* + 0.9 1.0 1.5 2.0
763 Sound and video equipment - 5.0 6.9 3.0 1.8
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of the CANPLUS computer programme.
Groups based on the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC Rev.2).
1/ Sections 0, 1 and 4; divisions 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 29.
2/ Section 3.
3/ Groups 26, 27 and 28.
4/ Divisions 61, 63 and 68; groups 661, 662, 663, 667 and 671.
5/ Sections 5, 6 (minus the divisions and groups mentioned in footonote 4), 7 and 8.
6/ Section 9.
a/ Groups corresponding (*) to the most dynamic ones, 1980-1995
    b/ Groups in which Japan increased (+) or decreased (-) its market share during 1980-1995.
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Table 4
DEVELOPING ASIA:  ASPECTS OF ITS INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS
IN OECD
1980 1985 1990 1995
I. Market share 7.51 9.44 10.74 13.62
Natural Resources 1/+2/+3/ 7.71 9.04 8.60 9.16
    Agriculture 1/ 10.18 10.15 9.85 11.10
    Energy 2/ 6.43 8.46 7.23 6.49
    Textile fibers, minerals and metal mines 3/ 6.97 7.55 8.25 8.95
Manufactures 4/+5/ 7.43 9.84 11.65 15.31
    Based on natural resources 4/ 7.90 8.69 9.24 11.42
    Not based on natural resources 5/ 7.38 9.93 11.83 15.57
Others 6/ 5.23 4.74 5.31 5.21
II. Contribution (structure of its exports to the
OECD)
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Natural Resources 1/+2/+3/ 44.8 32.2 19.9 15.3
    Agriculture 1/ 19.5 14.1 11.1 9.9
    Energy 2/ 22.0 15.8 7.0 4.1
    Textile fibers, minerals and metal mines 3/ 3.4 2.3 1.9 1.2
Manufactures 4/+5/ 53.9 66.6 78.9 83.6
    Based on natural resources 4/ 5.9 4.4 4.5 3.9
    Not based on natural resources 5/ 48.0 62.2 74.4 79.7
Others 6/ 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1
III. 10 principal exports by contribution a/ b/ 20.0 28.1 34.8 41.0
752 Automatic data processing machines and
units thereof
* + 0.1 1.5 5.2 8.0
776 Thermionic, cold cathode and photo-
cathode valves and tubes
* + 3.4 4.3 4.3 7.3
759 Parts for automatic data processing eqpt.
and office machinery
* + 0.3 1.8 1.9 4.3
894 Games, sporting goods, toys and baby
carriage
* + 2.5 3.3 4.1 4.0
843 Outer garments, women's, girls and
infants', of textile fabric
* + 3.3 4.1 4.3 3.6
845 Outer garments, knitted or crocheted * + 2.5 3.5 4.0 3.4
851 Footwear + 2.6 3.5 3.9 3.4
764 Telecommunication equipment, parts and
accessories
* + 1.3 2.2 2.6 3.2
762 Radio-broadcast receivers + 1.9 1.6 2.1 2.0
842 Outer garments, men's and boys', of
textile fabrics
* + 2.1 2.2 2.3 1.9
 Source: ECLAC, on the basis of the CANPLUS computer programme.
 Groups based on the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC Rev. 22
 Groups based on the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC Rev.2).
   1/ Sections 0, 1 and 4; divisions 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 29.
   2/ Section 3
3/ Groups 26, 27 and 28
4/ Divisions 61, 63 and 68; groups 661, 662, 663, 667 and 671
5/ Sections 5 and 6 (minus the divisions and groups mentioned in 4/), sections 7 and 8
6/ Section 9
a/ Groups which correspond to the 50 most dynamic ones, 1980-1995.
 Developing Asia includes the Republic of Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan (Province of




THE FOUR ASIAN TIGERS: ASPECTS OF THEIR INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS
IN OECD
1980 1985 1990 1995
I. Market share 3.48 5.30 5.76 5.84
Natural Resources 1/+2/+3/ 1.04 1.48 1.58 1.56
    Agriculture 1/ 1.88 2.38 2.31 2.04
    Energy 2/ 0.67 1.01 0.97 0.87
    Textile fibers, minerals and metal mines 3/ 0.67 0.80 1.14 1.39
Manufactures 4/+5/ 5.40 7.39 7.25 7.16
    Based on natural resources 4/ 2.52 2.64 2.36 1.81
    Not based on natural resources 5/ 5.73 7.77 7.63 7.53
Others 6/ 4.22 3.33 3.64 3.25
II. Contribution (structure of its exports to the
OECD)
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Natural Resources 1/+2/+3/ 13.1 9.4 6.8 5.8
    Agriculture 1/ 7.4 5.6 4.6 4.2
    Energy 2/ 4.9 3.4 1.8 1.2
    Textile fibers, minerals and metal mines 3/ 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.5
Manufactures 4/+5/ 84.6 89.0 91.6 92.6
    Based on natural resources 4/ 4.0 2.4 2.1 1.5
    Not based on natural resources 5/ 80.6 86.7 89.5 91.1
Others 6/ 2.3 1.5 1.5 1.5
III. 10  Principal exports by contribution a/ b/ 23.9 31.4 37.2 50.8
752 Automatic data processing machines and
units thereof
* + 0.1 2.7 9.0 14.0
776 Thermionic, cold cathode and photo-cathode
valves and tubes
* + 3.8 3.9 5.0 11.3
759 Parts, n.e.s. for use solely of groups 751 or
752
* + 0.7 3.1 3.1 8.0
845 Outer garments knitted or crocheted * - 4.8 5.1 4.7 3.5
764 Telecommunication equipment, parts and
accessories
* + 2.5 3.6 3.6 3.4
778 Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.s. * + 1.1 1.6 1.7 2.5
894 Games, sporting goods, toys and baby
carriages
* - 5.1 5.2 4.0 2.4
843 Outer garments, women's, girls' and
infants', of textile fabrics
* - 5.1 5.0 3.8 2.3
781 Passenger vehicles * + 0.0 0.5 1.2 1.9
772 Electrical apparatus for making and breaking
electrical circuits
* + 0.5 0.8 1.2 1.5
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of the CANPLUS computer programme.
Groups based on the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC Rev.2).
1/ Sections 0, 1 and 4; divisions 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 29.
2/ Section 3.
3/ Groups 26, 27 and 28
4/ Divisions 61, 63 and 68; groups 661, 662, 663, 667 and 671
5/ Sections 5, 6 (minus the divisions and groups mentioned in footnote 4), 7 and 8.
6/ Section 9.
a/ (*) Groups corresponding  to the most dynamic ones, 1980-1995.
b/ Groups in which these countries increased (+) or decreased (-) their market share during
1980-1995




THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH-EAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN): ASPECTS OF ITS
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS IN OECD
1980 1985 1990 1995
I. Market share 287. 2.54 2.51 3.58
Natural Resources 1/+2/+3/ 5.34 5.39 4.84 4.99
    Agriculture 1/ 6.55 5.71 5.37 5.66
    Energy 2/ 4.97 5.68 4.74 4.37
    Textile fibers, minerals and metal
mines 3/
3.20 2.10 2.64 3.35
Manufactures 4/+5/ 0.96 1.10 1.76 3.24
    Based on natural resources 4/ 3.40 3.31 3.48 4.03
    Not based on natural resources 5/ 0.68 0.93 1.62 3.19
Others 6/ 0.72 0.75 1.08 1.65
II. Contribution (structure of its exports
to the OECD)
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Natural Resources 1/+2/+3/ 81.4 71.5 48.0 30.3
    Agriculture 1/ 32.8 29.5 25.9 19.0
    Energy 2/ 44.5 39.6 19.6 9.5
    Textile fibers, minerals and metal
mines 3/
4.0 2.4 2.5 1.8
Manufactures 4/+5/ 18.2 27.8 51.0 68.4
    Based on natural resources 4/ 6.6 6.2 7.3 5.5
    Not based on natural resources 5/ 11.6 21.6 43.7 62.9
Others 6/ 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.3
III. 10 Principal exports by contribution a/ b/ 53.4 51.9 39.1 42.2
776 Thermionic and similar semi-
conductor devices
* + 4.4 8.0 6.7 9.5
752 Automatic data processing
machines and units
* - 0.0 0.1 1.6 6.3
341 Gas, natural and manufactured + 5.7 13.0 7.9 4.4
764 Telecommunications equipment,
parts and accessories
* + 0.2 0.4 1.9 3.6
333  Petroleum oils, crude, also from
bituminous minerals
+ 35.0 22.5 8.8 3.5
036 Crustaceans and mollusks * - 1.4 1.8 3.4 3.2
762 Radio-broadcast receivers + 0.2 0.5 2.0 3.1
232 Natural rubber latex,  natural rubber
and similar natural gums
+ 6.3 5.2 3.6 3.0
851 Footwear + 0.3 0.3 2.1 2.8
763 Sound and video equipment + 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.7
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of the CANPLUS computer programme.
Groups based on the Standard International Trade Classification (CUCI Rev.2).
1/ Sections 0, 1 and 4; divisions 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 29.
2/ Section 3.
3/ Groups 26, 27 and 28
4/ Divisions 61, 63 and 68; groups 661, 662, 663, 667 and 671
5/ Sections 5 and 6 (minus the divisions and groups mentioned in 4/), sections 7 and 8
6/ Section 9
a/ Groups which correspond to the 50 most dynamic ones, 1980-1995.
b/ Groups in which these countries increased (+) or decreased (-) their market share during
1980-1995.
ASEAN includes Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines,  Singapore and Thailand.
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Table 7
CHINA: ASPECTS OF ITS INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS IN OECD
1980 1985 1990 1995
I. Market share 0.67 1.03 1.85 3.66
Natural Resources 1/+2/+3/ 0.89 1.47 1.60 1.87
    Agriculture 1/ 0.94 1.30 1.62 2.18
    Energy 2/ 0.76 1.43 1.35 1.18
    Textile fibers, minerals and metal mines 3/ 1.60 2.58 2.54 2.72
Manufactures 4/+5/ 0.52 0.81 1.98 4.29
    Based on natural resources 4/ 0.43 0.38 0.86 2.32
    Not based on natural resources 5/ 0.53 0.84 2.07 4.42
Others 6/ 0.18 0.50 0.46 0.67
II. Contribution (structure of its exports to
the OECD)
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Natural Resources 1/+2/+3/ 57.6 48.4 21.5 11.1
    Agriculture 1/ 20.0 16.6 10.6 7.2
    Energy 2/ 29.0 24.6 7.6 2.5
    Textile fibers, minerals and metal mines 3/ 8.6 7.2 3.3 1.4
Manufactures 4/+5/ 41.9 50.4 77.9 88.4
    Based on natural resources 4/ 3.5 1.8 2.4 3.1
    Not based on natural resources 5/ 38.4 48.7 75.5 85.3
Others 6/ 0.5 1.2 0.6 0.5
III. 10 Principal exports by contribution a/ b/ 10.2 20.0 42.5 45.4
894 Games, sporting goods, toys and baby
carriages
* + 0.4 2.7 9.2 9.6
851 Footwear * + 1.2 1.3 5.2 7.5
843 Outer garments, women's, girls' and
infants', of textile fabric
* + 2.1 4.9 6.8 5.9
845 Outer garments, knitted or crocheted * + 1.3 3.0 4.9 4.6
831 Travel goods, shopping bags, handbags,
etc.
* + 0.3 1.6 3.8 3.8
842 Outer garments, men's and boys', of
textile fabrics
* + 2.1 3.3 3.9 3.4
764 Telecommunication equipment, parts
and accessories
* + 0.0 0.1 1.5 2.9
762 Radio-broadcast receivers + 0.0 0.3 2.7 2.6
899 Other miscellaneous manufactured
articles, n.e.s.
* + 2.7 2.4 3.0 2.6
893 Articles of materials of the kind
described in division 58
* + 0.1 0.3 1.4 2.4
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of the CANPLUS computer programme.
Groups based on the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC Rev.2).
1/ Sections 0, 1 and 4; divisions 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 29.
2/ Section 3.
3/ Groups 26, 27 and 28.
4/ Divisions 61, 63 and 68; groups 661, 662, 663, 667 and 671.
5/ Sections 5 and 6 (minus the divisions and groups mentioned in 4/), sections 7 and 8.
6/ Section 9
a/ Groups which correspond to the (*) 50 most dynamic ones, 1980-1995.
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Table 8
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN : ASPECTS OF ITS INTERNATIONAL
COMPETITIVENESS IN OECD
1980 1985 1990 1995
I. Market share 5.30 5.70 4.54 4.97
Natural Resources 1/+2/+3/ 9.37 11.46 9.89 10.30
    Agriculture 1/ 12.28 13.29 10.53 10.81
    Energy 2/ 6.98 9.72 8.43 8.62
    Textile fibers, minerals and metal mines 3/ 14.73 13.91 12.89 13.93
Manufactures 4/+5/ 2.07 2.68 2.72 3.44
    Based on natural resources 4/ 7.22 7.95 7.57 7.24
    Not based on natural resources 5/ 1.48 2.25 2.34 3.18
Others 6/ 4.30 5.30 4.44 4.89
II. Contribution (structure of its exports to the
OECD)
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Natural Resources 1/+2/+3/ 77.2 67.7 54.1 45.0
    Agriculture 1/ 33.3 30.6 28.0 26.2
    Energy 2/ 33.8 30.2 19.2 13.5
    Textile fibers, minerals and metal mines 3/ 10.1 7.0 6.9 5.4
Manufactures 4/+5/ 21.3 30.0 43.5 52.3
    Based on natural resources 4/ 7.6 6.6 8.7 7.1
    Not based on natural resources 5/ 13.7 23.4 34.8 45.1
Others 6/ 1.5 2.3 2.4 2.7
III. 10 principal exports by contribution a/ b/ 55.7 51.2 40.8 36.9
333 Petroleum oils, crude, and crude oils from
bituminous minerals
+ 23.4 21.2 13.4 10.4
071 Coffee and coffee substitutes - 11.0 9.5 4.9 4.1
057 Fruit and nuts, fresh or dried + 3.0 3.4 4.6 4.1
781 Passenger vehicles * + 0.2 0.4 2.3 3.9
081 Animals feed + 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.5
334 Petroleum products, refined - 9.3 8.2 5.1 2.4
784 Parts and accessories n.e.s. of motor
vehicles
* + 0.6 1.2 1.9 2.2
773 Equipment for distributing electricity * + 0.3 0.8 1.6 2.2
287 Ores and concentrates of base metals + 4.0 2.3 2.5 2.2
931 Special transactions and commodities not
classified by kind
* - 1.0 1.2 1.7 2.1
Source:  ECLAC,  on the basis of the CANPLUS computer programme.
Groups based on the Standard International Trade Classification (CUCI Rev.2).
1/ Sections 0, 1 and 4; divisions 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 29.
2/ Section 3.
3/ Groups 26, 27 and 28
4/ Divisions 61, 63 and 68; groups 661, 662, 663, 667 and 671
5/ Sections 5, 6 (minus the divisions and groups mentioned in footnote 4), sections 7 and 8.
6/ Section 9
a/ (*) Groups which correspond to the  50 most dynamic ones, 1980-1995.
b/ Groups in which these countries increased (+) or decreased (-) their market share during
1980-1995.
       LATIN AMERICA: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica. Ecuador
       Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico,
       Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela.
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Table 9
LATIN AMERICAN INTEGRATION ASSOCIATION (LAIA): ASPECTS OF ITS
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS IN OECD
1980 1985 1990 1995
I.  Market share 4.41 5.01 4.02 4.39
Natural resources 1/+2/+3/ 7.64 9.94 8.62 8.95
    Agriculture 1/ 9.28 10.58 8.66 8.85
     Energy 2/ 6.20 9.19 8.08 8.39
     Textiles fibers, minerals, etc. 3/ 11.34 11.69 10.80 11.90
Manufactures 4/+5/ 1.87 2.43 2.45 3.08
     Based on natural resources 4/ 6.71 7.41 7.10 6.81
     Not based on natural resources 5/ 1.32 2.03 2.09 2.82
Other 6/ 3.02 4.37 3.85 4.28
II. Contribution (structure of its exports) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Natural resources 1/+2/+3/ 75.6 66.8 53.3 44.4
    Agriculture 1/ 30.2 27.7 26.0 24.3
     Energy 2/ 36.1 32.4 20.8 14.9
     Textiles fibers, minerals, etc. 3/ 9.3 6.7 6.5 5.2
Manufactures 4/+5/ 23.1 31.1 44.4 52.9
     Based on natural resources 4/ 8.5 7.0 9.2 7.6
     Not based on natural resources 5/ 14.6 24.0 35.1 45.3
Other 6/ 1.3 2.1 2.3 2.7
III. 10 principal exports by contribution a/ b/ 55.0 52.8 42.6 37.8
333 Petroleum oils, crude, and crude oils from
bituminous minerals
+ 25.6 22.8 14.5 11.5
781 Passenger vehicles * + 0.2 0.5 2.6 4.4
071 Coffee and coffee substitutes - 9.8 8.3 4.2 4.1
057 Fruit and nuts, fresh or dried + 1.9 2.3 3.4 3.0
081 Animal feed + 3.4 3.2 3.3 2.8
334 Petroleum products, refined - 9.2 8.8 5.5 2.6
784 Parts and accessories n.e.s. of motor
vehicles
* + 0.7 1.4 2.1 2.5
773 Equipment for distributing electricity * + 0.3 0.9 1.8 2.5
682 Copper - 3.2 2.2 3.2 2.2
713 Internal combustion piston engines and parts * + 0.7 2.4 2.1 2.2
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of CANPLUS computer programme.
Groups based on the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC Rev.2)
1/ Sections 0, 1 and 4; divisions 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 29.
2/ Section 3.
3/ Divisions 26, 27 and 28.
4/ Divisions 61, 63 and 68; groups 661, 662, 663, 667 and 671.
5/ Sections 5, 6 (minus the divisions and groups mentioned in footnote 4), 7 and 8.
6/ Section 9.
  a/ (*) Groups corresponding  to the 50 most dynamic ones, 1980-1995.
b/ Groups in  which  these countries increased (+) or decreased  (-) their market share during
1980-1995. LAIA includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico,
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela
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Table 10
CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: ASPECTS OF ITS
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS IN THE OECD
1980 1985 1990 1995
I. Market share 0.88 0.69 0.52 0.58
Natural resources 1/+2/+3/ 1.72 1.52 1.26 1.35
    Agriculture 1/ 3.00 2.71 1.87 1.96
    Energy 2/ 0.77 0.53 0.36 0.23
    Textile fibers, minerals, etc. 3/ 3.39 2.22 2.09 2.02
Manufactures 4/+5/ 0.20 0.24 0.26 0.36
   Based on natural resources 4/ 0.51 0.54 0.47 0.43
   Not based on natural resources 5/ 0.16 0.22 0.25 0.36
Others 6/ 1.28 0.93 0.59 0.61
II. Contribution (structure of its exports) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Natural resources 1/+2/+3/ 85.1 74.3 60.3 50.1
    Agriculture 1/ 48.7 51.5 43.5 40.3
    Energy 2/ 22.5 13.6 7.1 3.1
    Textile fibers, minerals, etc. 3/ 13.9 9.2 9.7 6.6
Manufactures 4/+5/ 12.2 22.3 36.9 47.1
   Based on natural resources 4/ 3.2 3.7 4.8 3.6
   Not based on natural resources 5/ 9.0 18.6 32.2 43.4
Others 6/ 2.7 3.3 2.7 2.9
III. 10 principal exports by contribution a/ b/ 53.1 54.4 57.5 64.4
057 Fruit and nuts, fresh or dried - 8.9 11.9 14.2 12.4
071 Coffee and coffee substitutes - 16.9 18.5 10.0 11.0
846 Under garments, knitted or crocheted * + 1.0 1.8 4.0 8.5
842 Outer garments, men's and boys' * + 0.3 1.3 4.0 6.3
287 Ores and concentrates of base metals - 11.2 7.0 8.7 6.3
843 Outer garments, women's, girl's and infants' of
textile fabrics.
 * + 0.7 1.9 4.2 5.6
845 Outer garments and accessories, knitted or
crocheted
* + 0.1 0.4 2.6 4.2
061 Sugar and honey - 10.9 7.3 5.7 4.1
844 Under garments, of textile fabrics * + 0.3 0.7 1.3 3.2
036 Crustaceans and mollusks, fresh, whether in shell
or not
* - 2.9 3.6 2.8 2.9
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of CANPLUS computer programme.
Groups based on the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC Rev.2).
1/ Section 0, 1 and 4; divisions 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 29.
2/ Section 3.
3/ Divisions 26, 27 and 28.
4/ Divisions, 61, 63 and 68; groups 661, 662, 663, 667 and 671.
5/ Divisions 5, 6 (minus the divisions and groups mentioned  in footnote 4), 7 and 8.
6/ Section 9.
a/ (*) Groups which correspond to the 50 most dynamic ones, 1980-95.
b/ Groups in  which  these countries increased (+) or decreased  (-) their market share during
1980-1995. Central America and the Caribbean includes Barbados, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican
Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti,  Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama,
Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago.
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Table 11
MEXICO: ASPECTS OF ITS INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS IN OECD
1980 1985 1990 1995
I. Market share 1.26 1.77 1.50 2.09
Natural resources 1/+2/+3/ 1.94 3.06 2.03 1.96
    Agriculture 1/ 1.13 1.30 1.27 1.38
    Energy 2/ 2.47 4.55 3.05 2.92
    Textile fibers, minerals, etc. 3/ 1.40 1.87 1.44 1.66
Manufactures 4/+5/ 0.71 1.09 1.29 2.10
   Based on natural resources 4/ 1.24 1.25 0.98 1.07
   Not based on natural resources 5/ 0.65 1.08 1.31 2.17
Other 6/ 1.49 1.63 2.45 2.80
II. Contribution (structure of its exports) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Natural resources 1/+2/+3/ 67.2 58.2 33.6 20.4
    Agriculture 1/ 12.9 9.6 10.2 8.0
    Energy 2/ 50.3 45.6 21.1 10.9
    Textile fibers, minerals, etc. 3/ 4.0 3.0 2.3 1.5
Manufactures 4/+5/ 30.6 39.5 62.4 75.9
   Based on natural resources 4/ 5.5 3.4 3.4 2.5
   Not based on natural resources 5/ 25.1 36.1 59.0 73.4
Other 6/ 2.2 2.3 3.9 3.7
III. 10 Principals exports by contribution a/ b/ 58.6 61.6 52.4 48.7
333 Petroleum oils, crude, and crude oils
from bituminous min.
+ 46.1 42.0 19.9 10.2
781 Passenger motor cars * + 0.3 0.9 6.0 9.0
773 Equipment for distributing electricity * + 1.1 2.5 4.6 5.2
784 Parts and accessories n.e.s. of motor
vehicles
* + 1.3 2.6 4.3 4.3
761 Television receivers * + 0.0 0.5 2.5 3.8
764 Telecommunications equipment, parts
and accessories
* - 4.6 3.4 3.1 3.8
713 Internal combustion piston engines and
parts thereof
* + 0.6 4.6 3.6 3.6
931 Special transactions and commodities
not classified by kind
* + 2.2 2.2 3.6 3.5
772 Electrical apparatus for
making/breaking electrical circuits
* + 1.3 1.6 2.6 2.9
778 Electrical machinery and apparatus,
n.e.s.
* + 1.2 1.4 2.2 2.3
Source:  ECLAC, on the basis CANPLUS computer programme.
Groups based on the Standard International Trade Classification SITC Rev.2)
1/ Section 0, 1 and 4; divisions 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 29.
2/ Section 3.
3/ Divisions 26, 27 and 28.
4. Divisions, 61, 63 and 68; groups 661, 662, 663, 667 and 671.
5/ Divisions 5 and 6 (minus the divisions and groups mentioned  in 4), 7 and 8.
6/ Section 9.
a/ Groups which correspond (*) to the 50 most dynamic ones, 1980-95.
   b/ Groups in which Mexico increased (+)  or decreased (-) its market share during 1980-1995.
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Table 12
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: ASPECTS OF ITS INTERNATIONAL
COMPETITIVENESS IN OECD
1980 1985 1990 1995
I. Market share 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.12
Natural resources 1/+2/+3/ 0.11 0.12 0.08 0.08
    Agriculture 1/ 0.33 0.31 0.16 0.15
    Energy 2/ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
    Textile fibers, minerals, etc. 3/ 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.01
Manufactures 4/+5/ 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.13
   Based on natural resources 4/ 0.20 0.22 0.28 0.29
   Not based on natural resources 5/ 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.12
Others 6/ 0.37 0.47 0.22 0.15
II. Contribution (structure of its exports) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Natural resources 1/+2/+3/ 62.3 44.8 22.0 15.0
    Agriculture 1/ 59.4 44.6 21.6 14.7
    Energy 2/ 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1
    Textile fibers, minerals, etc. 3/ 2.7 0.2 0.4 0.2
Manufactures 4/+5/ 28.8 41.9 71.9 81.6
   Based on natural resources 4/ 14.1 12.0 16.8 12.1
   Not based on natural resources 5/ 14.7 29.8 55.1 69.5
Others 6/ 8.9 13.3 6.0 3.5
III. 10 Principals exports to for contribution a/ b/ 49.2 47.2 66.3 70.0
842 Outer garments, men's and boys' of
textile fabrics
* + 0.9 4.9 12.0 15.8
846 Under garments, knitted or crocheted * + 3.9 0.8 4.3 11.4
843 Outer garments, women's, girls' and
infants', of textile fabrics
* + 1.8 5.2 9.1 9.8
872 Medical instruments and appliances,
n.e.s.
* + 0.1 0.0 3.8 6.0
612 Leather manufactures, artificial or
regenerated
+ 1.0 3.0 5.7 5.9
845 Outer garments, knitted or crocheted * + 0.6 0.8 4.3 5.1
671 Refined metal (nickel) - 12.2 7.7 10.0 5.0
772 Electrical apparatus for making and
breaking electrical circuits
* + 0.6 1.1 3.5 3.7
061 Sugar and honey - 28.0 16.0 6.4 3.6
897 Jewelry, goldsmiths' and silversmiths'
ware
* + 0.1 0.0 3.8 3.5
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of the CANPLUS computer programme.
Groups based on the Standard International Trade Classification (CUCI Rev.2)
1/ Section 0, 1 and 4; divisions 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 29.
2/ Section 3.
3/ Divisions 26, 27 and 28.
4. Divisions, 61, 63 and 68; groups 661, 662, 663, 667 and 671.
5/ Divisions 5, 6 (minus the divisions and groups mentioned  in footnote 4), 7 and 8.
6/ Section 9.
a/ (*) Groups which correspond to the 50 most dynamic ones, 1980-95.
           b/ Groups in which Dominican Republic increased (+)  or decreased  (-) its market share during
           1980-1995.
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Table 13
COSTA RICA: ASPECTS OF ITS INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS IN OECD
1980 1985 1990 1995
I. Market share 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09
Natural Resources 1/+2/+3/ 0.14 0.17 0.20 0.25
    Agriculture 1/ 0.42 0.44 0.42 0.44
    Energy 2/ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
    Textile fibers, minerals and metal mines 3/ 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
Manufactures 4/+5/ 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
    Based on natural resources 4/ 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
    Not based on natural resources 5/ 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05
Others 6/ 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03





Natural Resources 1/+2/+3/ 91.2 81.0 66.6 60.4
    Agriculture 1/ 90.9 80.3 66.5 60.3
    Energy 2/ 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0
    Textile fibers, minerals and metal mines 3/ 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.1
Manufactures 4/+5/ 8.0 18.4 32.5 38.5
    Based on natural resources 4/ 0.9 0.9 1.4 1.1
    Not based on natural resources 5/ 7.1 17.6 31.1 37.4
Others 6/ 0.8 0.6 0.9 1.1
III. 10  Principal exports by contribution a/ b/ 78.2 77.8 79.4 78.1
057 Fruit and nuts, fresh or dried + 39.2 35.7 37.0 33.6
071 Coffee and coffee substitutes + 32.3 27.5 14.7 12.5
846 Under garments, knitted or crocheted * + 2.8 3.2 6.3 8.3
842 Outer garments, men’s and boy’s, of textile
fabrics
* + 0.3 2.3 6.1 7.5
292 Crude vegetable materials + 1.3 2.9 4.6 4.7
844 Under garments, of textile fabrics * + 0.0 1.3 1.8 2.9
845 Outer garment, knitted or crocheted * + 0.2 0.3 2.0 2.6
843 Outer garments, women's, girls' and infants',
of textile fabrics
* + 1.4 3.4 4.3 2.3
058 Fruit, preserved, and fruit preparation + 0.3 0.5 1.4 1.9
054 Vegetables, fresh, chilled, frozen or preserved + 0.5 0.7 1.2 1.8
Source: Source: ECLAC, on the basis of the CANPLUS computer programme.
Groups based on the Standard International Trade Classification (CUCI Rev.2).
1/ Sections 0, 1 and 4; divisions 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 29.
2/ Section 3.
3/ Groups 26, 27 and 28.
4/ Divisions 61, 63 and 68; groups 661, 662, 663, 667 and 671.
5/ Sections 5 and 6 (minus the divisions and groups mentioned in footnote4/), 7 and 8.
6/ Section 9.
a/ (*) Groups which correspond to the  50 most dynamic ones, 1980-1995.




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: ITS SHARE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE OF
THE MOST DYNAMIC INDUSTRIES, 1980 AND 1995
1980 1995 Variation
I. COMPUTERS 1.72 1.30 0.42
  Mexico 0.55 1.21  0.66
 Other countries 1.18 0.09 -1.09
II. ELECTRIC MACHINERY &
EQUIPMENT
3.68 4.82  1.14
 Mexico 3.05 4.55 1.50
 Dominican Republic 0.03 0.07 0.04
 Costa Rica 0.02 0.04  0.02
Other countries 0.60 0.18 -0.42
III. CLOTHING 2.22 6.56 4.34
Mexico 0.79 1.95 1.16
Dominican Republic 0.29 1.35 1.06
Honduras 0.04 0.59 0.55
Guatemala - 0.47 0.47
Costa Rica 0.15 0.55 0.40
Jamaica 0.04 0.42 0.38
Other countries 0.91 1.23 0.32
IV.  CHEMICALS AND
PHARMACEUTICAL
0.54 0.74 0.20
Mexico 0.16 0.43 0.27
Brazil 0.19 0.20 0.01
Other  countries 0.19 0.11 -0.18
V. AUTOMOBILE 1.09 3.49 2.40
Mexico 0.43 3.08 2.65
Venezuela 0.01 0.03 0.02
Other countries 0.66 0.38 -0.28
VI.  NON-ELECTRIC MACHINERY 0.63 2.22 1.59
Mexico 0.39 1.63 1.24
 Brazil 0.14 0.52 0.38
Others 0.10 0.07 -0.03
VII.  16 OTHER INDUSTRIAL GROUPS 3.44 3.86 0.42
Mexico 1.36 1.93 0.57
Brazil 0.35 0.71 0.36
Ecuador 0.10 0.19 0.09
Dominican Republic 0.07 0.14 0.07
Costa Rica 0.02 0.05 0.03
Bolivia 0.00 0.03 0.03
Peru 0.03 0.06 0.03
Other countries 1.51 0.75 -0.76
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of the CANPLUS computer programme.
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Table 15
ADAPTABILITY INDEX OF THE THREE EXCEPTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA
AND THE CARIBBEAN, 1980 AND 1995
Market Share Export Structure
Dominican Republic
   1980 0.35 0.31
   1995 1.46 4.35
Percent change 316.2 1304.9
Mexico
   1980 0.51  0.45
   1995 1.35 4.01
Percent change 164.3 792.1
Costa Rica
   1980   0.15   0.13
   1995   0.33   0.97
Percent change 120.8 645.2
    Source: ECLAC, on the basis of the CAN PLUS computer programme.
